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ABSTRACT 
Transformation in Knowledge: The Aristotelian Concepts ef Actualiry and 
Potentialtry and the Cartesian Method 
In tlus thesis, I will discuss the Anstotelian concepts of actuality and potentiality in 
combination with the Cartesian method. On the one hand this will be done as an attempt to 
balance the traditional English language interpretation of the relationship between Anstotelian 
and Cartesian philosophy, which tends to characterise them as fundamentally opposed. On 
the other hand, it will be done in order to generate legitimate unexplored conceptual 
frameworks for viewing the work of both philosophers. There is an assumption central to the 
greater part of English language scholarship on Descartes, attaining almost the status of self-
evidence, that within the philosophical canon, the appearance of the Cartesian method marks a 
definitive break between the ancient and the modern. Descartes signal achievement, on this 
assumption, was that he found a way once and for all, to break philosophy free from the 
shackles of Aristotelian thought. Such an idea is based upon the notion that, after Aristotle 
and prior to Descartes, philosophy consisted of little more than the endless repetition, or 
subtle modification of a hybrid Christian/ Anstotelian doctrine. The subsequent trajectory of 
English language philosophy appears to attest to the validity of such a Vlew, and its apparent 
self-evidence from the perspective of this tradition serves to cover over other legitimate 
approaches to interpretation and use of Aristotelian and Cartesian concepts. In this thesis, 
rather than performing a comparison of the philosophy of Aristotle and Descartes, the 
Aristotelian concepts of actuality and potentiality and the Cartesian method will be considered 
ID light of a smgle task, namely, an attempt to theorise transformations in fundamental 
structures of knowledge. This will be accomplished by identifying latent possibilities suitable 
for such a task within Aristotelian and Cartesian conceptual structures, and extending them 
accordingly. As such, this thesis must be understood as a speculative work rather than as a 
work in history of philosophy. 
Aristotle demonstrates the meaning and function of the concepts of actuality and potentiality 
by way of analogy. This form of demonstration leaves the meaning of actuality and 
potentiality open to further extension by analogy. As such, the concepts of actuality and 
potentiality can be extended to cases not originally brought under these concepts by Aristotle. 
In this thesis the concepts of actuality and potentiality will be extended, according to the 
structure of the analogy by which Aristotle originally defines them, to an explanation of 
transformation in structures of knowledge. At the same time, the Cartesian method will be 
interpreted as a detailed account of a particular transformation from one structure of 
knowledge to another. Whilst Descartes characterises his own project in terms of the 
attainment of certainty, I intend to show that Descartes' stated intention in the creation of his 
method is less significant in terms of his overall system that the transformation that this intent 
brings about. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In the study of history of philosophy two broad approaches are prevalent. One is represented 
by scholars who enter deeply into the work of a smgle phtlosopher or a small group of related 
philosophers, attemptmg to lay out in detail the minute internal characteristics of their works. 
The goal of such exegetical work is the ever more accurate rendition into modern 
philosophical language of archaic philosophical works, achieved through a combination of 
scrupulous philological work and empathy.1 The second approach is characterised by its focus 
on the development of individual concepts or sets of concepts. This 'developmental' approach 
can be divided into two further groups according to whether the development under 
consideration 1s that of philosophy as such 2 or of a given concept or set of concepts. 3 
Regarding this latter approach, one rmght choose to follow the concept of 'knowledge' from 
Plato through to Descartes, noting continuities and differences of form and function along the 
way. In this case one would be required to trace this concept across several translations, using 
1 Recent examples being Charlotte Witt, Ways of Being : Potentiality and Actualzty in Aristotle's 
Metaphysics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003). and John J. Cleary, Aristotle on the Many Senses 
of Priority (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Umversity Press, 1988). In this thesis make significant use of 
these kinds of work. Of particular note are the several papers and books by George Blair, Stephen Menn 
and Daniel Graham on Aristotle's concepts of actuality and potentiality. Each of these authors is notable 
for their attention to detail and for their uncommonly sophisticated application of empathy and intellectual 
vigilance. 
2 E.g., Anthony Kenny, A New History of Western Philosophy, 4 vols. (Oxford: Oxford Umversity Press, 
2006)., Anthony Kenny, A Brzef History of Western Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1998) 
pg. 201., Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1996). 
3 E.g., Marjorie Greene, The Knower and the Known (New York: Basic Books, 1966).; Etienne Gilson, 
Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952).; Etienne Gilson, 
The Unity of Philosophical Experience (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1999). In each of these cases a 
particular concept is followed through the works of a range of philosophers. In these examples, these 
concepts are 'knowledge', 'being' and 'experience'. 
7 
etymological and other philological connections as a guide, ensuring at each step that one was 
in fact still considering the 'same' concept.4 A problem arises when, between one text and 
another, an apparently unified concept comes to take on a fundamentally different function. It 
would, for example, be a mistake to consider the concept of the divine in Aristotle and the 
concept of God in Spinoza to be instances of the same concept, at differing stages of 
transformation, when the greater mass of textual evidence suggests their (the concept of the 
'divine' and the concept of 'God) relative systemic functions to be radically dissimilar. One 
may indeed find precursors to Spinoza's concept of God in Aristotelian thought, but there is 
no obvious reason to direct the search for these precursors on the basis of etymology. In such 
a case, one might reconsider linguistic similarity or connection as a valid marker for the 
continuity of a concept, and attempt to find another indicator for this continuity. The 
question of conceptual discontinuity is of particular significance in this thesis because it is in 
part an attempt to demonstrate a continuity in the function of the Aristotelian concepts of 
actuality and potentiality (enet;geia and dunamis) that diverges from the continuity of the related 
terminology. The concepts of actuality and potentiality may be traced etymologically and 
genetically from Aristotle's texts through to the present day. It is a contention of this thesis 
that, with the Cartesian method, a functional continuity with the Aristotelian concepts of 
actuality and potentiality can be found, and that this continuity is entirely separate from the 
history of the concepts that have remained attached to the termmology. Neither of the 
aforementioned approaches to history of philosophy will be appropriate to the task of tracing 
such a continuity, as it will be shown to be found m the function, rather than any overt 
characterisation, of the Cartesian method. 
4 This unity manifests in different ways. In the case of the works of Etienne Gilson, for example, unity is 
provided by utilising the work of Thomas Aquinas as a touchstone. In a similar manner, Bertrand Russell's 
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Rather than being unified around a philosopher, or a concept, the integration of the 
Aristotelian concepts of actuality and potentlality and the Cartesian method in this thesis will 
be made by turrung both Aristotelian and Cartesian texts to a common task; namely, the 
construction of an account of the transformation of structures of knowledge. Further, the 
account of this transformation will be utilised to demonstrate the fundamental instability of 
'first philosophy'; understood as a broadly Aristotelian-Cartesian amalgam. As such, this thesis 
cannot be considered a work in history of philosophy according to the standard forms such a 
work might take. Rather than taking the history of philosophy as a subject matter for analysis, 
history of philosophy will be utilised as material for extension and recombmation. In this 
regard, it 1s more appropriately considered alongside several of the earlier works of Gilles 
Deleuze5, in which canorucal authors are brought to bear on questions or problems that they 
may never have overtly considered. In Empiricism and Suijecti'vify6, for instance, 'subjectivity' is 
approached through Hume, not as an overt topic m Burne's wnting, but as an underlying 
question, or structure, orgarusing his work. Deleuze's goal in this case is not to provide an 
accurate account of authorial intent, but rather to develop an account of an enabling 
conceptual formation, of some concept or structural tendency that can be brought to light in 
interpretation, and which 1s presupposed, perhaps unconsciously on the part of the author, by 
the structure of the text being interpreted. As such, Deleuze's approach to history of 
philosophy has been characterised by David Neil 7 in terms of a benevolent use of 
anachrorusm. Deleuze's work on 'history of philosophy' may perhaps legitlmately be said to 
History of Western Philosophy is unified by Russell's own theoretical perspective. The difference between 
the two, however, is that while Gilson is clear about his investments, Russell is not. 
5 In particular, Gilles Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature, 
trans. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia Umvers1ty Press, 1991). and Gilles Deleuze, 
Expressionism zn Philosophy: Spznoza, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1992) .. 
6 Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature. 
7 David Neil, 'The Uses of Anachronism: Deleuze's History of the Subject', Philosophy Today, 4214 (1998), 
418-31. 
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be intentionally anachronistic insofar as he tends to ask questions through the work of 
canonical philosophers that appear different from those questions through which the work 
was initially constructed. Neil describes this in more Deleuzian terms. He claims that in 
Deleuze's work in 'history of philosophy', "particular concepts are being raised on another 
plane: a plane other than that one on which they were originally constructed."8 In producing 
'anachronistic' texts on canorucal philosophers, Deleuze is not simply 'playing around'. 
Rather, he is responding strategically to the factual situation in which he understands an 
interpreter necessarily finds themself. This 'factual situation' is such that the text itself is not 
the proper object of interpretation - a purely textual analysis, if possible, would remain on the 
level of 'grammar'. But nor is the intended meaning of the author the factual object of textual 
interpretation, as this would negate the 'plane' or 'horizon' within which the interpretation 
takes place. Rather, the object of textual interpretation is a formation created between the 
mterpreter and the text, as a kind of hybrid. Deleuze's approach, which is quite baldly 
pragmatic, is an attempt to put mterpretation to useful work, to make use of the factual 
situation within which interpretation begins. 'Useful work', for Deleuze, primarily mvolves the 
construction of useful concepts. This approach itself is consistent with Deleuze's own 
theorizing on the nature of concepts. In a short paper that provides a rough formulation of 
his own thought on the function of concepts, Deleuze writes, 
A phtlosoplucal concept fulfils several functlons, ill fields of thought wluch are themselves defined by illstde 
variables. There also are outside variables (states of things, moments in history), ill a complex relation with the 
inside variables and the functlons. This means that a concept does not die at will, but illsofar as new functlons in 
8 Neil, 'The Uses of Anachronism: Deleuze's History of the Subject', pg. 426. 
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the field discharge 1t. This is also why 1t 1s never very illteresnng to cnticise a concept: 1t 1s better to build the new 
functions and discover the new fields which make it useless or inadequate.9 
This passage also neatly descnbes Deleuze's own relationship with Hegelian thought, which 
looms particularly large in Deleuze's history thanks to one of his own teachers, Jean Hippolyte. 
Although Deleuze is often considered 'anti-Hegelian', and has described ms early relationship 
with Hegelian thought in negative terms, he d1d not in fact write any critical works on Hegel's 
philosophy. However, much of his work, and in particular Difference and Repetition, can be read 
as an attempt to create concepts suited to the task of displacing the Hegelian dialectic. On this 
point, Daniel Smith writes, 
[IJhe Deleuze-Hegel relation needs to be assessed less ill terms of Deleuze's explicit comments 'agamst' Hegel 
than ill terms of the alternate conception of dialectics he develops through his oeuvre: a dialectic ill which an 
affirmative conception of the 'problematic' 1s substituted for the 'labour of the negative', and a principle of 
difference 1s substituted for the movement of opposition or contradiction.10 
Although this thesis does not maintain a wholly Deleuzian theoretical perspective 11 , the 
interpretation of Aristotelian and Cartesian material presented here is comparable to Deleuze's 
relationship with history of philosophy in two ways. Firstly, the object of the interpretation, in 
the first instance being the idea of the 'transformation of knowledge', is from the outset 
understood as a hybrid formed between text and interpretation. However, in the case of this 
thesis the hybnd is triple; i.e. Aristotle-Descartes-interpreter. Secondly, it is intended to 
demonstrate a way of thinking about Aristotle and Descartes that sidesteps their standard 
incorporation into the canon. Of course, Deleuze's relationship with the philosophical canon 
9 Gilles Deleuze, 'A Philosophical Concept ... ', Topaz, 7 (1988), 111-12 pg. 111. 
10 Daniel W. Smith, 'Deleuze, Hegel and the Post-Kantian Tradition', Philosophy Today, 44/Suppl. (2000), 
119-31 pg. 128. 
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situated him quite differently. From several of his comments it seems that he perhaps 
understood certain conceptual arrangements, deriving from Kant, Hegel and Heidegger, as so 
thoroughly saturating theory in France at the time he started writing, that a tacit engagement 
Wlth these philosophers would be unavoidable. Indeed, perhaps, this tacit understanding was 
for him both unavoidable and undesirable. In Dialogues Deleuze notes that, 
At the liberation we were still strangely stuck ill the lustory of philosophy. We slmply plunged illto Hege~ Husser! 
and Heidegger; we threw ourselves like puppies illto a scholasric1sm worse than that of the rmddle ages.12 
and 
The lustory of philosophy has always been the agent of power ill philosophy, and even ill thought. It played the 
repressor's role: how can you thmk without havmg read Plato, Descartes, Kant and Heidegger, and so-and-so's 
book about them?13 
It is clear at least that Deleuze sought to move away from the canon as he received it, but this 
by no means meant that he rejected the thought of canorucal thinkers. Instead he engaged 
with different questions, utilising the available material in different ways, making use of this 
material to play a different game. Rather than engaging with 'history of philosophy' in an 
attempt to reconstruct 'appropriate questions', ala hermeneutics, he saw the interaction 
between a text and the possibility of, in hermeneutical terms, 'entering the horizon of the 
question', as an opportunity to enter into differing forms of relationship Wlth a text. 
Nonetheless, Deleuze takes his inspiration for this systematic divergence from the canonical 
authors themselves. On the criticism of philosophical works he writes, 
11 Although there are some significant commonalities; one in particular being the focus onfunction as being 
of primary value when interpreting conceptual arrangements. 
12 Gilles Deleuze, Dialogues/Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, trans. Barbara Habberjam (London: 
Athlone Press, 1987) pg. 12. 
13 Deleuze, Dialogues/Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet pg. 13. 
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In truth only one kmd of objecnon 1s worthwhtle: the objecnon whtch shows that the quesnon raised by a 
philosopher 1s not a good question, that 1t does not force the nature of things enough, that it should be raised in 
another way, that we should rruse 1t in a better way, or that we should raise a different quesnon. It 1s m exactly this 
way that a great philosopher critiases another. for example ... this is how Kant cntiases Hume.14 
In this thesis the object of criticism is not a philosopher or work as such, but rather a tacit 
agreement in the literature regarding the proper place of two canonical philosophers. As such 
this thesis grows out of assessment of this 'tacit agreement' that 1t 'does not force the nature of 
things enough'. Thus, 1t 1s indirectly written against the orthodox conception, of the relevance 
and value of Aristotelian and Cartesian thought, to philosophy and to thought in general. 
There is an assumption central to the greater part of English language scholarship on 
Descartes, attaining almost the status of self-evidence, that Wlthin the philosophical canon, the 
appearance of the Cartesian method marks a definitive break between the ancient and the 
modern. Descartes signal achievement, on this assumption, was that he found a way, once and 
for all, to break philosophy free from the shackles of Aristotelian thought. Such an idea is 
based upon the notion that, after Aristotle and prior to Descartes, philosophy consisted of 
little more than the endless repetition, or subtle modification of a hybrid Christian/ Aristotelian 
doctrine. Anthony Kenny, for example, writes that, 
More than any other phtlosopher, Descartes stands out as a solitary ongmal gemus, creating from hts own head a 
system of thought to dommate hts intellectual world.15 
and 
14 Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature pg. 105. 
15 Kenny, A Brief History of Western Philosophy pg. 201. 
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The seventeenth century, unhke the sixteenth century, was fertile ill the production of phtlosophers of geruus. 
The man who is often conSidered the father of modern phtlosophy is Rene Descartes.16 
and 
Descartes was a standard-bearer for the rebellion against Anstotle. In metaphysics he rejected the notions of 
potenttal.tty and actual.tty, and m phtlosophical psychology he substituted consoousness for rauonal.tty as the mark 
of the mental.17 
As such the Western philosophical canon, for better or worse, is often understood in terms of 
two progenitors; with Aristotle as the father of Western systematic philosophy, and Descartes 
as the father of modern philosophy. The canon is thus divided, by the revolutionary insight of 
the Cartesian method, into a before and an after. This division contributes to a situation in 
wruch the few scholars writing on both Aristotle and Descartes tend, by default, to approach 
the relattonship between the two thinkers in terms of a battle between incommensurable 
systems18; ignoring continmties in favour of the all too obvious discontinuity. Kenny, for 
example, writes, 
If you wanted to put Descartes' main ideas on the back of a postcard you would need JUSt two sentences: man is a 
thmkmg mmd; matter is extension in motion. Everything, in Descartes system, is to be explamed ill terms of this 
dualism of mind and matter. Indeed, we owe to Descartes that we thmk of mmd and matter as the two great, 
mutually exclusive and mutually exhaustive, divisions of the universe we inhabit.19 
16 Anthony Kenny, The Rise of Modern Philosophy, 4 vols. (A New History of Western Philosophy, 3; 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) pg. 33. 
17 Kenny, The Rise of Modern Philosophy pg. xiii. One of the tasks of this thesis is in fact to demonstrate 
the continuing function of actuality and potentiality in Descartes thought. One ought also to note, and this 
will be given attention in the body of the thesis, that the Aristotelian and Cartesian notions of 'thought' are 
more similar than they are different. 
18 Quite literally on occasion; an example being Charles H Kahn, 'Anstotle Versus Descartes on the 
Concept of the Mental', in Ricardo Salles (ed.), Metaphysics, Soul, and Ethics in Ancient Thought: Themes 
from the Work of Richard Sorabji (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), 193-208. 
19 Kenny, A Brief History of Western Philosophy pg. 191. 
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Kenny's perspective on Descartes is not incorrect, but it is seriously reductive. Much in the 
Cartesian system aside from the resultant substance dualism is of equal or greater significance. 
Further, Descartes philosophical legacy is significantly greater ill scope than Kenny appears to 
suggest. What Kenny describes is rather the sillgular trajectory of post-Cartesian thought that 
has led to his own illterest in Anglo-analytic philosophy of mind. There are other strands of 
post-Cartesian evolution that are significant, yet show little regard for substance dualism20 • 
Kenny's Anglo-analytic perspective should be understood as an illterpretive prejudice, but in 
the most generous possible sense. To say that Kenny holds this 'prejudice' is simply to take 
note of the fact that his own engagement with philosophy has served to enable him to draw 
certain forms of historical connections between ideas and philosophers, and to render other 
connections unlikely.21 However, and this has been one of the fundamental difficulties (and 
also one of the mo11vations) for the construction of this thesis, the 'prejudice' that Kenny 
demonstrates has attained near-complete orthodoxy in English language philosophy, and in 
parncular ill philosophical pedagogy. As such, historical interpretation arising from this 
tradition tends to take on the appearance of self-evidence. This is most sigmficant with regard 
to the division of the canon mentioned above - which rmght be considered one of the most 
fundamental of English-language philosophy orthodoxies. Of course, such a division is not 
'incorrect', so long as it is understood as a division based upon the projection of certain 
historical interests, understood according to par11cular structures of knowledge, back onto the 
20 The phenomenological tradition being a case in point. 
21 On this sense of 'prejudice' Hans-Georg Gadamer writes, "The overcoming of all prejudices, this global 
demand of the Enlightenment, will itself prove to be a prejudice, and removing it opens the way to an 
appropriate understanding of the finitude which dominates not only our humanity but also our historical 
consciousness. Does being situated within traditions really mean being subject to prejudices and hmited in 
one's freedom? Is not, rather, all human existence, even the freest, hmited and qualified in various ways? 
If this is true, the idea of an absolute reason is not a possibility for historical humanity. Reason exists for us 
only in concrete, historical terms - i.e., it is not its own master but remains constantly dependant on the 
given circumstances m which it operates." Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method trans. Wemsheimer 
and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum, 2004) pg. 276. 
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canon. The few scholars who seem inclined towards considering the continuity of Aristotelian 
and Cartesian thought directly, tend to do so either as a direct critique of Descartes22 (i.e. he 
failed to break properly with Aristotle), or as minor qualifications of what they otherwise 
consider to be his success making such a break.23 
As noted, the integration of the Aristotle and Descartes material will be made by directing 
both toward an account of transformation in structures of knowledge, with a view to a more 
general interpretation of 'first philosophy'. It has already been noted that according to the 
nature of such a project it will require a sigruficantly speculative approach. To begin with, 
neither Aristotle nor Descartes write of knowledge as something capable of 'transformation', 
and each would be hostile to any notion of possible transformation in knowledge of 'first 
philosophy'. Aristotle does utilise knowledge as an index of the transformation of a 'learner' 
into a 'knower' and uses this example on several occasions throughout lus works to aid lus 
clarification of the concepts of actuality and potentiality. In doing this, Aristotle takes the 
person who possesses the knowledge as the subject of the transformation, rather than the 
knowledge itself. It would in fact not make sense for Aristotle to take 'knowledge' as a subject 
for transformation. As he does not take 'knowledge' as a being, and the concepts of actuality 
and potentiality are devised specifically to articulate changes in or transformations of beings, it 
would be inconsistent for Aristotle to make knowledge the subject of such a transformation. 
Nonetheless, it is one of the contentions of this thesis that the greater conceptual apparatus of 
actuality-potentiality, understood in terms of its function within the Aristotelian system, can be 
22 E.g. Oswald Hanfling, 'Can There Be a Method of Doubt?', Philosophy: The Journal of the Royal 
Institute of Philosophy, 59 (1984), 505-11.; Richard H. Schlagel, 'The Waning of the Light: The Eclipse of 
Philosophy', Review of Metaphysics, 57/1 (2003), 105-33. 
23 An exception is Etienne Gilson, particularly in his The Unity of Philosophical Experience. The approach 
here, however, is very broad. This is a remarkable book but, as indicated by the title, Gilson is more 
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consistently extended in this direction. Similarly, Descartes' overt definition of knowledge as 
necessarily true appears to directly contradict the possibility of a 'transformation' of 
knowledge. Nonetheless it is a contention of this thesis that the uses to which Descartes puts 
the concept of knowledge (and also particular instances of knowledge), and the relationship it 
holds with mdubitability and certainty belie this apparent contradiction. Although the terms 
'actuality' and 'potentiality' continue to tlus day to function in ordinary language, to reference a 
distinction between something like 'logical possibility' and concrete existence, their original use 
was to indicate a structure that explamed the 'coming-to-be' of entities in such a way as to 
avoid their 'coming-to-be' from nothing. Aristotle thus used actuality and potentiality as a 
means to sidestep the problem structure set up by Parmerudes. However, this wasn't achieved 
simply in virtue of his devising a pair of concepts. The integration of these concepts into 
Aristotle's thinking occurred at a foundational level, profoundly affecting the function and 
status of other concepts central to his thought. The concepts of actuality and potentiality have 
a determinate function in Aristotle's thinking, but this function 1s not isolated; it cannot be 
captured srmply by describing the meaning of actuality and potentiality. The Aristotelian 
concepts of actuality and potentiality interact fundamentally with Aristotle's conceptualisation 
of the categories, with his four causes, with the concepts of continuity, infinity and number, 
and with his hylomorphic physics. This set of concepts formed a particular kind of structure 
smted to a set of tasks related to the problem of 'commg to be', or of 'change' in its broadest 
sense. It is ill terms of this larger structure formed around the concepts of actuality and 
potentiality, and their function within that structure, that actuality and potentiality can be 
recognised as a pattern of function that might be discovered within another system - in the 
case of this thesis, in the Cartesian method and as part of the Cartesian system as a whole. 
interested in demonstrating the unity of all plulosophical expenence and, given his own predilections, 
17 
There is precedent, in Aristotle's own use of the concepts of actuality and potentiahty, for an 
expansion of their scope by means of analogy. From the outset Aristotle develops the 
mearung of these concepts through their application to a range of concrete problems. Their 
meaning is developed by the analogy formed according to the range of these uses. Indeed 
·Aristotle makes the direct claim that actuality and potentiality can on!J be demonstrated 
analogically. As a result, the complete set of possible applications for the pair of concepts 
remains open, allowing for the possibility of their extension by analogy to cases beyond those 
considered by Aristotle. 
In this thesis, the concepts of actuality and potentiality, and the Cartesian method, will be 
brought into proximity according to the opportunity afforded by the openness of the 
analogical structure Aristotle produces in his attempts to define actuality and potentiality. 
Functioning as they do ID Aristotle's work to provide a theoretical framework for considering 
the 'movement' from not-x to x, actuality and potentiality will be extended by analogy to a 
consideration of the 'movement' or transformation from one structure of knowledge to 
another. The idea of such a transformation of knowledge will be rendered more concrete, 
from the perspective of the knower as such, through consideration of the process and function 
of the Cartesian method. Whatever the motivation for Descartes' construction of his method, 
whether it be the achievement of a 'certain' foundation of the sciences, turning the faithless to 
faith, as an answer to the scepticism of his time, or some other more covert motivation, what 
he ultimately produced was a singular description of a transformation of one particular 
structure of knowledge into another. This transformation was described ostensibly from a 
perspective mternal to thought, that is, 'subjectively'. Whilst acknowledging Descartes' 
profound contribution to philosophy with regard to the 'internal' aspect of thought, it is not 
unifying the idea of such experience into a form broadly compatible with the thought of Thomas Aquinas. 
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necessary that one only consider this 'internal' aspect when considering the 'transformation' of 
knowledge that Descartes describes. The structure of this change can also be considered in 
abstraction as a transformation or 'movement'24 from one state to another, where each 'state' is 
understood as the totality of concepts functioning, in thought, to determine the world as being 
one way or another. It is this transformation, from one 'state' of knowledge to another, that 
will be considered in terms of Aristotle's concepts of actuality and potentiality. 
This thesis is constructed neither as an attempt to establish an author's intent behind the text, 
nor as a critique of the authors or of the concepts associated Wlth their names. Rather, it 1s an 
attempt to think about the work of two canonical philosophers in a useful way - to think 
about them in terms of the unity of interpretive possibility born in part from their presence in 
the philosophical canon. That is, it is an attempt to take account of the co-existence of 
Aristotelian and Cartesian patterns of thinking in the inherited philosophical tradition, and to 
work from the perspective of this simultaneity rather than the traditionally imagined disuruty 
of the Cartesian and Aristotelian systems. Traditional interpretations of Aristotle's and 
Descartes' work, at least in English language publications, tend to oppose them either 
1mplicitly or explicitly, along several axes. Rather than beginning from the perspective of such 
a division, this thesis begins from the perspective of the unity of the problem or question 
through which they are to be viewed - a question the idea of which is arguably derived in part 
from the interplay of sets of ideas usually associated Wlth these two philosophers. The 'text' 
that is central to this thesis is less Aristotelian or Cartesian and more a facet of inherited 
tradition. It is an engagement with an aspect of philosophical pedagogy insofar as this has 
shaped certain possible engagements with and between Aristotle and Descartes and closed off 
24 The term 'movement' is appropnate as, when considering the problem of coming-to-be, both Plato and 
Aristotle formulated this problem in terms of the movement (kinesis) from not-being to bemg. 
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others. It is not an engagement in the sense of a direct critique, but rather in the sense that this 
thesis is created largely for the sake of articulating another possibility, not so much to displace 
altogether, but to displace the necessity of, the 'tacit agreement' on the functional and 
historical relevance of Anstotelian and Cartesian thought. 
Nonetheless, the Aristotelian and Cartesian texts are not considered merely as tools m the 
service of an indirectly related argument. There would be little sense in turning to historical 
texts if one was unwilling to submit to the limitations and potentialities that this would entail. 
However, it must be remembered that, although the authors in question were writing two 
millennia apart, they are always received and understood within one human lifetime. One does 
not carry the differences in the historical development of the knife and the fork to the dinner 
table. Similarly when one begins to think, for example, in terms of actuality, potentiality and 
the thinking subject, one does not carry the idea of their relative development. Rather, one 
thinks according to the potential of the situation within which one thinks. The unity of the 
projection that originates in this situation must nonetheless be shaped by the detail of the texts 
under interpretation. In all, the aim is to provide an alternate - but more to the point useful -
account of several Aristotelian and Cartesian conceptual structures, unified around a single 
question. In service of this aim, in chapter two I will focus upon the development and 
function of the concepts of actuality and potentiality (energeia and dunamis) within Aristotle's 
thought. I will begin with a broad discussion of origin, structure and function of the concepts 
and will finish by suggesting a possible direction for the extension of the concepts of actuality 
and potentiality to consideration of transformations in structures of knowledge. In the 
application of Aristotelian notions of actuality and potentiality to transformations in structures 
of knowledge, cues will be taken from the sorts of analogies through which actuality and 
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potentiality are demonstrated in various Aristotelian texts. The material is extended beyond its 
Aristotelian application, but in directions already left open by the text. Similarly m chapter 
three, in expanding the notion of pros hen structure as a form of non-generic unity, every 
attempt has been made to remam within the confines of the analogies by which Aristotle 
demonstrates such a structure. Aristotle utilises this structure at several points in various 
works to create a unity that is not formed by subsummg the several terms under a genus. In 
particular he suggests m Metapf?yszcs iv that the study of being qua being is organised accordmg 
to a pros hen structure. I will suggest that pros hen structure can be understood as a latent 
possibility, withm the Aristotelian system, for theorising the fme detail of transformations in 
structures of knowledge. Further, I will argue that the pros hen structure of Aristotelian first 
philosophy (prote philosophza) allows it to be integrated mto the greater causal milieu, and that 
this integration opens up the possibility of a fundamental transformation of the subject matter 
of first philosophy. This chapter will form a bridge between the interpretation of Aristotle's 
uses of the actuality and potentiality concepts, as given in chapter two, and the examination of 
the Cartesian method in chapter four. In chapter four, the Cartesian method will be 
considered as an account of the movement from one knowledge-state to another, by way of 
the at least notional mclusion of a 'phenomenal' element. It will be argued that this 
phenomenal element is fundamentally disconnected from the greater Cartesian theory about 
the structure of thought, and that the two are nonetheless conflated in his method. This will 
be argued with a view to a demonstration of the possibility for fundamental creative reordering 
that resides within the structure of first philosophy. In chapters two and three, material 
pertaming to Aristotelian actuality and potentiality is discussed in anticipation of the 
engagement with Cartesian method. Similarly, in chapters four and five, the Cartesian material 
is discussed with the Aristotelian material still in mind. In fact, it should be understood that 
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the Aristotelian and the Cartesian material is read together. The Aristotle component turns the 
eye towards matters of transformation, whilst the Descartes material turns this eye for 
transformation towards transformations of structures of knowledge and associated 
phenomena. Through chapters four and five, Cartesian method is first characterised in term 
of modifications of structures of knowledge more generally; and then finally it is considered 
more specifically in terms of the modifications enacted within the Cartesian system. 
The greater purpose of these particular analyses will be to demonstrate, from various angles, 
the possibility for creative reordering mherent within any totalising system. The Cartesian and 
Aristotelian material will be used as evidence for this claim. Whilst the Aristotelian and 
Cartesian systems have formed a blueprint for a wide array of totalising metaphysical systems, 
Aristotelian and Cartesian first philosophy, taken together, do not exhaust either their 
possibility or their existence in fact. As such, the larger argument of this thesis, even if 
successful, should be understood as provisional upon further study. 
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Chapter 2 
ACTUALITY-POTENTIALITY 
1. Introduction 
In 1960, Herbert Spiegelberg responded to Martin Heidegger's oft quoted claim that, 'the 
essence (Wesen) of human being hes in its existence', with the following: 'One might well 
wonder whether this is not an overstatement, since even possibility presupposes at least some 
actuahsation at its base'25 . The absolute certainty with which Spiegelberg appears to use the 
concept of 'actualizatlon' is striking - particularly in the context of fundamental ontology. 
How is it that such a retort as lus can be made - that the priority of actuality, or 'actualisation', 
can be so evident, so certain, and so fundamental? Further, how is one to understand which 
historical derivation of 'actuality' is in fact meant, particularly as Heidegger himself had 
philosophical roots in the works of both Aquinas and Anstotle? Of course, 1t is also a case 
here perhaps of a mundane mismterpretation on the part of Herbert Sp1egelberg. Heidegger 
was not involved in a minor squabble over the relative values of a pair of essential 
philosophical terms, but was rather mvolved in an exploration of that place in which such 
concepts come to be. Nonetheless, Sp1egelberg's comment has real value, as it demonstrates a 
great difficulty that is inherent in any discussion of actuahty-potentiahty; these concepts are so 
thoroughly built into the structure of philosophical thinkmg that they can be taken as purified 
phenomena. They can assume, even in a critical context, a privileged place within the 
25 Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introductwn, 2 vols. (l; The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960) pg. 327. 
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philosophical milieu. Even as they are critically evaluated, it is only with respect to the other 
half of the dyad, and then only with respect to their relative value.26 In any case, Spiegelberg's 
use or misuse of the actuality-potentiality dyad is not among the topics of this chapter. It is 
mentioned only to highltght the inherent complication of actuality-potentially and to draw 
attention to the ease with which one can run astray 1f one fails to use these concepts with the 
greatest care. The subject matter of this chapter is Anstotelian actuality-potentiality in its 
development, function and possibility. The first two of these require substantial direct 
engagement with Aristotle's (and to a lesser extent Plato's) texts, whilst the latter is necessarily 
'projective'. In order to project latent possibilities of Aristotelian actuality-potentiality one 
must move beyond attempts to 'save' Aristotle, or the provision of lists of Aristotelian 
concepts. One must try, however impossible, to think in an Aristotelian way. To this end the 
objects of investigation will be, in the first mstance, the situation that necessitated the 
development of actuality-potentiality, and in the second, its function27 • An assessment of 
26 Several assumptions are contained within Spiegelberg's short statement. Firstly, the identity of existence 
and possibility is supposed; secondly, existence-possibility are assumed to operate, against actualisation, as 
one half of a dichotomy; thirdly, that 'actualisation' is the prior term, the 'foundation' of possibility. Taken 
together, these suppositions place Spiegelberg's comment within quite a specific stage of the development 
of the concept dyad, actuality-potentiality. The clues are several. The use of 'possibility' rather than the 
broader 'potentiality' suggests, at least, that the sense of potential/possible-actual that Spiegelberg is 
referencing is something other than Aristotelian. 'Actual-possible' relates to Aristotelian 'actual-potential' 
in a way analogous to that between species and genus. The first pair does not suggest the ontological sense 
of the actuality-potentiality dyad. Spiegelberg' s supposing a relation of identity between existence and 
possibility suggests similarly. 'Existence' and 'being' had not been separated from one another as concepts 
until long after Aristotle. Etienne Gilson in his Being and Some Philosophers, argues that that which came 
to be called 'existence' could not be encountered as a problem before the idea of divine creat10n had 
occasioned its necessity; that only after A vicenna had existence come to refer to a separate concept. In 
Aristotle actuality-potentiality serves to explain continuity and stasis in their mutual possibility. By the 
time of A vicenna, this explanation is no longer necessary, as the most basic ontological functions have 
been taken over by God. As such, actuality-potentiality comes to take on the reduced meaning of 'that 
which is' (the actual) and 'that which could be' (the possible). The possible retains its connection to the 
actual by means of the concept of essence. The 'actual' refers to a 'possible' essence that has its existence 
superadded by God. 
27 A central and fundamental mterest in the function of concepts, rather than their historical denvation or 
the latent meanings of the terms used to indicate them, is another point of similarity between the approach 
demonstrated in this thesis and that of Gilles Deleuze. In Negotiations, for example, he makes his (and in 
this case Felix Guattari's) dedication to function quite clear - "We're strict functionalists: what we're 
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function will also include the concrete characteristics of its systemic manifestation, e.g. the 
senses in which actuality and potentiality are prior in turn and together, the modification of 
their apphcability through analogy, and so on. The goal is to understand the conditions under 
which actuality-potentiality becomes a necessary concept, and to explore what is added and 
lost by its appearance, such that it may be recognised as a function rather than merely a name. 
In this way the function of actuahty-potentiality might be recognised in other domains, in this 
case that of the metaphysics of Descartes, where the term 'actuahty-potentially' no longer 
refers to a recognisably related concept. 
2. Actuality and Energeia/Entelecheia 
The relationship between the Greek terms energeta/ entelecheia and the Enghsh word 'actuality', 
which 1s most often used as a translation of these Greek terms in Aristotle's work, is not 
simple. There are several differing accounts of Aristotle's mature actuality-potentiality 
concept. The most common are founded upon a reduction of activity to a special case of 
actuality. Along with this reduction is included a reduction of the sense of potentiality that 
opposes activity, to a special case of that sense which opposes actuality. Some of the 
difficulties surrounding interpretation and subsequent translation of energeia and entelecheia are 
philological in nature. Others are both philological and philosophical, stemming from the 
variety of Aristotle's applications of the two terms and his apparent reticence to giving them 
complete defimtion. The issue of translation and the issue of the function of the terms are 
intertwined; although, of course, one does not completely determine the other. Perhaps the 
most obvious complication is that, whilst there are two Greek terms, they are often replaced by 
one English term. Energeia is for the most part translated as 'actuality' - though, dependent on 
interested in is how something works." Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, 1972-1990, trans. Martm Joughin 
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context, it may be translated as 'activity'. In most translations entelecheza is translated as actuality 
exclusively, though it may also be rendered as 'full-' or 'complete-' reality. Most commentators 
appear to agree that, minimally, the translation of both ene1J!,eia and entelecheia into actuality is 
problematic. Even those who accept that 'actuality' is likely the best option for translating 
these terms tend to expend great amounts of energy modifying its sense to fit the Aristotelian 
context28; suggesting that the translation of these terms into 'actuality' is considered at most a 
'best fit'. This complication is rendered more serious by the fact that both of the Greek terms 
appear to be Aristotelian neologisms. One might wonder why Aristotle would com two new 
terms if one would have sufficed. Indeed, although Aristotle did appear on occasion to use the 
two terms interchangeably29 , on other occasions he clearly contrasts them. Furthermore, 
although in the Metapf?ysics Aristotle eventually reduces the two terms to one (ene1J!,eia), it would 
be reasonable to assume the reduction of two fundamental terms to be of significant 
philosophical import, thus necessitating an independent translation and interpretation of both 
terms.30 If Aristotle made a point of bringing entelecheia under the concept of ene1J!,eza, one ought 
to assume that an understanding of their difference would be necessary, or at least useful, for 
developing an appreciation of the nuances of the final sense of ene1J!,eia. In tlus chapter, the 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) pg. 21. 
28 For example: L.A. Kosman, 'Aristotle's Definition of Motion', Phronesis, 14 (1969), 40-62., L.A. 
Kosman, 'Being Properly Affected: Virtues and Feelings in Aristotle's Ethics', m Rorty & Amelie (ed.), 
Essays on Aristotle's Ethics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 101-16. and Ronald Polansky, 
'Energeia in Aristotle's Metaphysics Ix', Ancient Philosophy, 3 (1983), 160-70. 
29 Indeed Aristotle, in explicating the different senses of 'being' [Metaphysics 1017a35-1018b10 - all 
references to the works of Aristotle are to Aristotle, 'The Complete Works of Aristotle', in Jonathan Barnes 
(ed.), (1 & 2; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1984).] uses the same examples to form an analogical 
'defmit10n' of entelecheia as he used in book ix 6 to outline energeia. 
30 On this matter opimon is divided. George Blair (George A. Blair, 'Unfortunately, It's a Bit More 
Complex: Reflections on Energeza', Ancient Philosophy, 15 (1995), 565-80.) considers it fundamental 
while, for different reasons, Stephen Menn (Stephen Menn, 'Origins of Aristotle's Concept of Energeia: 
Energeia and Dunamis', Ancient Philosophy, 14 (1994), 73-114.) and Daniel Graham (Daniel Graham, 'The 
Development of Aristotle's Concept of Actuality: Comments on a Reconstruct10n by Stephen Menn', 
Ancient Philosophy, 15 (1995), 551-64.) consider it evidence of Aristotle's occasional sloppiness. I tend to 
agree with Blair. Accusing Aristotle of sloppiness m order to render one's interpretation coherent seems 
philosophically lazy. More on this later. 
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final, reduced, sense of energeia will be considered most relevant, as it is the sense developed in 
the context of prote philosophia. Nonetheless, an appreaatlon of the watershed elements flowing 
into mainstem energeia will allow for the formation of a sufficiently nuanced interpretation. 
'Energeid appears in most extant works attributed to Aristotle; from the fragments of the 
Protrepticus, regarded as belonging to one of Aristotle's earliest works31 , to the Metaplqysics, of 
which parts, at least, are considered to represent some of lus later work. However, the precise 
mearung of energeia and its derivatives is not identical across all of its instances. For example, 
on occasion Aristotle will draw a distlnction between energeia and kinesi/2, whilst on others he 
will bring them together33 or use one to aid a definition of the other; in the Protrepticus, energeia 
appears to signify something as prosaic as 'activity' or 'use', defined in opposition to mere 
'possession', whereas in the Metaplqysics, energeia-dunamis reaches such heights of abstraction that 
it is considered one of the four fundamental senses of 'bemg'. Commentators have developed 
differing approaches to dealing with such variety. In a 1956 paper, Chung-Hwan Chen sets 
out a list of ten separate meanings of energeia, dividing them further into two groups of quasi-
modal and non-modal meanings34• Wlulst not being entirely without merit, such a list on its 
own does little to aid m appreciating energeia as a unified concept. At best, assuming its 
accuracy, such a list can serve as data for a more coherent interpretation. Such an 
interpretation would need to account for the possibility of the transformation of energeia 
according to the different stages of Aristotle's career, as well as for the differing uses 
31 And most likely the earliest known use, perhaps along with the Eudemzan Ethics, of the term energeia. 
32 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1173a31-b4, 1174a19-29, 14-16; Physics 201b31-32, 257b 8-9; 
Metaphysics 1066a20-21, 1048b21-30; On the Soul. 417a16-17. 
33 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1065b16. 
34 As quasi-modal is hsted, "l. actuality[,] 2. being actualised[,] or 3. being perfect[,] 4. in application to 
form [,]5. in application to soul[.]" The non-modal senses are given as "l. actualisation[,] 2. in application 
to sensation[,] 3. in application to mtellectual knowledge[,] 4. contemplative activity of human intellect[,] 
5. pure activity[.]" Chung-Hwan Chen, 'Different Meanings of the Term Energeia in the Philosophy of 
Aristotle', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 17 (1956), 56-65 pg. 65. 
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contemporaneous with one another. It would need to account for the particular and the 
abstract, for the final incorporation of entelecheia into enet;geia, and for the relationship between 
each of these iterations with its counterpart, dunamis. To this end, the conversation-m-print 
between George Blair35 and Daniel Graham36, by way of Stephen Menn37, on the topic of the 
etymology and interpretation of enet;geia and entelecheia, will be used as a touchstone for this 
chapter. Each of these three take a broadly 'developmentalist' approach to Aristotle 
scholarship, and as such each projects a temporal axis along which the various Aristotelian 
texts and related concepts might be placed. All three demonstrate an impressive range of 
scholarship on the topic of enet;geia and entelecheza. Nonetheless each, whilst agreeing on many 
major mterpretive points, takes a position that differs quite significantly from the others. 
Daniel Graham's position is on the surface the most conservative of the three. Regarding 
entelecheia, Graham upholds the long dominant etymology that understands entelecheia as being 
derived from the phrase, "(to) enteles echein" (or "have completeness"). As Graham notes, the 
major elements of this account extend back at least to the fifteenth century38• However, the 
proximate source of Graham's etymology of entelecheia is philologist Hermann Diels39, who is 
perhaps the first scholar to make a strong case for the traditional account, rather than just to 
incorporate it as an assumption. Graham recognises the Diels account as one of two 
35 George A Blair, 'The Meaning of Energeia and Entelecheia in Aristotle', International Philosophical 
Quarterly, 7 (1967), 101-17., George A Blair, 'Aristotle on Entelecheia: A Reply to Daniel Graham', 
American Journal of Philology, 114 (1993), 91-97., and Blair, 'Unfortunately, It's a Bit More Complex: 
Reflections on Energeia'. 
36 Daniel Graham, Aristotle's Two Systems (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987)., Daniel Graham, 'The 
Etymology of Entelecheia', American Journal of Philology 110 (1989). and Graham, 'The Development of 
Aristotle's Concept of Actuality: Comments on a Reconstruction by Stephen Menn'. 
37 Graham, 'The Development of Aristotle's Concept of Actuality: Comments on a Reconstruction by 
Stephen Menn'. 
38 As Graham notes, "[t]his analysis was already assumed by the fifteenth-century Venetian humanist and 
Aristotle scholar Ermolao Barbaro, who translated the Greek term into the inelegant but unambiguous 
perfectihabia." Graham, 'The Etymology of Entelecheia', pg. 74. 
39 Hermann Diels, 'Entelecheia Zeitschrift Ftir Vergleichende Sprachforschung', Etymologica, 3 (1916). 
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significant traditions, the other bemg that of Kurt von Fritz40, and accordingly structures his 
polemic as a defence of the Diels account against the von Fritz account. Graham attacks the 
von Fritz account on three fronts. The weakest criticism, that the von Fritz account would 
leave Aristotle creating neologisms in such a manner as to fail to adhere to the rules of 
linguistic formation 41 is positively Procrustean; especially where Aristotle himself appears 
himself to defend an account that fails in this regard. There is every possibility that in forming 
entelecheia Aristotle did a 'bad' job of word construction. With a little effort it is not difficult to 
form a word that 'means' m some way, yet fails to accord with the "strict (if not deterministic) 
rules" of word formation that Graham notes Aristotle falling short of (George Blair gives the 
real example of 'photograph', the meaning of which would be more accurately expressed by 
'photogram'; 'photograph' more accurately referring to the camera 42). Von Fritz derives 
entelecheia from the phrase 'en (heauto) telos echein', meaning 'have an end in itself'. This 
mterpretation has the advantage of cohering with Aristotle's own proto-etymological account 
of the relationship between enezy,eia and entelecheia in Metapf?ysics ix. Here Aristotle explicitly 
connects both enezy,eza and entelecheia with telos, a connection that appears to oppose the Diels 
account: 
For the ergon is the telos, and the energeia 1s the ergon. And so even the word 'energezd 1s derived from 'ergon', and 
'merges toward' [Blair's translation - which 1s more literal] entelecheza.43 
Although it is not entirely clear, Aristotle appears to be suggesting an etymological, as well as a 
conceptual link between ezy,on, enezy,eia and entelecheza. In text prior and subsequent to the above 
4° Kurt Von Fritz, Philosophie Und Sprachlicher Ausdruck Bei Demokrit, Platon Und Aristoteles (New 
York: G.E. Stechert, 1938). 
41 Graham, 'The Development of Aristotle's Concept of Actuality: Comments on a Reconstruction by 
Stephen Menn', pg. 556. 
42 See: Blair, 'Aristotle on Entelecheia: A Reply to Daniel Graham'. 
43 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1050a21-23. 
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quote, Aristotle appears to be using et;g,on and telos to demonstrate sense of enet;g,eia most similar 
to entelecheia, and to distinguish this sense from the earlier sense of enet;g,eia, strongly associated 
with kinesis (i.e. he is attempting to highlight the 'actuality' as opposed to the 'activity' sense of 
enet;g,eia). Graham rescues the Diels account by denying the accuracy of Aristotle's account of 
the origin of his own neologism. Graham writes, 
The ability to coin words m one's own native language 1s a competence based on the mternahsatlon of complex 
transformation rules. But the ability to explam those neologisms depends upon a capacity to reason abstractly 
about a pre-logical sktll.44 
What Graham fails to realise is that Aristotle's conceptual integration of telos into entelecheza, 
whether etymologically correct or not, argues against Graham's founding mterpretlve 
assumption, that regarding the word entelecheia, "we are fortunate to know [ ... ] the 
philosophical concept which it expressed."45 Graham actually modifies the Diels etymology, 
deriving entelecheia from entelos echein, on the grounds that it more truly suggests the state of 
being complete. Graham is thus committed to a philosophical interpretation of entelecheia, in 
spite of his siding with the philologists 'against' the philosophers, who he considers as prone to 
the production of 'folk etymologies' (he divides philosophers and philologists: "A very 
different etymology - one often endorsed by philosophers, though not by philologists, who 
follow Diels - is given by Kurt von Fritz."46). He is able to maintain a purely philological 
concern precisely because, like 'the philologists', he does not see reason to question the 
traditional mterpretation of the meaning of entelecheia. Yet it is its meaning that is primarily 
affected by its proximity to telos, regardless of etymology. But Graham is committed, without 
44 Graham, 'The Etymology of Entelecheia', pg. 77. 
45 Graham, 'The Etymology of Entelecheia', pg. 73. 
46 Graham, 'The Etymology of Entelecheia', pg. 75. 
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argument, axiomaticalfy, to an interpretation of entelecheia that sidelines telos.47 He structures his 
account of the etymology of entelecheia accordingly, ultimately using its results to confirm this 
un-argued assumptlon. By a separate argument Graham writes off the von Fntz account. He 
considers the von Fritz argument 'indefensible' on the grounds that its structure renders the 
'en' of 'en telos echein' tautological: "In order to make the word roots come out with the right 
signification, we must suppose that in the original phrase from which entelecheza is allegedly 
derived, telos is not the object of en, on pam of rendering the verb echein meaningless." 48 
Although he admits a precedent for the compound formed of the first two elements of the 
phrase (i.e. entelos) given that other compounds of en- can be found (he cites enaimos and entheos, 
meaning 'having blood within' and 'having a god withm' respectlvely), he argues that the 
addition of echein merely restates the meaning that would already be implicit in entelos (i.e. 
'having the end within' would become 'having having the end within'. George Blair49, in his 
reply to Graham's paper, notes that the reason for this particular constructlon is deternuned by 
the philosophical role the term takes. According to Blair, the distinction made by entelecheza is 
not so much between having and not having the telos but between having and not having the 
end inside. Thus the en- serves its rudimentary function of indicating internality, given that 
'having' is already indicated by echein. Defending Stephen Menn's account of the etymology of 
entelecheia, Blair writes that "Menn is right in saying that the en means 'inside' and Graham's 
pooh-poohing it is sunply silly. If you 'have a mind', there's nowhere else to have it but inside; 
but if you 'have an end' you may or may not 'have it' within."50 It would seem that Graham, 
having founded ms account on the sidelining of telos, thus failed to consider the interpretive 
47 
"For entelecheia turns out to be a neutral and rather abstract term that does not point to an mcreasing role 
for the telos in Aristotelian metaphysics or science." Graham, 'The Etymology of Entelecheza', pg. 80. 
48Graham, 'The Etymology of Entelecheia', pg. 78. 
49 Blair, 'Unfortunately, It's a Bit More Complex: Reflections on Energeia' 
so Blair, 'Unfortunately, It's a Bit More Complex: Reflections on Energeia', pg. 567. 
31 
possibilities proper to it. In any case, it seems that Graham's critique of the von Fritz 
etymology is not as damning as he assumed and precisely because, in placing philology before 
philosophy, he was not given cause to consider the potentially questionable nature of his 
assumptions regarding the philosophical use of the term under consideration. The von Fritz 
etymology is outside of Graham's purview from the outset, due to its central use of telos. 
On the other hand, the interpretations of entelecheia given by Stephen Menn and George Blair 
demonstrate the divergent possibilities inherent in the von Fritz etymology. Menn's position, 
once deprived of its genetic narrative, is that energeia most properly corresponds to 'activity' and 
entelecheia to 'actuality'; that Aristotle's usage of energeia in the sense of entelecheia in the 
Metaphysics was "somewhat improper: the description of entelecheia as energeia is an analogical 
extension of the term energeia beyond its strict meaning." 51 Menn gives a highly detailed 
description of the development of energeia in Aristotle's work. His account of the conceptual 
origins of energeia in Plato's work52, in particular the Theaetetus and Euthydemus, is undisputed by 
both Graham and Blair and is indeed highly compelling. In fact, Graham chides Menn on this 
matter for stating the obvious (notwithstanding the fact that the alternative sources Graham cites 
for the 'same' narrative are not only obscure, but tend only to make passing reference to 
arguments that are made thematic in Menn's paper53). He finds that the earlier development of 
energeia was such as to develop a concept roughly equivalent to 'activity', and that entelecheia was 
developed out of a different problem situation and is qwte appropriately translated as 
'actuality'. For Menn, entelecheia is well translated by 'actuality' as it specifically opposes the 
51 Graham, 'The Development of Aristotle's Concept of Actuality: Comments on a Reconstruction by 
Stephen Menn', pg. 105. 
52 This will be dealt with further on in this chapter. 
53 Werner Jaeger makes passing reference to the Platonic origin of the energeia concept in Werner J eager, 
'Review of P. Gohlke', Varia Gnomon 4(1928). John Rist makes passing reference to the Jeager article and 
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sense of dunamiS as possibility-for-being (that Menn calls 'existing-in-the-power-of-the-cause'), 
rather than the capacity-for-action sense of dunamis that opposes enetgeia. Thus, the close 
relationship between enetgeia and entelecheia that Aristotle posits, from the Metapf?ysics on, 1s 
rendered quite mysterious. Menn does understand that enet;geia and entelecheia are genetically 
related, each term representing the counterpart to a different sense of dunamis. Whilst allowing 
that the term 'enetgeid was first used by Aristotle, Menn considers its conceptual content to be 
Platonic in nature. On the other hand, he sees entelecheia as a novel concept, an Aristotelian 
innovation. Menn demonstrates his sense of the positive difference between enet;geia and 
entelecheia with reference to De Anima ii.1, where Aristotle describes the nature of the 'soul' 
(psuche) in terms of a distinction between two senses of entelecheia. Aristotle writes: 
Hence the soul must be a substance in the sense of the form of a natural body havrng life potentially withm 1t. But 
substance 1s actuality, and thus soul 1s the actuality of a body as above charactensed. Now the word actuality has 
two senses correspondmg respectively to the possession of knowledge and the actual exerose of knowledge It 1s 
obvious that the soul 1s actuality in the first sense, viz. that of knowledge possessed, for both sleeping and waking 
presuppose the existence of soul, and of these waking corresponds to actual knowmg, sleepmg to knowledge 
possessed but not employed, and, m the history of the mdividual, knowledge comes before its employment or 
exercise. This 1s why the soul 1s the first grade of actuality of a natural body havmg hfe potentially in it.54 
Menn takes it that the division Aristotle is making is between the entelecheia and enetgeia sense of 
psuche. In classifying the soul as 'the first grade of actuality' (entelecheia he prote) Aristotle is not 
suggesting the existence of a 'second entelecheid. Rather he is showmg that this entelecheia can be 
said in two ways, as analogous to the possession and use of knowledge. The acorn, for 
example, is ensouled in the sense that Aristotle understands. It is what it is precisely by being 
the Platonic origin of energeia mentioned therein in John M. Rist, The Mind of Aristotle: A Study in 
Philosophical Growth (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989). 
54 Aristotle, On the Soul 412a20-28. 
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in possession of a certain form of life. However, this life need not yet have been activated in 
the fullest sense in order to be considered entelecheia; the sense analogous to the use of 
knowledge. The structure is complex. What Menn proposes is that the first sense, the 
'possession' sense, is the one most appropriately understood as entelecheza and that the 'use' 
sense IDdicates the energeia ef the entelecheia. Both senses thus technically can be considered 
entelecheia, and not as two kinds, but rather as two senses of the one. Entelecheia primarily 
indicates the 'weak' sense of 'ensouled', as it is the minimal condition according to which a 
body can be said to be ensouled as such. On the other hand, the energeia is to be understood as 
the full expression of this entelecheia. As, according to Menn, entelecheia is opposed to the sense 
of dunamis as 'existing-in-the-power-of-the-cause', it is to be positively understood as referring 
to the state in which an entity can be said to be freed from its causal origms qua what-it-is. 
Menn writes, ''When Aristotle says in De Anima ii 1 that the soul is the entelecheia of the body 
having life dunamei, he means that the state of possessing soul is the state of having been 
generated from the appropriate active and passive powers."55 The dunameis relating to the 
entelecheza that is the soul refer precisely to those 'active and passive powers'. 'Existing-in-the-
power-of-the-cause' allows for the coming-fa-be of an entity such that its 'movement' from 
not-being to being is not from absolute not-being. Rather, the not-being from which it comes 
to be is simply its privation. The origin of an Anstotehan entity is in fact entirely positive on 
this account, as it already 'existed' in the power of the cause - though only as an entelecheia does 
this power become an agent of a certain kind, as a player in the causal milieu of a certain kind 
with certain active and passive powers. Daniel Graham questions Menn's interpretation of 
entelecheia by suggesting that it may confuct with Aristotle's definition of kineszs (motion, 
change, process) in Pf?yszcs iii 1, as "the entelecheia of what exists potentially, in so far as it exists 
55 Menn, 'Origins of Aristotle's Concept of Energeia: Energeia and Dunamis', pg. 104-05. 
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potentially."56 Graham points out that although some scholars like to understand the use of 
entelecheza rather than energeia in this passage as indicating Aristotle's choosing to emphasise the 
'product' aspect of the kinesis (i.e. the effect arising out of a causal milieu) over the 'process' 
aspect for reasons of demonstrative efficacy57, this interpretation requires a 'weak' sense of 
product. He argues that Menn "seems to require the actual physical result of a creative process 
in which matter is given a new form."58 Graham suggests that Mary Gill's identification of 
entelecheia with 'state'59 is more appropriate. However, it seems that Graham, in correctly 
identifying Menn's notion of entelecheia with 'product', has failed to note the subtlety with which 
Menn draws this notion; Menn's understanding of entelecheza is not in conflict with, and is in 
fact far broader than, the notion of a 'state'. In full, Aristotle's definition of motion in P01sics ill 
1 runs as follows: 
The enteleche1a ef what exzsts potentiaf!y, in so far as zt exzsts potenttal!J, zs kmes1s - namely, of what is alterable qua 
alterable, alteration: of what can be mcreased and its opposite what can be decreased (there is no common name), 
increase and decreasl!'. of what can come to be and can pass away, coming to be and passing awqy: of what can be earned 
along, /ocomotion.60 
In the case of each of these, the dunamis related to the entelecheia can be considered as 'existing-
in-the-power-of-the-cause'. The confusion is that the 'powers' in which the products exist are 
largely passive. For example, the alterable has the power to be altered, the moveable the 
power to be moved. There is no reason, under Menn's interpretation, that entelecheia cannot be 
extended to kinesis. It does require, however, understanding that 'power' as a concept extends 
equally to passion as to action. It also reqwres an appreciation that 'product' is only 
56 Aristotle, Physics 201al0-l l. 
57 i.e. avoiding defming one sense of 'process' (kinesis) in terms of another (energeia). 
58 Graham, 'The Development of Aristotle's Concept of Actuality: Comments on a Reconstruction by 
Stephen Menn', pg. 558. 
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interpretable as an 'actual physical result', if it is a product under the category of ousia 
(substance). Under any other category, a 'product' will necessarily differ in kind. Menn writes: 
We can best mterpret Aristotle's analogy between kmesis and ousza if we recogruse that kzneszs, like ousza, is the name 
of a category: although 1t 1s not on the canonical list of categones m the Categories, Aristotle clearly refers to a 
category of kznesis at Metapf?yszcs 102%22-25, 1054a4-6, 1069a21-22 and 1071 a1-2: this 1s what elsewhere 1s divided 
mto the categones of poiezn and paschezn. 61 
Aristotle on several occasions refers to the strictly identical nature of active and passive 
powers62, so it ought not to be surprising that they be reduced to the one category. Although 
he doesn't follow the idea through, Menn clearly recognises that one of the reasons for the 
wide array of analogical content by which dunamis, energeia and entelecheia are derived is the 
splayed nature of the categories. Of course an entelecheta in the category of kinesis (or poiein and 
paschein) would manifest differently to an entelecheia in the category of substance (more on the 
categories later). What is significant, and what Aristotle draws attention to time and time 
again, is that in spite of the differences of manifestation there is a unity of structure that can 
only be borne out through analogy. His injunction to 'survey the analogy' rather than 
searchmg for a definition63 ought to be read in this way. Perhaps the most intriguing element 
of Menn's paper regarding this present chapter 1s the sense in which he shows entelecheia as 
necessarily referring back to the process of production. That is, that it refers to the sense in 
which a being has been freed from this process. It is a term that indicates an effect, but one 
that has ceased to be externally caused to be what it is. The entity characterised as an entelecheia 
is understood as an effect, but msofar as it is an entelecheia it is an effect that has presently 
59 Mary Louise Gill, 'Aristotle's Theory of Causal Action in Physics Iii.3', Phronesis, 25 (1980), 129-47. 
60 Aristotle, Physics 201a10-14. 
61 Menn, 'Origins of Aristotle's Concept of Energeia: Energeia and Dunamis', pg. 107. 
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disengaged from the process of its production (insofar as this process itself is not in fact what 
the being is). It has ceased to be produced insofar as 'bemg produced' refers to the set of 
causes that operated to produce precisely this effect. Such a being 1s freed to enter into causal 
relations as that which zt is. 
The position George Blair takes is quite different precisely because he takes the failure to 
incorporate the unity of energeia and entelecheia into a reading of these concepts as a key mdicator 
that a given interpretation has fallen short. His account appears pnmarily to be the result of an 
attempt to reconcile these two concepts. The effect is that his account is on the one hand 
compelling, but on the other sigruficantly speculative. Whilst agreemg with Menn on many key 
points, Blair argues that both Menn and Graham sacrifice the integrity of Aristotle's thought in 
order to keep thel! interpretation correct. He gives a list of sixteen difficulties that an account 
of energeza/ entelecheia must account for if it is to be adequate. One, in particular, can facilitate a 
demonstration of the major difference between Blair, Graham and Menn. Blair points out that 
Aristotle qwte expliatly descnbes kinesis as an incomplete entelecheia. Aristotle writes that 
"motion [kinesis] is an incomplete [ateles] actuality [entelecheia] of the movable."64 Blair wonders 
how, if entelecheia is supposed to mean 'being at an end', could kinesis be described as an 
incomplete entelecheia. He notes that it "makes absolutely no sense to say that there is such a 
thing as 'being at the end' that is not at the end."65 This on its own seems to weigh heavily 
against the traditional account. However, Blair's own interpretation is difficult to defend; not 
because 1t is clearly incorrect, but rather because it is so thoroughly speculative. He posits a 
quasi-physical (or at least quasi-spatial) sense of 'internal' as being the reason for the 'en' of 
62 For example, in Physics 224b22-26, Aristotle points out that the mover and the moved together constitute 
the 'movable in activity'. 
63 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1048a36-1048b10. 
64 Aristotle, Physics 257b6-9. 
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both energeia and entelecheia. Having already developed his interpretation of energeia as '10ternal 
acttvity'66 and entelecheia ~s 'having the end within', Blair writes on the uruty of the two, 
Actually, the solution to the problems 1s very srmple. Anstotle discovered in the course of his invest1gat1ons that 
even apparently static thmgs like rocks had an internal dynamism to them; and therefore for something to be a 
certain kmd of thmg, its matter (the elements 1t was made of) had to be doing a certain kmd of act - mteractlng or 
intermingling, if you will, m a certain way. Hence every entelecheza 1s m fact an energeia 67 
The 'intermingling' is considered to be inside. What is strange about this explanation is that 
Aristotle would have been perfectly capable of giving it himself rather than relying on analogy. 
Blair understands entelecheia to be derived from energeia, albeit in a roundabout fashion. He 
understands entelecheia as being constructed as an opposing concept for his expanding 
awareness of dunamis. Blair states correctly that, rather than relating to the question of change, 
the early sense of energeia-dunamis was used to structure an answer to the question of 
something's simultaneous being and not-being x. This rested upon a notion of dunamis as the 
ability to do something. Blair understands the application of this particular notion as being 
restricted to living beings, as it is only they that are able to either do or not-do, having 'energy 
in reserve' as Blair puts it, thus providing the circumstances 10 which the problem arises. 
Indeed it is to human capacities that energeia-dunamis is applied in its earliest usages. From here, 
he suggests that it was a simple matter for Aristotle to recognise that dunamis as 'ability' had 
two senses; the ability to do, and also the ability to be. Accordingly, Blair suggests that entelecheza 
was coined to contrast with the sense of dunamis that suggested a power to be, as there was no 
65 Blarr, 'Unfortunately, It's a Bit More Complex: Reflections on Energeia', pg. 569. 
66 He derives it thus: ergazesthai means 'to do'. From this is formed the verb ergein. Strictly the verb does 
not exist as such, but there are precedents, prior to Aristotle, for its being used m compound words, i.e. 
sunergein, periergein. The en- prefix indicates the intemality of the activity. 
67 Blair, 'Unfortunately, It's a Bit More Complex: Reflections on Energeia', pg. 569. 
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equivalent word, and energ,eia was already used to oppose the other sense of dunamzs as ability.68 
As the energ,eia-dunamis pair spawned an analogous entelecheia-dunamis pair, dunamis also appeared 
to be opposable to a notion that was not strictly associated with activity. Blair writes: 
What is meant when somethmg is 'able to be' somethmg:> Obviously 1t has to be somethmg else at the moment, 
which 1s capable of becoming the thing m question. But 1f the object 1s an A, and 1s capable of bemg a B because 1t 
can turn mto 1t, then 'bemg B' 1s the end of the transition; and hence, whatever makes B a B 1s what A 1s now 
'depnved of' as its end. Its end 1s not withm 1t. And so Aristotle mvented the awkward term 'mternal-end-havmg' 
(en [by analogy with eneigeia] tetios] echeza [by analogy with ergeza m relation to ergezn]) Thus the two correlatives to 
potency were etymologically related, and entelecheza was formed because agam there was no ordmary word that 
would express exactly what Anstotle wanted. 69 
Thus Blair understands Aristotle as having coined two concepts as correlates for dunamzs. One 
sense, the original sense, energ,eia, is used primarily with reference to structures pertaining 
primarily to living beings. The other, derivative, sense is used as the more abstract correlate. 
Blair explams the encroachment of entelecheia on the energ,eza concept in terms of the gradual 
broadening of Aristotle's metaphysical sensibilities. Entelecheia begins to cover more ground as 
Aristotle recognises that the 'ability to be' sense of dunamis incorporates the 'ability to do' 
sense. Finally, Blair makes his quasi-physical explanation in order to explain Aristotle's 
eventual switch to energ,eia as the broader term; that each 'internal end having' is at essence 
'internal activity'. 
For the purposes of this chapter, 1t is not especially important which of the two 'actuality' terms 
comes to doffilnate. What is 1mportant is that their several mearungs are either united under 
one term or not, thus either legitimating or failing to legitlmate the ongoing discussion of a 
68 Blair, 'Unfortunately, It's a Bit More Complex: Reflections on Energeza', pg. 570. 
69 Blair, 'Unfortunately, It's a Bit More Complex: Reflections on Energeza', pg. 571. 
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'unified' Aristotelian concept dyad; be it translated as 'actuality-potentiahty' or anything else. 
Multiple kinds of capacities are brought together under dunamis, and are opposed to an 
'actuahty' concept that has a correspondingly broad sweep of meaning. These multlple kinds 
can be considered as falling into two basic categories according to the kinds of powers 
(dunamez) and the relationship between their actualisation and the work (et;g,on) produced. On 
the one hand there are those where the 'work' and the 'actuality' are identical, i.e. with seeing, 
seeing is both the activity and the product. On the other hand there are those kinds of 
powers, such as the knowledge of house-building, where the work is separate from the 
actuality; i.e. the direct correlate of the power to build is the act of building, but the work itself 
exists finally as a house. The trouble with these two kinds of actuality is that Aristotle on 
occasion draws a distinction between them (where some consider that enet;g,eia seems to mean 
something like 'activity' and entelecheia 'actuality') and on others draws them together. There 
clearly is a difference in these two senses on a very practical level, e.g. from the perspective of 
actual house-building praxis, but at the level of abstraction that Aristotle attains in the 
Metapf?ysics there are good reasons for them to be considered identical. More on this later. In 
any case, on Menn's account, Aristotle improperly draws the 'activity' and 'actuality' senses of 
the dunamis correlate together. On Graham's account, entelecheia names a concept that is 
completely novel, and appears at roughly the same time that Aristotle comes to use enet;g,eia ill 
the metaphysical 'actuality' sense rather than the 'activity' sense of the value theory suggested 
in the Protrepticus. Of the crossover between the two terms Graham writes, 
40 
He may have even mtended entelecheia to replace energeta m the sense of 'actuahty'. That he chd not maintain the 
semanttc chsttnctton between lus new term and his old is just one of many mchcattons of a lack of terminological 
disciplme.70 
Thus, although disagreeing on the etymology of both terms, Graham and Menn are very close 
in their interpretation of the greater mearung and value of energeia and entelechei'a. Unfortunately, 
their positions require that Aristotle was either unaware of, or lazy with, the finer details of two 
of lus most sigruficant concepts. Blair at least takes it as given that Aristotle was a competent 
user of his own terminology; but he introduces a structure into Aristotelian plulosophy that for 
the most part has only neatness and a tenuous etymology to recommend it. It would seem 
strange for Aristotle to make entelechei'a redundant for such a particular reason without explaining 
it. Blair's explanation is not so subtle as to be inexplicable according to an Aristotelian 
conceptual schema. Aristotle did admit difficulty on several occasions when attempting to 
define actuality-potentiality. Furthermore he appears to have suggested that it may be 
undefinable in the ordinary sense. Indeed tlus difficulty of definition may be a sigruficant 
indicator of the kind of concept actuality-potentiality is. There are in fact very good 
Aristotelian philosophical-structural reasons for understanding the most abstract sense of 
actuality-potentiality as fundamentally undefinable. This will be revisited later in this chapter; 
for the moment it will be useful to develop an appreciation of the analogical process by which 
'actuality' (assuming a united energei'a/ entelechei'a and utilising the traditional English translation) 
comes to have mearung. 
70 Graham, 'The Etymology of Entelecheia', pg. 80. 
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3. From Bezng and Not-being to Actuality and Potentiality 
Aristotle uses 'actuality' (energeia/ entelecheia) and 'potentiality' (dunamis) in several different ways 
throughout his many works. Although it is the most abstract sense, as described in the 
Metaphysics, which is of most relevance to the current chapter, the earlier and more particular 
uses of actuality-potentiality are also not without relevance. This is true for several reasons. 
Not the least of these being that an appreciation of the genesis of the later actuality-potentiality 
concept might lend a dose of contingency to actuality-potentiality. This concept pair has seen 
so much use in divergent works of philosophy, that it is only occasionally considered otherwise 
than necessary. An appreciation of a possible genesis can allow the placement of actuality-
potentiality into a larger causal context, in which diverging causal elements can be seen to 
converge about the point at which actuality-potentiality appears. Perhaps more significantly, as 
the actuality-potentiality dyad develops primarily by way of analogy, an exploration of its 
development ought to aid an appreciation of the role of analogy in the development of 
foundational concepts. Finally, in surveying the analogical relations by wluch actuality-
potentiality transforms, one gets a sense not only of its development, but of its changing 
function. Actuality-potentiality accumulates meaning in such a manner as to render it 
increasingly abstract. In the Protrepticus, in which it is generally agreed that energeia makes its 
first appearance, energeia is used as a tool in the service of a very particular argument. It is 
brought in as an ancillary concept that is used to highlight an existing relation. At the other 
extreme, in the form found in the Metaphysics, actuality-potentiality achieves such a level of 
abstraction that Aristotle considers it one of four ltreducible aspects of being as such. 
The transformation that energeia-dunamis undergoes is cumulative rather than destructive. The 
later notions do not contradict the earlier. This is most significant, as many commentators 
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expend a great deal of energy attemptmg to provide an array of contextual definitions. Whilst 
there may be some sense to this if one restricts the focus of investigation to the earlier, 
apparently more concrete uses of energ,eia-dunamis, such an approach becomes less useful as one 
approaches the abstraction of the Metapf?yszcs. Indeed, the Aristotle of the Metapf?ysics does not 
appear so much reticent to concretely define these terms, but rather completely and happily 
unable to do so. The reasons for this will be explored further in this chapter. For now 1t will 
be useful to explore the background of the energ,eia-dunamis concept pair. The origin of the 
actuality-potentiality concept as it ulttmately develops is found at the intersection of several 
recognisable forces. Of clear importance 1s Aristotle's known philosophical heritage, which 
includes an array of Platonic and other constructions.71 Regarding Plato, one can most clearly 
recogruse the Eutf?ydemus and the Theaetetus as relating to the earlier use of enetgeia-dunamis in the 
Protrepticus.72 Further, there are echoes of the method described in the Phaedrus in the structure 
of argumentation in some relevant parts of the Protrepticus. In this dialogue, the character of 
Socrates asks, 
Ought we not to consider first whether that wluch we wish to learn and to teach 1s a sunple or a multiform thing, 
and if sunple, then to enqwre what power it has of acting or be1Ilg acted upon 1Il relation to other thlngs, and if 
multiple, then to number the forms; and see first m the case of one of them, and then m the case of all of them, 
what 1s the power of acting or bemg acted upon wluch makes each and all of them to be what they are?73 
71 George Blair in his "Energeia and Entelecheia: 'Act' in Aristotle," makes much of Aristotle's father's 
profession as shaping a certain approach to thmking in Aristotle. This can never be any more than an 
interesting biographical aside, but nonetheless it is worth remembering that the sources of philosophical 
concepts need not be entirely philosophical. 
72 This Platonic connection is ment10ned by Stephen Menn (in Menn, 'Origms of Anstotle's Concept of 
Energeia: Energeia and Dunamis'.), and also by David Bradshaw in the first chapter of his book, "Aristotle 
East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom," (David Bradshaw, East and West: 
Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom (Cambridge University Press, 2004).) 
73 Plato, Phaedrus 270c-d [Note: All Plato references are to Plato, 'The Dialogues of Plato', (4tll edn.; 
Clarendon: Oxford University Press, 1953).] 
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If such a connection seems tangential to the development of actuality-potentiality, one ought 
to consider the later development of the dyad and its integration into the theory of the four 
causes, and further the relation that this integrated structure had with ideas of unity and 
multiplicity more generally. The significance of this passage in relation to the Protrepticus is 
simply that, as Aristotle mirrored the structure of the method presented in the Phaedrus, whilst 
negotiating a conceptual space for enet;geia, he brought into proximity concepts that later 
became fundamentally tied together. In the Eutf?ydemus, Plato structures a dialogue on the 
obtaining of 'good things' in terms of an opposition between possession (ktesis) and use 
(chresis): 
And would they profit us, 1f we only possessed them and did not use them? For example, 1f we possessed great 
deal of food and did not eat, or a great deal of dnnk and did not dnnk, should we be profited? 
Certrunly not, he srud. 
[ ... ] 
Then, I srud, a man who would be happy must not only possess the good thmgs, but he must also use them; there 
is no advantage to merely possessmg them? 
True.74 
Thus Plato lends value to 'use' (chresis) over possession (ktesis), a hierarchical ordering that will 
be carried over into the Protrepticus. However, the matenal of the Protrepticus, the ideas about 
which its hortatory75 operates, and the structure of the subsequent development of actuality-
potentiality relate more directly to parts of the Theaetetus. The relevant passage in the Theaetetus 
74 Plato, Euthydemus 280b-e. 
75 The Protrepticus is a 'protreptic' or 'hortatory' piece - an exhortation to a life of active contemplation. 
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concerns the difference between possessing and having knowledge, and opposes possessing 
(ktesis) and having76 (/Jexis). The dialogue is between Socrates and Theaetetus: 
Soc. Well, may not a man 'possess' and not 'have' knowledge m the sense ofwluch I am speaking? As you may 
suppose a man to have caught wtld birds - doves or any other birds - and to be keepmg them m an aviary wluch 
he has constructed at home; we may say of lum m one sense that he always has them because he possesses them, 
rmght we not? 
Theaet. Yes. 
Soc. And yet, m another sense, he has none of them; but he has gamed a power (dunamts) over them, and he has 
got them under his hand m an enclosure of lus own, and can take and have them whenever he likes, and let the 
bird go agam, and he may do so as often as he pleases. 
[ ... ] 
Soc. May we not pursue the image of doves, and say that the chase after knowledge 1s of two kmds? One kmd 1s 
pnor to possess10n and for the sake of possession, and the other for the sake of taking and holdmg m the hands 
that wluch is possessed already. And thus, when a man has learned and known somethmg long ago, he may 
resume and get hold of the knowledge wluch he has long possessed, but has not at hand m his mmd.77 
Aristotle combmes the structures of these two Platonic elements in the Protrepticus. He takes as 
his major topic the same material as in the excerpt of the Theaetetus, the relation between 
possessing and using knowledge in particular, or a capacity in general. Analogously to the 
passage from the Eutf?ydemus, he gives this relation a definite hierarchy, which he uses to make 
a case for living a certain kind of life; namely one of active philosophical contemplation. 
However, in the course of this argument, Aristotle includes amongst the terms for possession, 
having and use, the terms that will come to mean potentiality and actuality (dunamzs and ene'l!,eta). 
76 
'Having' m this case meaning 'having in hand'. Part of the function of this part of the Theaetetus is to 
distinguish between two senses of having. Of course one can also 'have at ones disposal'. ThIS ambigmty 
contmues into the Protrepticus, as Aristotle uses the same term in the opposite sense to Plato. In any case, 
though the details of the semantics surrounding the Greek equivalents of 'possession and 'use' may be 
interestmg, they are only tangentially related to the aims of this chapter. 
77 Plato, Theaetetus 197a-199b. 
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From this pool of terms several analogies are drawn. Most sigruficantly, the neologism energeia 
is used interchangeably with chresis, thus opposing it also to dunamis, which had already been 
mentioned in passing by Plato in the Theaetetus 78 , in connection with ktesis. Both 
possession/having and capability or power (dunamis) are contrasted with both use (chreszs) and 
activity/actuality (energeia), forming a clear set of analogical relationships that will provide the 
groundwork for further development of energeza in terms of dunamis and vice versa79• 
Although the first use of energeia is found in the Protrepticus, there was already a precedent for 
the philosophical use of dunamis at the time of its writmg. Plato uses dunamis in the sense of a 
'capability' or 'power', and this sense is taken up by Aristotle. In the Protreptzcus, Aristotle 
contrasts possession (echein) with both exercise (chresis) and energeza. Energeia is used 
interchangeably with chresis in this text, though its pairing with capability (dunamzs) suggests a 
higher level of generality for energeia. The two terms are clearly paired even at this early stage, 
i.e. their relationship is not accidental, as they are both unique amongst the collection of 
opposed terms in their bemg transformed into a quasi-modal form by the addition of the 
preposition kata (in accordance with). In the Protrepticus possession (echein) is consistently 
contrasted with exercise (chresis) or activity (energeia), and the mere possession is characterised as 
being-capable (dunasthaz). Possession (echein) is already considered as a kind of dunamis, and 
mere possession is considered the antonym of exercise (chresis). As such, a space is left for a 
term that operates at the same level of generality as dunamis, and that opposes it in the same 
manner that chresis opposes echein. Thus energeia appears originally as an outgrowth of dunamis. 
Before Aristotle, it appears there may have been no functioning notion of the opposition 
78 Plato, Theaetetus 197c4-8. 
79 In the introduction to Aristotle East and West, David Bradshaw also points out that energeza and chresis 
continue to be used interchangeably in several of Aristotle's subsequent works. In particular, Physics 
247b7-9, Rhetoric 1361a23-24, Magna Moralia 1184b10-17 and 1208a35-b2. 
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between energeia and dunamzs. Energeia may not have made its first appearance merely as a novel 
term, roughly equivalent to 'exercise', but perhaps as a reference to a novel concept - that of 
the opposite of dunamis, a term which perhaps previously had no direct antonym. Nonetheless 
chresis and energeia appear as near synonyms ill the Protrepticus as a result of the context. The 
focus is upon the more particular concepts. The central opposition in the Protrepticus is 
between knowledge merely possessed and knowledge presently ill use. Echein and dunamis 
attach to one side of this antinomy, and chresis and energeza to the other. A certain state of 
affairs (e.g. a philosopher philosophising) can be characterised correctly in terms of both chresis 
and energeia because one of the concepts (energeia) subsumes the other (chresis); not because they 
are synonyms. Although not the focus of the Protrepticus, the functioning of this additional 
level of generality is necessary for its moral argument. It is by its being subsumed under 
energeia that chresis can take structural priority over echein. For example, considering possession 
and exercise; possession is possession of a particular knowledge, and exercise is exercise of a 
particular knowledge. Both possession and exercise refer directly to the knowledge, the 
element the have in common. As modes of a form of knowledge, neither term is favoured 
necessarily. That is, neither term is at a structural advantage, given that both refer directly to 
that knowledge of which they are modes. On the other hand if one considers this same 
knowledge ill terms of being-capable and activity, a structure develops in which one of these 
terms becomes the reference for the other. A particular person might be capable or active 
according to a particular form of knowledge. However, only the active state refers directly to 
the knowledge ill question. The state of being-capable in this context is not a being-capable of 
a particular knowledge, but rather of the active state relating to that knowledge. Considered 
synchronically dunamzs is the dependant term, although considered diachronically it is 
genetically prior. There are two significant outcomes, for the future development of the 
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actuality-potentiality dyad, that extend from the characterisation of echein as a kind of dunamis 
and chresis as a kind of enetgeia. Firstly, it means that enetgeia and dunamis are already understood 
as being the more abstract concepts. Thus, they are rendered capable of subsuming other 
concepts under them by way of analogy. That is, understood as analogous with another pair of 
concepts, the enetgeza-dunamis pair is at least minimally capable of deforming to incorporate 
them. Secondly, the manner in which the enetgeia-dunamis pair structurally favours the enetgeza as 
the bearer of their meaning, is readily able to be passed on to those antinomies subsumed 
under them. Thus the emergence of enetgeia-dunamis should be understood as both the 
emergence of a new pa.tr of abstract concepts and also, in a way, as the emergence of a new 
valuing technology - that is, a new means by which value may be distributed across relatively 
inert terms. 
Towards the beginning of Plato's Parmenides, the character of Socrates, in conversation with the 
character of Zeno, complains: 
If a person shows that such thrngs as wood, stones and the like, being many are also one, we admit that he shows 
the coexistence of the one and the many, but he does not show that the many are one or the one many; he 1s 
uttering not a paradox but a truism.so 
This passage demonstrates a precedent for the characterisation of the Parmenidean problem of 
the possibility of coming-to-be in terms of the relationship between particulars and universals, 
or between sensible and intelligible substances. Socrates is not immediately struck by Zeno's 
demonstrations of the impossibility of the multiple as they appear to rest upon a fundamental 
confusion between things and ideas. In Metapf?ysics iv, at the beginning of chapter four, 
Aristotle considers the results of the previous chapter and announces that, 
80 Plato, Parmenides 129d. 
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we have now posited that it is =possible for anything at the same ome to be and not to be, and by this means 
have shown that this is the most illdisputable of all principles.-Some indeed demand that even this shall be 
demonstrated, but this they do through want of education, for not to know of what things one should demand 
demonstration, and of what one should not, argues want of education 81 
He asserts the law of non-contradiction to be both foundational and indemonstrable. 
Nonetheless, later he identifies an ambiguity in its application, which leads certain thinkers into 
taking up the untenable position of both affirming and denying the same thing in the same 
sense. In the next chapter, Aristotle goes on to identify Protagoras with the same errors 
directly, and to suggest an origin for this particular confusion, namely, the failure to distinguish 
between sensible and intelligible substance. Of those who sincerely grapple with problems 
extending from this confusion (as opposed to those who merely enjoy argument) Aristotle 
writes, 
They think that contradictones or contranes are true at the same ome, because they see contranes commg illto 
existence out of the same thmg. If, then, that which is not cannot come to be, the thing must have existed before 
as both contranes ahke, as Anaxagoras says all is IIl1Xed ill all, and Democntus too; for he says the void and the 
full exist ahke ill every part, and yet one of these is beillg, and the other non-beillg. To those, then, whose behef 
rests on these grounds, we shall say that ill a sense they speak nghtly and ill a sense they err. sz 
Hence the ambiguity in the application of the law of non-contradiction. Most intriguingly, 
Aristotle identifies the doctrines of Anaxagoras and Democritus as extending from the same 
confusion as those of Protagoras. He recognises that the same basic error has provided the 
foundation for these differing manifestations of the relationship between bemg and not-being. 
Furthermore, he notes that the 'error' itself is born from the partial recognition of a truth. 
Aristotle continues, 
81 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1006a2-10. 
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For 'that wluch 1s' has two meanings, so that in some sense a thing can come to be out of that which is not, while 
ill some sense it cannot, and the same thmg can at the same tune be ill being and not ID bemg - but not ID the 
same respect. For the same thmg can be potenually at the same tune two contraries, but 1t cannot actually.83 
Here Aristotle uses the actuality-potentiality dyad in a heightened sense - as modalities of 
being as such. In the Pf?ysics (book 1 chapter 8), Aristotle provided his solution to the 
Parmenidean problem. The solution in question is of course the hylomorphic explanation of 
change or motion which, in this case, is described in terms of the modal attribution of being. 
The fundamental notion upon which Aristotle's explanation rests, is that the determination of 
a particular being as such and such a beIDg is always quahfied by an 'insofar as' (rendered in 
translation by qua) that saves any determination from being absolute. For example, Aristotle 
writes, 
A doctor builds a house, not qua doctor, but qua housebuilder, and turns grey, not qua doctor, but qua dark-barred. 
On the other hand he doctors or fatls to doctor qua doctor. But we are usmg words most appropriately when we 
say that a doctor does something or undergoes something, or becomes something from bemg a doctor, if he does, 
undergoes, or becomes qua doctor. Clearly then also to come to be so-and-so from what is not means 'qua what is 
not'.84 
As such, the problem of coming-to-be from not-being could only be a problem if a being was 
assumed to come-to-be from not-being qua not-being. Aristotle is in agreement with the 
young Socrates character of the Parmenides on this point. Socrates says, 
82 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1009a23-31. 
83 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1009a31-36. 
84 Aristotle, Physics 19lbl-10. 
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Now if a person could prove the absolute like to become unlike, or the absolute unlike to become like, that, m my 
optruon, would indeed be a wonder; but there 1s nothmg extraordinary, Zeno, in showing that the things which 
only partake of likeness and unlikeness expenence both. 85 
Similarly Anstotle writes, 
But 1f anything 1s to become an animal, not m a qualified sense, 1t will not be from animal: and 1f bemg, not from 
bemg- nor from not-bemg either, for 1t has been explained that by 'from not-bemg' we mean from not-bemg qua 
not-bemg. 
However, in spite of the similar manner in which Plato and Aristotle orient themselves toward 
the Parmenidean problem, the divergence of their respective responses is fundamental. Both 
Plato and Aristotle recognised that the problem itself arose from confusing the universal and 
the particular. Plato approached physical change by explaining the coming-to-be of any 
particular being in terms of its 'suitability' for being. In the use of this 'suitability', Plato had 
come remarkably close to a fully modal hylomorphism; being restrained primarily, at least 
apparently in Aristotle's view, by an overly simplistic understanding of matter. In the Timaeus 
Plato writes of matter (or rather of something matter-like) as unintelligible and unchanging: 
[I]he same argument applies to the universal nature which receives all bodies - that must always be called the 
same; for, whtle rece1vmg all thmgs, she never departs at all from her own nature(.]86 
Plato's formless matter cannot truly have being before receiving the form, as its mtelligibility 
derives from its being formed. It is of a different nature to the 'matter' of Aristotle, which is 
always in some way formed, even if only as a 'heap'. Of this difference Aristotle writes, 
85 Plato, Parmenides 129a-b. 
86 Plato, Timaeus 50. 
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Others, mdeed, have apprehended the nature In question, but not adequately. In the first place they allow that a 
thing may come to be without quahficarion from not-being, accepting on tlus pomt the statement from 
Parmerudes. Secondly, they tlunk that 1f the substratum is one numerically, 1t must have also only a smgle 
potentiality- which is a very different thing. 
Now we dist1ngwsh matter and privation, and hold that one of these, namely the matter, is not-beillg only ill 
virtue of an attnbute which it has, while the pnvatlon in its own nature 1s not-beillg; and that the matter 1s nearly, 
ill a sense is, substance, while the privation ill no sense is.87 
Aristotle, in isolating 'privation' and 'matter', created circumstances compatible with a causal 
explanation of change, by allowing form and substratum to be modally apphed. Rather than 
the universal 'not-being', privation for Aristotle is always not-x. Broadly speaking, Plato's 
characterisation of the movement from not-being to being offers very little in the way of an 
explanation of the nature of its possibility. Bemgs move from not-being to being, but only if 
they are in some way suitable for such a movement. The suitability for bemg is an intrinsic 
property of the essence. What is lacking in such a 'solution' is a more or less precise 
explanation of what such 'smtability' might mean. 'Suitability', or rather, the sense of 
possibility that renders the dunaton as not necessarily impossible, merely reconfigures the 
naming convention of the problematic space ill which the relationship between not-being and 
being become strained. It does not clarify the nature of tlus space or render it any less 
problematic. In response to the Eleatic problem Plato made two significant moves; he located 
the problem as arising from a confusion born of the difference between the particular and the 
universal and he announced that, somehow, beings of an essence suitable for being are able to 
come-to-be from not-being. It is significant in itself that the notion central to the Eleatic 
problem is movement. The consideration of 'movement' tends to lend itself to how questions 
and their related answers, questions appropriate to an interrogation of process. However, the 
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Platonic solution continues to function in terms of what questions, the answers to which take 
the form of static deternunations of states-, even though these determinations are themselves 
nominally related to change as a possibility. Plato allows that a being can come to be from 
not-being if it possesses the kmd of essence that is suitable for being. However, the sense in 
which something might be suitable for being, 'suitability' as such, does not receive analysis; it is 
the mere idea of a constitutive difference between those beings that come-to-be and those that 
do not. Plato's account of the movement from not-being to being does not include a 
descnption of the structure of movement as such. He recognises that not-being is not 
absolute; that one must recognise the difference between the not-being that moves to being, 
and the not-being that remains as such. Nonetheless, Plato's account continues to characterise 
movement entirely in terms of stasis. That is, the explanation of change is given entirely in 
terms of the determination of a general state, that of being essentially suitable, that is projected 
into not-being as the explanation for the present state of being. The continuity of the 
phenomenal manifestation of change, which Plato recognises as the source of Eleatlc 
confusion, is given entirely in terms of the discrete. On the other hand, Aristotle's mature 
development of actuality-potentiality is an attempt to establish the manner in which this 
coming-to-be operates. 
From a stock of concepts the antecedents of which can be found in the Eutf?ydemus and 
Theaetetus, Aristotle early on forms a set of analogical relations that will later allow the more 
abstract sense of actuality-potentiality to have meaning. However, the later structure of 
actuality-potentiality develops out of a rather different problem situation. The later sense of 
actuality-potentiality grows to encompass a response to the Parmenidean denial of the 
possibility of coming-to-be from not-being; of the 'movement' between being and not-being. 
87 Aristotle, Physics 191b35-192a5. 
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In developing actuality-potentiality as an abstract concept, Aristotle urutes several ostensibly 
unrelated Platonic structures. The problem-structure of the Parmenzdes and the Sophist is 
continuous with the problem-structure within which the later actuahty-potentiality concept 
develops as its ostensive solution. However, the solution itself develops from a set of 
tangentially related concepts that are given attention in the Eutlqydemus and the Theaetetus, that 
Aristotle develops in the Protrepticus. From Plato, Aristotle inherits both problem concepts and 
tool concepts. Having themselves developed within the contexts of particular problems, the 
tool concepts appeared origmally not as tools, but rather as solutions, or descnptions of 
problems, or elements of both. These tool-structures are effects arising out of a causal 
structure nominally disconnected from the causal manifold out of which potentiality-actuality 
arises as an effect.88 The role of these structures differs in their function in Plato's work as 
compared to Aristotle's. In Aristotle's work they take on the role of cause as well as effect, 
forming the basic structure for other elements as well as being themselves determined by other 
mteractlng concepts and structures. In the Protrepticus, and continuing back into the Eutlqydemus 
and Theaetetus, the fundamental distinction in play is one between possession and use. In the 
Eutlqydemus this distinction is understood quite broadly, whilst in the Theaetetus and Protrepticus 
the same basic structure is brought to bear on the topic of human faculties generally, and 
knowledge more specifically. The difference between considermg these structures as problem-
structures or tool-structures is dependent upon the situation into which they are immersed and 
to what end. For example, one nught consider 'having' as presented in the Theaetetus. In this 
context, the concept of 'having' itself is recognised to constitute a problem. In the Theaetetus 
the possibility of interpreting 'having' in two ways is recognised as the source of the confusion 
88 Note that such a situation resembles Deleuze's use of 'anachronism' as mentioned in chapter one. As 
such, one can understand Deleuze' s interaction with history of philosophy less as a 'radical' approach to 
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surrounding the possibility of coming to know something. The division of 'having' into two 
related senses is the situation within which the problem of the Theaetetus plays out. However, 
when the distinctions formulated according to tlus problem are utilised by Aristotle in the 
Protrepticus, they no longer constitute a problem as such, but rather allow for the creation of a 
structure according to which the problem at hand can be discussed effectively. The problem-
structures are able to become tool-structures once they are extricated from their origmal 
context. The problem-structures and tool-structures are transformed subtly according to their 
use. By way of analogy, a particular concept formation may form the foundation for the 
development of another, only to be itself modified in return by the concept formation it has 
had a hand 1n causing, once the latter's meaning has been further refined. For example, 
although energeia develops out of an analogy within which dunamis is already present, as energeia 
develops as a concept it comes to transform the meaning of its partner, dunamis. According to 
the context, one half of the energeza-dunamis dyad may be more readily intelligible, and thus 
more useful as a pinion against whtch the other half might be described. Ultimately the 
energeia-dunamis of the Protreptzcus, having developed in accordance with the analogous 
relationship it was shown to have with use-possession, comes to be modified in such a fashion 
as to be meaningfully applied to the problem-situation characterised by the difficult 
relationship between being and not-being. However, the factual change in these concepts, or 
the structure of the analogy according to which they change, is not adequately explained by 
their 'appropriateness' or by the bare fact of their being in proximity to one another. That is, it 
1s not enough to show that Aristotle's mature actuality-potentiality had several tangentially 
related Platonic precursors. The simple interaction of concepts and associated structures may 
be a necessary, but not sufficient condition for a modification of these same concepts. Rather, 
history, and more as the recognit10n and utilisation of an already functioning system according to which 
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the modification ought to be understood to grow out from a complex environment featuring 
the interactions of concepts, sets of relations, and the particular context within which the 
nature of the problem to which they are applied is formed. 
Stephen Menn, in his paper on the origins of energeia89, notes Aristotle's suggestion, implicit in 
the passage quoted above, that Plato did not in any real sense have at his disposal the concept 
of being dunamei. In the Sophist, Plato allows, against Parmenides, that beIDg can come to be 
from not-being - according to Menn, Aristotle agrees, although, "Plato has not explained the 
kind of not-being from which X can come-to-be: X must come-to-be, not from absolute not-
being, but from some Y that exists not as X but as X potentially."90 1bis is entirely compatible 
with Bradshaw's noting that the Protrepticus marks the first appearance of dunamis modified by 
an 'insofar as'. Menn goes on to say that, in having developed his new concept of being 
dunamei, Aristotle has the means to produce a new solution to the Parmenidean problem. 
Aristotle phrases it this way: 
Therefore not only can a dung come-to-be, madentally, out of that whtch 1s not, but also all things come to be out 
of that whtch 1s, but 1s potentially (dunamet), and 1s not actually (energeia).91 
Though it may be unlikely that Aristotle developed this modal sense of dunamis for this 
particular reason (the solution of the problem of coming-to-be), it does appear to have 
provided favourable circumstances. Indeed, though Plato uses dunamzs in several places, it 
refers to the 'power' to affect or be affected92 • It as yet had no modal aspect. 1bis 1s 
concepts are produced. 
89 Menn, 'Origins of Aristotle's Concept of Energeia: Energeia and Dunamis', pg. 74. 
90 Menn, 'Origins of Aristotle's Concept of Energeia: Energeia and Dunamis', pg. 74. 
91 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1069b19-20. 
92 Plato, Sophist 247d8-el, "Anything which possesses any sort of power (dunamzs) to affect another, or to 
be affected by another, if only for a single moment, however trifling the cause and however slight the 
effect, has real existence; and I hold that the definition of being is simply power." 
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considered by Aristotle as well to be the strictest sense of dunamis. 93 This is not, however, the 
sense most applicable to the modal rendenng of actuality-potentiality. On this Aristotle writes' 
And first let us explam potency ill the strictest sense, which is, however, not the most useful for our present 
purpose For potency and actuality extend beyond the cases that mvolve a reference to mouon. But when we 
have spoken of tlus first kmd, we shall ill our discussions of actuality explam the other kinds of potency as well. 
The notion of actuality-potentiality as a fundamental division of being is to a large degree born 
out of the modal rendering of dunamis, and the new mterpretations tlus comes to demand of 1ts 
counterpart, and then, in reverse, the demand these interpretations come to make on dunamts. 
The analysis of motion or change provides the opporturuty for several analogies to be drawn; 
in particular between matter/form and actuality/potentiality. 
The inadequacy that necessitates the modification of the theory of the movement from not-
being to bemg arises from the apparent failure of the Platonic conceptual schema to account 
for the phenomenal continuity of change. As such, the inadequacy of Plato's account of tlus 
movement lies in its mability to negotiate continuous phenomena in such a manner as to 
render continuity as such intelligible. One of the external causes of the movement from the 
Platonic to the Aristotelian causal schema is the apparently intractable difference between 
phenomena and theory. This may not be such an issue for the question of the movement 
from not-being to being, except that Plato had already located the origin of the problem in the 
space between idea and phenomena. Locating the problem in this space brings the question of 
the integration of phenomena and idea to the fore. The confusion out of which the 
Parmenidean problem grows is shown to originate in the equivocations that form in this space. 
As such, the front line of the problem is shifted from the movement between not-being and 
93 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1045b35-1046a2. 
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being, to the interaction between particular and universal. In this way, the phenomena can be 
understood to function as an inspiration for the modification of concepts; as a trigger for the 
shift from Aristotle's inheritance to his development of concepts. However, the manifestation 
and function of the phenomena 1s not simple. For example in Pf?yszcs vi, Aristotle approaches 
the continuity of motion phenomena via a geometrical analogy. This is possible only because 
the notion of geometrical 'continuity', and so a notion of 'the continuous', had already been 
substantially rendered within the geometrical context. The geometrical context already 
contained relational structures directly comparable with the structure of change conceived as a 
movement from one discrete state to another; in particular the relation between the point and 
the line, between the hue and the plane, and between the plane and the solid object. The 
continuity of change is thus conceptualised as occupymg the temporal axis of an existent 
geometrical continuity-concept. The theorisation of continuous phenomena is thus instituted 
by transferring a notion from the geometrical context mto the study of motion - by way of 
analogy. The analogy 1s facilitated by the structural similarity of the relations under 
comparison. In this way, 'continuity' is mtroduced as a 'tool concept'. Its introduction both 
enables and restricts the interpretation of non-discrete phenomena. It enables such 
interpretation by rendering non-discrete phenomena intelligible within the structure of the 
existing conceptual framework. That is, it forms non-discreteness under a positive concept. 
On the other hand, it restricts the interpretation by limitmg it to precisely that form of 
mtelligibility; determining (perhaps over-determining) undifferentiated phenomena in terms of 
a particular conceptual structure. 
Aristotle's solution to the Parmenidean problem is in part enabled by the inherent structural 
similarities between it, and those structures enabling the content of Plato's Eutf?ydemus and 
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Theaetetus. These structures form the analogical material from which the early senses of the 
enetJ,eia-dunamis dyad grow; senses according to which enetJ,eia-dunamis is most plausibly 
translated as activity-capability. In the Eutqydemus, Theaetetus and Aristotle's Protrepticus, the 
possession of a capacity is contrasted with its exercise. The Aristotelian actuality-potentiality 
concept thus has its structural origins m activity-capability; in the distinction between 
possession and use of a capacity. Plato had already characterised possession (in the weak sense, 
i.e. as 'having' without 'holding') as a kind of dunamis, where dunamis is conceived as a power to 
affect or be affected. Thus was enabled the ready transition of dunamis across to the Protrepticus 
as a concept parasitic on the more relevant (to Aristotle's protreptlc argument) 'possession'. 
Though Plato had already connected possession and dunamis, with dunamis considered the 
broader concept, and contrasted possession with use, he did not contrast dunamis itself with 
another state, as Aristotle came to do. 
In the Pqysics Aristotle merges the actuality-potentiahty concept with the uruty and continuity 
concept pair in order to bring the apparent continuity of change-phenomena to conceptual 
order. The sense of continuity that Aristotle uses is derived from an existing geometrical 
sense, and merged with a quasi-phenomenal temporal sense. Aristotle gives detailed 
description of the relationship between the infinite and the continuous, thus drawing the idea 
of the mfirute into the pool of ideas influencing the shape of actuality-potentiality. The 
structure of actuality-potentiality was already such as to render it a natural fit within the 
manifold of concepts and phenomenal content relating to change in sensible beings. George 
Blair holds that Aristotle did not create actuality and potentiality in order to explam change; 
arguing against the usual view. He writes, 
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What he 1s after 1s a distinctlon, not how one gets from one condinon mto the other; in fact, on hne 17 (of the 
Protrepticus] he says that a bemg wluch "has the power" 1s able to change znto the "process (ktnesis, 'movement') by 
which we call him awake" Presumably, then, the "process" is not the transition itself. No, Anstotle's quesnon 1s 
much more that of, ''Why 1s a non-A called an A?" and the answer 1s ''When 1t can do what A is domg."94 
Blair actually mashes together two separate arguments here. On the one hand he is making an 
argument concerning the basic use of the actuality-potentiality dyad; on the other, he is making 
a claim about Aristotle's use of kinesis and its relationship with actuality-potentiality. On the 
matter of the basic use of actuality-potentiality, Blair is right in thinking that Aristotle is after a 
chstmction rather than an explanation. Actuality-potentiality does not explain change in the 
way that modern physical theories attempt to explain facts about the physical world. That is, 
actuality-potentiality does not serve as a discrete causal explanatory element in a particular 
explanation of a particular change or kind of change. Rather, actuality-potentiality reconfigures 
the basic relationship between beillg and not-being so that both change and stasis are 
simultaneously possible. Thus it does not explain change as such, but rather forms an 
explanation of a basic ontological structure that integrates the Herachtean and the 
Parmenidean. Although this application of actuality-potentiality reaches its highest point in the 
PkJsics and MetapkJszcs, it is no doubt fundamental even in the Protrepticus. On the matter of the 
relationship between kinesis and actuality, Blair's interpretation appears somewhat narrow. The 
problem for which actuality-potentiality supplies at least an attempt at a solution relates to the 
contradictions that arise from transitions or movements from one being-state to another. 
These transitions or 'movements' need not be movements of a sensible kind. The same basic 
problem structures arise whether one considers the transition or change from one sensible 
being to another, the relationship between whole and part, the transition from learner to 
94 George A. Blair, Energeia and Entelecheia: Act in Aristotle (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1992) 
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knower, or the status of a builder when not building or a thinker when not thinking. It is true 
that Aristotle at times refers to kineseis as energeiaz, to motions or processes as actualities, and 
that at other times he appears to associate energeza with a state of completion. At times he 
appears to bring the meaning of kinesis and energeia together, and at others oppose them to one 
another. Neither of these should be taken m the manner of a definition. Firstly, Aristotle's 
use of kinesis is sufficiently broad to allow for both; he uses it to describe both 'motions' and 
'transitions'. Secondly, depending on the context, energeia may relate more strongly to either 
the 'moving' or 'resting' half of a given dichotomy. It depends primarily upon which of the 
two is to be taken as defming the pair. Tbis will usually, but not always, be the part that is 
taken as being in the present tense (a continuous movement will still count as 'present'). For 
example, regardmg Blair's example, the 'movement' of waking and its attendant active thinkmg 
is that by which a sleeping person might be called a thinker. Likewise it is with reference to the 
tree that the seed or sapling might be called an oak. Regardless of whether the actuality refers 
to a motion or a concrete being or a state, actuality-potentiality integrates that being with its 
privation in a non-destructive manner. It allows a nommal present tense (nominal as it may in 
fact be projected into the future as a prediction) to take the same precedence as it had done in 
Plato's and his predecessors' thinking, without the attendant contradictions. Blair is entirely 
aware of the complicated relationship between kineseis and energeiai. He writes, 
Aristotle here precisely distinguishes the "metaballeill' ("change," "transition") toward (ezs) tlus kinesis from the 
kinesis Itself. And later, of course, he exphcitly says that things hke seeing, knowmg, and such should not be called 
kmesezs but energezaz. And so, though kzneszs clanfies energeza m that It emphasises the active nature of what Anstotle 
pg. 25. 
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is talkmg about, 1t cannot be used as a substitute for 1t. It is, therefore, only 1£ you use "process" in a loose sense 
(as we do in English when we refer to constant acts such as "watchmg" as "processes'') that this term will fit.95 
Blair is tied up by his primary task; to convince the reader that energeia is most properly 
translated as 'internal activity', and that this terminology literally describes the concept. For 
this reason he makes significant use of the kinesis-energeia of the Protrepticus as evidence of the 
general 'activity-ness' of energeia. However, this 'activity-ness' can just as easily be attributed to 
context. In the Protrepticus, the work itself, the ergon, is active - seeing, knowing, waking, 
thinking, etc. This is a result of the nature of the moral argument he is making. It functions 
along the difference between 'able to act' and 'presently acting'. However, when the topic is 
different, and in particular where the 'work' is an object rather than an act, the kinesis can be 
taken as both energeia and dunamis-, indeed, qua the 'work' itself, the kznesis is most significantly a 
dunamis. Energeia is not fundamentally 'active' except perhaps in the nommal sense of an 'active 
account', that is, presently engaged in a certain way, even if that engagement is entirely static zn 
fact. Darnel Graham is somewhat close to appreciating this distinction (between active as 
'moving' and active as 'engaged')96• He understands Aristotle as referring to states of activity 
and capacity; terminology which, though perhaps imprecise, at least forces the possibility of 
differentiating between a motion as such, and the status of its present operation. Blair brushes 
Graham's 'stative' interpretation aside without any significant argument. He writes, "If I were 
to spend a half hour pushing against a refrigerator which wouldn't budge, I will grant you that 
I could say that I was in an "active state," but I certainly wouldn't want to imply that I wasn't 
really doing something during that time."97 Such a comment suggests an astoundingly literal-
minded approach to a significantly abstract subject. Actuality-potentiality cannot be 
95 Blair, Energeia and Entelecheia: Act in Aristotle pg. 27. 
96 See Daniel Graham, 'States and Performances: Aristotle's Test', Philosophical Quarterly, 30 (1980), 117-
30. 
62 
considered in isolation. Its presence as a concept pair is necessitated by the overall structure of 
Aristotelian thought. Of particular significance is the fourfold structure of Aristotelian being 
and the place of categorial being within that structure. More on this later. 
The focus of the Physics, insofar as it deals with actuality-potentiality, is upon the relationship 
between continuity and discreteness withm change phenomena. As has been discussed 
already, the actuality-potentiality concept functions to provide a conceptual framework 
according to which change and stasis are compossible ontological facts. The Physics restricts its 
focus to sensible change, yet remains highly abstract. It does not function as an explanation of 
physical change but, once again, serves to provide conceptual grounding for its very possibility. 
Consider for a moment Socrates recognition, in the Parmenzdes, that Zeno's puzzles grew from 
confusion between the sensible and the formal. The Physics is in part an attempt to integrate 
the sensible and the formal into discourse so as to immunise philosophy against such 
confusions. The relationship between discreteness and continuity is a recurring theme in 
Aristotle's work. In the Categories, regarding discreteness and continuity in the category of 
'quantity', Aristotle writes, 
Of quantities some are discrete, others contlnuous; and some are composed of parts wluch have position m 
relation to one another, others are not composed of parts wluch have posltlon. Discrete are number and 
language; continuous are Imes, surfaces, bodies, and also, besides these, rime and place.98 
In the Physics, Aristotle initially classes motion, considered generally (that is, not as this or that 
motion), among those things that are thought to be continuous. This, it seems, relates to the 
indefinite nature of both time and matter; the two axes of change against which being and its 
97 Blair, Energeia and Entelecheia: Act in Aristotle pg. 30. 
98 Aristotle, Categories 4b20-25. 
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privation are able to form the problem of the structure of motion. Thus Aristotle writes in the 
Physics, 
Now motion 1s supposed to belong to the class of things which are continuous; and the infirute presents itself first 
ill the continuous - that is how it comes about that the account of the infinite is often used ill defirutions of the 
continuous; for what 1s illfirutely d!Vls1ble is continuous 99 
Note that here Aristotle is giving an explanation for the appearance of certain problems. He is 
demonstrating a genetic relationship between the concept of the infinite and sensible 
experience in order to keep infinitude in its proper context. It is significant also that he 
recognises several aspects of the infinite. In particular, he describes infinite division and 
infinite multiplication, defining the former in terms of continuity. Aristotle clearly recognises 
the differmg origins of the awareness of infinitude, whether logical, mathematical, geometrical 
or phenomenal. Further, and significantly, he nonetheless behaves as though each origin leads 
toward a similar concept. In the Physics he writes, 
Belief ill the existence of the illfinite comes mamly from five considerations: From the nature of time - for it 1s 
illfinite; From the d!Vlslon of magnitudes - for the mathematicians also use the mfinite, again, 1f coming to be and 
passillg away do not give out, 1t 1s only because that from which things come to be 1s illfirute; agam, because the 
limlted always fillds its hmlt ill something, so that there must be no limit, 1f everything 1s always hmlted by 
something different from itself. JOO 
So the consideration of the infinite comes about as result of the exercise of mathematical 
knowledge, but space is already made for the concept by the fact of temporal phenomena. 
The question remains open as to whether the idea of the infmite is projected from one of these 
onto the other, or whether they both appear spontaneously. The next two examples refer to 
99 Aristotle, Physics 200b15-20. 
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the infinitude of matter, on the one hand, and of composite substances on the other. The 
former relates to infinite division and the second relates to mfinite multiplication. Continuity, 
or indefiniteness, the particular infinitude of matter, 1s associated by Aristotle with potentiality, 
whilst discreteness is associated with actuality. This is why Aristotle is able to classify 
movement as the 'actuality of the potential as such'; it is the actuality of the potential of matter 
as 'moveable'. As 'matter' itself 1s classified as a kind of potential, its movement can thus be 
described as the 'actuality' of 'potential'. However, the integration of kinesis into the actuality-
potentiality structure is problematic. Kinesis is, in a way, both cont1nuous and discrete. Insofar 
as it works within time, upon matter, kinesis is indefinite or continuous. However, that which 
is said to change, the subject of the action or passion, is discrete insofar as it is formed. But 
further, the kinesis itself is also discrete, insofar as it is this movement or change, and insofar as 
this movement is brought into categorial being. Categorial being is that aspect of Aristotelian 
being that represents the interface between language and being as such. It describes being 
insofar as it is representable and thus discrete. On the matter of the difficult relationship 
between kinesis and the structure of actuality-potentiality Aristotle writes, 
The reason why motion 1s thought to be indefinite is that lt cannot be classed as a potentiality or as an actuality - a 
tbmg that 1s merely capable of having a certain size 1s not necessarily undergomg change, nor yet a certain thing that 
is actual!J of a certain size, and motion 1s thought to be a sort of actualzty, but mcomplete, the reason for this view 
bemg that the potential whose actuality 1t 1s incomplete. ThlS is why 1t 1s hard to grasp what motion is. It is 
necessary to class it with privation or with potentiality or with simple actuality, yet none of these seems possible. 
There remains then the suggested mode of defirution, namely that 1t 1s a sort of actuality, or actuality of the kind 
descnbed, hard to grasp, but not mcapable of existing 101 
100 Aristotle, Physics 203b15-25. 
101 Aristotle, Physics 201b25-202a4. 
65 
As Aristotle points out, if a thing is capable of being modified in a certain way, this in no way 
determines the modification or motion as occumng; thus kinesis cannot be rendered simply in 
terms of potentiality. For a change to happen requires the correct alignment of passive and 
active powers, the elements of which may be determined in a variety of ways as actual or 
potential102• Though not determinable as potential, Aristotle notes that motion is also only 
determinable as actual in a qualified sense. On the one hand it is clearly different to an 
actuality conceived as an entity that is a product of a particular confluence of active and passive 
capacities; on this model, kinesis is a movement from one determinate entity to another. On 
the other hand, insofar as the 'moveable' is precisely that which has 'movement' as one of its 
capacities, kineszs must be considered actual - as the actuality of the moveable qua moveable. 
In any case, it is clear that, insofar as 'actuality' is to be considered a concept whose meaning is 
associated with 'stasis', this stasis must be something other than material stasis. 
Aristotle's theory of the four causes integrates fundamentally with actuality-potentlality, 
understood as a theory about being insofar as it is taken as both continuous and discrete. The 
final and formal causes function on the side of discreteness. The efficient cause describes the 
continuous in terms of the discrete, as it serves to describe kinesis, strictly continuous, in terms 
of the discrete subjects of active and passive powers. The material cause is continuous 
absolutely, and indeed insofar as the infinite can be considered a cause it is considered to be a 
cause in the sense of material. On this Aristotle writes, 
102 See Aristotle, Physics 255a34-b2, "whenever the poietiikon and the pathetikon are together, what is 
dunaton comes to be energeia, as the learner, from being dunamei, comes to be dunamei in another way." 
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In the four-fold scheme of causes, it is plam that the infinite is a cause in the sense of matter, and that its essence 
is pnvat:lon, the subject as such bemg what is cont:lnuous and sensible.103 
Aristotle associates matter, potentiality and infinitude (which itself is associated with 
indefiniteness and continuity). He writes positively of an interpretation of infinity he ascribes 
to Parmenides, against that ofMelissus, and which is entirely in keeping with his own thought: 
For to connect the infinite with the universe and the whole is not hke jommg two pieces of stnng: for it is from 
this that they get the digruty they [followers of Mehssus] ascnbe to the mfirute - its contammg all thmgs and 
holdmg the universe m itself - from its havmg a certam slIDllanty to the whole. It is m fact the matter of the 
completeness which belongs to size, and what is potentially a whole, though not m fulfilment. It is divisible both 
m the direct:lon of reduction and of the mverse addit:lon. It is a whole and linuted; not, however, m virtue of its 
own nature, but m virtue of somethmg else. It does not contain, but, m so far as it is mfirute, is contained. 
Consequently, also, it is unknowable, qua mfinite; for the matter has no form.104 
In this passage Aristotle highlights the association of matter and infinitude, and also appears to 
associate the formed whole with a certain pnority. However, notice that the passage is largely 
negative. He is arguing against the possibility of the infinite, unknowable and indetermmate as 
powers of finitude, determination and containment. Agamst this possibility, he is not overtly 
suggesting the necessity of a 'whole' or a 'greatest set'. That is, whilst he argues against the 
possibility of the infinite standing towards beings in a relation of 'containment', he does not 
argue against the infinite or indeterminate exceeding such beings according to a relation that is 
not one of containment. 
The 'IDfinite is a cause ID the sense of matter' for the reason that 'matter' is the name given to a 
substrate that is named but entirely inaccessible to definition. The natl.on of efficient causality 
103 Aristotle, Physics 207a16-25. 
104 Aristotle, Physics 207b35-208a5. 
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is thus required as an intermediary between the material and formal causes. It explains the 
continuous transformation of the substrate in terms of its determmate manifestations. Thus 
the interactions of determinate entities can be used to explain specific 'comings-to-be', whilst 
the material cause forms an ontological substructure that serves to rrutigate the kinds of 
contradictions associated with Parmerudes and Heraclitus. The formal and final causes are of 
course significant, but the basic mechanics according to which change is rendered ontologically 
possible within the Aristotelian system are set up by the interaction between the material and 
efficient cause. The formal and final causes supervene upon this structure; it gives the form a 
space in which to be and the final cause a structure according to which it can function. 
Although the efficient cause is of course already operating between formed entities, its true 
significance hes in its proximity to the material cause; as its categorial interpretation. 
The four Aristotelian causes, in tandem with actuality-potentiality, serve to integrate the 
continuous and the discrete into a cohesive system in two basic ways; the first being related 
primanly to the structure of efficient causality and the second to the material cause. Firstly, all 
causes can be considered in both a potential and an actual sense; this accounts for the 
possibility of presently inactive causes having being in spite of their inactivity. Thus Aristotle 
notes that the cause of a house being built can be considered as either a 'house-builder' 
(potential cause) or a 'house-builder building' (actual cause). 105 Aristotle writes of the 
difference between actual and potential causes that, 
105 Aristotle, Physics 195b2-5. 
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causes that are actually at work and partlcular exist and cease to exist sunultaneously with thetr effect, e.g. this 
healing person with this being-healed person and that house-building man with that being-built house; but tlus 1s 
not always true of potential causes - the house and the housebutlder do not pass away simultaneously.106 
The integration of four-fold causality and actuality in tlus first sense takes the form of an 
'insofar as'. That is, it allows for a certain subject to be described in several different ways 
depending on particular details of the causal milieu under scrutiny. Thus, although 'man is 
begotten by man and by the sun as well' 107 , his provenance can be reduced to a set of 
proximate causes without doing damage to the notion of an extended and interconnected 
causal structure. Aristotle writes, on the question of the location of motion, 
"The solution of the difficulty 1s plain: motion is m the movable. It 1s the fulfilment of tlus potentiality by the 
action of that which has the power of causmg motion; and the actuality of that which has the power of causmg 
motion 1s not other than the actuality of the movable; for 1t must be the fulfilment of both. A thmg is capable of 
causing motion because 1t can do tlus, it is a mover because it actually does 1t. But 1t 1s on the movable that 1t 1s 
capable of acllng. Hence there is a smgle actuality of both alike, JUSt as one to two and two to one are the same 
mterval, and the steep ascent and the steep descent are one - for these are one and the same, although their 
definitions are not one. So 1t 1s with the mover and the moved."108 
In this example, it is m the integration of the active power of the agent of change and the 
passive power of the 'moveable' (matter) that their shared actuality is produced (Aristotle, 
incidentally, recognises only a nommal difference between active and passive powers). This 
conceptualisation of causal interaction integrates several potentialities into a single actuality, 
thus creatmg a basic framework according to wruch macro- and micro-causal structures can be 
analysed without contradiction. So, whilst 'man is begotten by man and by the sun as well', 
106 Aristotle, Physics 195b16-21. 
107 Aristotle, Physics 194b13-14. 
108 Aristotle, Physics 202all-20. 
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and whilst threads of causal power are integrated about nodes of actuality, 1t is nonetheless 
possible to de-integrate this continuous causal structure back into definitional components. 
Thus Aristotle can write, 
To generalize, teaching 1s not the same as learnmg, or agency as pattency, m the full sense, though they belong to 
the same subject, the motion; for the actualization of this in that and the actualization of that through the action 
of this differ m definition.109 
The first sense in which the interaction between actuality-potentiality and four-fold causality 
integrates the continuous and the discrete is in allowing the organisation of a definitional 
structure that is flexible enough to allow for kinesis without encountering obvious 
contradiction. Whilst this first sense thus serves to integrate continuous change into categorial 
being, a second sense serves to make a place for continuity at least notionally aside from 
categorial being. This is primarily through the conceptual integration of matter and 
potentiality. These concepts are necessary for the system's coherence, yet are ineffable 
according to the structure of definition that the system provides. For this reason they are 
approached only through analogy. The function of analogy in the definition of actuality-
potentlality is drawn more clearly in the Metaphysics, as the focus is turned towards actuality-
potentiality as a structure of being rather than as a tool in the service of a particular problem. 
In the Protrepticus, the subject that is to be modified according to energeza-dunamis is the 
possessor of knowledge; the person who has gained the knowledge. Aristotle takes the 
possessor of a particular, currently mactive knowledge as possessing the capacity for the 
exercise of that knowledge. The attnbution of a capacity in this precise manner compares 
directly to Plato's Theaetetus, where the correlative structure arises from questions relating to the 
109 Aristotle, Physics 202bl8-22. 
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sense in which an inactive person is nonetheless a thinker, i.e. In what sense is this person, who is not 
thinking, a thinker? By the time of the Protrepti'cus, Aristotle could answer that this person is a 
thinker kata dunamin. However, the same case considered in light of the actuality-potentiality 
of the Metaphysics would take on a different structure. In this case the subject of the question 
would not be the possessor of the knowledge, but rather the being of that knowledge as such. 
The subject is no longer the status of the possessor, but rather the being of the possessed110• 
Thus the more relevant question for inactive knowledge in the Metaphysics would be: In what 
sense can this inactive knowledge be sazd to be? - to which the reply would still be, kata dunamin. In 
the Physii:s and in the Metaphysics111 the notion of the 'movement' from not-being to being 
advocated by Plato is modified. The change is more than terminological. Superficially, the 
description of coming-to-be is given in terms of actuality-potentiality rather than bemg and 
not-being. With the change of terminology comes a shift in focus from the naming of states 
to analysis of process. Whilst Plato allowed that a being can come-to-be from not-being 
provided that it was inherently suitable for being, Aristotle includes both the 'movement' and 
the 'suitability' as subjects of analysis. The subject of Aristotle's explanation includes the 
movement from 'suitability' for being to bemg as such. Plato alluded to a beginning state, an 
origin, for a given coming-to-be, thus bringing not-being under a positive concept. Aristotle 
took the movement itself as a possible subject of investigation, extending the concept of 
'suitability' to encompass the causal matrix as a whole. Aristotle's account of the movement 
between potentiality and actuality is given in terms of passive and active causes. These causal 
powers, given the ontologically identical nature of passivity and activity, form a continuous 
110 Menn writes, "[H]ow then will he derive the concept ofto on dunamei? An active or passive power is a 
principle that is able to do or suffer something; and we might suppose that Aristotle, by reflecting on 
dunamis as the ability to do or suffer, isolates the more fundamental notion of ability-in-general, and 
extends dunamis and the dunaton by analogy, from the ab1hty (or what is able) to do or suffer, to the ability 
(or what is able) to be." Menn, 'Origms of Aristotle's Concept of Energeia: Energeia and Dunamis'. 
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connection between elements contained within the causal process at large. In this manner the 
causal explanation is the theoretical manifestation of the temporal/phenomenal non-
discreteness of change. Further, the unity of the passive and active causal powers, in fact 1f not 
in logos, allows for the continwty of causal relations beyond particular moments or entities. 
Aristotle produces an explanatory framework that keeps in sight both the fluidity of the 
phenomena associated with motion, and the static nature of beings under the prevailing bemg-
concept. It is this juggling between the fluid and the determinate that serves as the Aristotelian 
answer to the question of coming-to-be. 
4. Analogy, the Categories, and Actuality-Potentiality 
Thomas Aquinas writes in lus Commentary on the Metapqysics that, 
simple nooons cannot be defined, since an rnfirute regress in defiruoons is impossible. But actuality 1s one of 
those first srmple nooons. Hence it cannot be defined. 
Similarly Franz Brentano112 notes, in commenting on a passage in the Metapqysic/ 13 in which 
Aristotle demonstrates the meaning of actuality analogically, that the analogical form of 
demonstration is possible only because the concept of actuality itself is basic and obvious. 
This is all very well, and perhaps quite correct, but one might still wonder in what sense actuality 
is 'first and simple' or how it is that it is 'basic and obvious'. In fact, the analogical 
demonstration of actuality is rendered necessary by metaphysical circumstances tangential to 
its development. Rather than being rendered possible by the simplicity of actuality, analogical 
demonstration is rendered necessary by its particular relationship with intelligibility. The 
111 Aristotle, Physics v.1 and Metaphysics ix.3 
112 Franz Clemens Brentano, On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle, trans. Rolf George (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1975) pg. 29. 
113 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1048a35. 
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necessity of an analogical demonstration of the concept of actuality-potentiality is created by 
Aristotle's division of being into four basic modalities, as outlined in book Delta of the 
Metapf?ysics. The quadripartite division of being does not form a framework for the 
classification of beings in the manner of the categories. Rather, it describes the basic 
modalities according to which all beings represented by the categories are to be understood. It 
is a division of being rather than a classification of beings. Categorial being, only one of the 
four basic modalities of being as such, is being insofar as 1t 1s intelligible; being insofar as it 1s 
compatible with logos. The categories are not merely tables of predicative possibility. They 
represent the interface of logos and being as such. That is, they are an attempt at a tabulation of 
being insofar as 1t is exhausted by logos. Thus the function of the categories is primarily 
ontological; the predicative possibilities that the categories demonstrate supervene upon their 
fundamental ontological sense114. In some way (presumably each in a different way), the other 
senses of being must be understood as being strictly incompatible with being as it is given 
according to the categories. This does not mean that being is exhausted on any occasion by 
one of these four modalities, to the exclusion of another, but rather that one modality cannot 
completely determine the other - thus the fundamental division. Nonetheless, given that the 
categories are the representation of being insofar as it is intelligible, categorial being is required 
in order to express the sense of any of the other four modalities. That 1s, although a-categorial, 
the three other senses of being can only be expressed categorially. This is because the 
categories are in fact a tabulation of the expressible. As it is necessarily a-categorial, what 
actuality-potentiality means is not properly determined in terms of motion or activity or any 
other such category-compatible notion. It is partly defined by its being a-categorial. This is 
why Aristotle needs to utilise analogy to draw out a sense of what actuality-potentiality might 
114 For further detail on this matter see J.E. Malpas, 'Kategoriai and the Unity ofBemg', The Journal of 
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mean. That is, as the process of Aristotelian definition functions strictly accord.tng to being 
insofar as it is represented categorially, the definition of a non categorial sense of being proves 
problematic. As each demonstration relating to actuality-potentiality is necessarily filtered 
through the structure of categorial being, it must begin from the perspective of the determined 
or determinable. This necessitates the use of analogy for the building of the fundamentally a-
categorial concepts of actuality and potentiality. In terms of the relationship between actuality-
potentiality and the categories, actuality is a model of the form that any manifestation must 
take if that which manifests is to be 'categorisable', i.e. adequately described by the categories. 
So there is a crossover between actuality-potentiality and the categories insofar as 'actual' being 
and 'categorial' being can be identified. Minimally, one can understand the priority of actuality 
and the priority of the categories as being similarly derived from their pre-eminent relationship 
with intelligibility. This is further tied to the structure of Aristotelian causality which, aside 
from the material cause, and in spite of the centrality of the how question to causal explanation, 
moves fundamentally along the axis of the what question. As Aristotle writes ill the Pf?ysics, 
It 1s clear then that there are causes, and that the number of them 1s what we have stated. The number 1s the same 
as that of the things comprehended under the question 'why'. The 'why' is referred ultimately either, in things 
which do not mvolve motion, e.g. in mathematics, to the 'what' (to the defirutlon of strrught lme or 
commensurable or the like); or to what initiated the motion, e.g. 'why did they go to war? - because there had 
been a raid'; or we are inquiring 'for the sake of what?' - 'that they may rule'; or in the case of thmgs that come 
into being, we are looking for the matter.115 
However, 'actual' being has meaning only with respect to 'potential' being, which is strictly a-
categorial. Although dyadic, actuality-potentiality forms a unified concept; they have meaning 
only together. The actuality-potentiality concept integrates this a-categorial unity into the 
Speculative Philosophy, 4/l (1990), 13-36. 
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categories through analogy. Although the categories can be understood as a tabulation of 
'actual' being, this in no way clarifies the interaction between the categories and 'potential' 
being. Considered in isolation from potentiality, the 'being' of the categories remains 
functionally identical to the being concept from which the Eleatic challenge is derived. In this 
way it can be seen that potentiality is necessary as an explanation of the Parmenidean sense of 
being; actuality-potentiality represents a modification of an exist1ng being concept rather than a 
radical shift. If the notion of 'actuality' can be said to correspond to the earlier meaning of 
'being', then the role of 'potentiality' is to provide the possibility to think positively (rather 
than always referring back to 'non-being') about the transition between 'actual' beings. 
The structure of actuality-potentiality 1s demonstrated analogically, until a point is reached at 
which it can be appreciated as an abstraction. Once this occurs its facility becomes evident. 
Aristotle uses analogy quite self-consciously - it does not demonstrate a deficiency in his 
understanding of this central concept dyad. This will be covered further in this chapter, but 
for now it is sufficient to note that, as actuality-potentiality denotes a sense of being that is 
(although contemporaneous with categorial being) resolutely a-categorial, a means must be 
found to bnng it to light that does not reduce its meaning to something categorially expressible. 
For Aristotle, analogy serves as the means to this end. Chung-Hwan Chen, in a 1956 article116 
on the various meanings of energeza, sets out a list of its various contextual meanings as found 
within the Aristotelian corpus. The paper's conclusion takes the form of a list - as though 
each sense of energeia could be taken in isolation. Chen complains that m the Metapf?ysics, "there 
is even no chapter in which its [referring to energeia] different meanings are explained, while, as 
a matter of fact, such an explanation is more needed because this term is employed in a still 
115 Aristotle, Physics 198a14-21. 
116 Chen, 'Different Meanmgs of the Term Energeia in the Philosophy of Anstotle'. 
75 
greater variety than the term dunamis."117 Chen is disturbed by Aristotle's failure to define this 
foundational term. It is true that Aristotle does not provide particular or general definitlons for 
actuality, and that he does not give a complete set of defirutions for potentiality. However, 
what he does in fact offer in the way of an overt explanation of actuality and potentiahty is far 
more philosophically significant that a mere definition. Regarding a definition of actuality 
Aristotle writes: 
Our mearung can be seen in the particular cases by mductlon, and we must not seek a definition of everythmg but 
be content to grasp the analogy, - that as that which 1s bwlding is to that which 1s capable of building, so is the 
wakmg to the sleepillg, and that which 1s seeing to that which has its eyes shut but has sight, and that which 1s 
shaped out of the matter to the matter, and that which has been wrought to the unwrought. Let actuality be 
defined by one member of this ant1thes1s, and the potential by the other. But all thillgs are not said m the same 
sense to exist actually, but only by analogy - as A Is in B or to B, C 1s In D or to D; for some are as movement to 
potentiality, and the others as substance to some sort of matter.11s 
In this passage Aristotle explicitly warns against seeking a defirution of actuality. Nonetheless, 
he supplies adequate informatlon, both in terms of data and an interpretive structure, to 
develop a sense of its meaning. Given Aristotle's characterisation of actuality-potentiality as an 
irreducible sense of being, such tangential definitional schema ought not to be surprising. If 
actuality-potentiality is understood as describing a separate sense of being from categorial 
being, it would be inappropriate to expect to determine one in terms of the other. Aristotle's 
'failure' to provide a definition of actuality ought to be understood as a natural outcome of his 
broader metaphysics and, generously, as an instance of intellectual honesty. 
117 Chen, 'Different Meanings of the Term Energeia in the Philosophy of Aristotle', pg. 56. 
118 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1048a35-1048b9. 
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George Blair makes use of Aristotle's references to analogy in the Metapf?ysics in order to 
further his argument for a translation of energeia along the lines of 'activity'. His argument is 
fundamentally flawed, but thankfully in such a manner as to enable the drawmg of a helpful 
distinction. Blair uses the structure of analogy to replace particular terms under comparison, 
whereas Aristotle uses analogy in the Metapf?ysics to clarify a relation. Blair provides a passage 
from the Poetics to back up his claim: 
That from analogy is possible whenever there are four terms so related that the second 1s to the first, as the fourth 
1s to the third; for one may then put the fourth m place of the second, and the second in place of the fourth.119 
On the back of this passage Blair writes, 
Therefore, from the sentence between the two hsts, we get the proportion, 'as motion 1s to power, so ousza 1s to 
some matter,' from which, by the analogy, we can say either that 'motion 1s the ousia of what can move' or 'ousia 1s 
a motion of some matter'. Or, 1f you want to suppress the other term, then Aristotle 1s claimmg that motion 1s a 
kmd of ousza, and ousza 1s a kmd of motion.120 
Blair's use of this passage from the Poetics is actually quite sneaky as, in the passage he quotes, 
Aristotle is not attempting to provide a definition of analogy. Rather, he is explaining the way 
that the structure of analogy can be used to create metaphor. In the context of creating 
metaphor 1t is perfectly acceptable to replace one term with another; indeed this is what 
metaphor is in part. Analogy is not the same as metaphor. Aristotle is aware of this, using 
analogy merely to explain metaphor. Blair makes use of this confusion to make his argument. 
He also translates the passage in a way that makes it appear to be a definition of analogy rather 
than a description of a form of metaphor. After the above quoted passage from the Poetics, 
Aristotle actually goes on to write, "Now and then, too, they qualify the metaphor by adding 
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on to it that to which the word it supplants is relative. Thus a cup is in relation to Dionysus 
what a shield is to Ares. The cup accordingly will be described as the 'shield of Dionysus' and 
the shield as the 'cup of Ares'."121 In this way Aristotle demonstrates that the analogical 
structure can be brought to poetic use. Aristotle actually explruns analogy as he provides lus 
analogical 'definition' of actuality, so one might wonder why Blair doesn't use this definition, 
given that it may be closer to what Aristotle had in rrund at the time. As it turns out, tlus 
definition doesn't support Blair's particular cause. Aristotle descnbes analogy as, "like this in 
this or toward this, and that in that or toward that." This definition emphasises the relation 
rather than the ability of terms to replace one another. It lends coherence to Anstotle's 
request to 'survey the analogy' rather than seeking definition, but it fails to support Blair's 
argument for the direct and literal replacement of terms. 
The structure of an analogical 'demonstration' or 'defirution' is usually such that two or three 
of the four terms involved can be understood in some way through either context or prior 
knowledge or definition. The function of such a demonstration is to brmg to light either a 
fourth term, or a salient relation obtaining between the third and fourth. In both of these 
cases this is facilitated by comparing the relation obtaming between two of the original terms 
to a relation projected to obtain between the third term and the fourth term. In the case of 
actuality-potentiality, both of these forms of 'defirution' are utilised. The undeterrruned fourth 
term could refer either to a variety of actuality or a variety of potentiality. It 1s largely context 
that determines which half of the dyad is to be determined by analogy. Depending on the 
context, one half may already hold a meaning or else be descnbed simply, whilst in another 
context this could apply to the other. In the Metcrpf?ysics, as they are both reaching a higher 
119 Aristotle, Poetics 1457b16-19. 
120 Blair, Energeia and Entelecheia: Act in Aristotle pg. 42. 
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level of abstraction and already have been used in many ways, both of the terms are formed 
purely through analogy. That 1s, they are formed as the thread of meaning joining several 
other dyads analogically. For example, in the Protrepticus it is energeia that gains its determmation 
through analogy (as 'possession' is to dunamis, so 'use' is to energeia.). As dunamis and related 
terms were already in use, and with a roughly similar meaning to that apparently intended by 
Aristotle ill this text, 1t is used as a solid foundation, from which its opposite can be projected 
accordmg to the structure of the analogy. On the other hand, in the Metapf?ysics dunamis 1s 
modified analogically by the incorporation of entelecheia into energeia. Although dunamis had two 
related meanings, one as correlate to entelecheia and one as correlate to energeza, they are rendered 
as aspects of the same by the inclusion of their partner concepts into one another. Pmioned 
agamst potentiality or actuality in turn, and also measured as a dyad against other dyadic 
structures, actuality-potentiality develops meanmg. ThlS process is rendered possible precisely 
by the dyadic nature of the concept. The fact that it functions as a pair allows that, within a 
given context, the less intelligible half be rendered more intelligible by the relatively static 
relation between the two. Further, it allows the integration of material into the forming 
concept that would not be easily integrated through definition (e.g. a 'geometrical' sense of 
continuity is fundamentally integrated illto actuality-potentiality, although most manifestations 
of actuality-potentiality are not related to geometry). The accumulation of meaning does not 
snnply 'enlarge' actuality-potentiality; i.e. it does not provide it with more meanings. Rather, the · 
sense of actuality-potentiality is further and further abstracted. It is enlarged in the sense that it 
is relevant to a wider array of topics; 1ts applicability 1s enlarged as its universality is suggested 
through repetition. However, it is 'reduced' in 1ts precise meaning, ill the idea of its structure, 
by the cancelling effect of the accumulation of analogy. As each analogical 'demonstration' is 
121 Aristotle, Poetics 1457b19-22. 
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made, the set of previous such demonstrations loses a degree of the specificity it held in its 
relation to actuality-potentiality. Tbis is because, if each pair of concepts is considered to be 
related to actuality-potentiality in the same way, the sense in which one pair differs from other 
pairs cannot be considered as essential to the meaning of the actuality-potentiality concept. It 
is what unites them that is called actuality-potentiality, and this becomes more abstract with 
each differing use. While the applicability of actuality-potentiality increases, its meaning 
becomes more abstract, finally resolving to its status as a basic structure of being. Failing to 
conform to the structure of categorial being, unable to be a being or an attribute of a being, 
and yet being fundamental to beings in some sense, it becomes another sense of bemg. 
Actuality-potentiality becomes, over the course of 1ts analogical development, somewhat 
'freed' (m a manner reminiscent of the above discussion of entelecheia) from the conditions of 
its origin. One way of understanding the most abstract sense of actuality is as a representation 
of the structure of being insofar as it is considered in terms of discreteness and continuity. 
However, this can be misleading. Discreteness and continuity are themselves only analogous 
to actuality-potentiality, and derive from geometrical concepts. Nonetheless, these concepts 
are useful, as their post-Aristotelian development has seen them take on a highly abstract 
sense. Their use must, in any case, be tempered by a sober insistence upon the central 
importance of the structure of the problem situation out of which actuality-potentiality grew. 
The primary question addressed by actuality-potentiality is: how can something both be and not-be X? 
When X becomes Y, X and Y are both the same and different. They are a unity that differs 
within itself. Whilst thel! difference is categorial in nature, the sense in which they remain one 
is necessarily a-categorial. That is, it cannot be demonstrated as falling under a definition. 
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The most fundamental worldly aspect affecting this problem-situation, and thus the most 
fundamental notion to be kept on hand for the rendering of discreteness and continuity as a 
useful pair of concepts for the mterpretation of actuality-potentiality, is time. The sense of 
something's being one thing is disrupted by time. All of the uses of actuality-potentiahty attest 
to tlus. In the case of the early use in the Protrepticus, and of its precursors in Plato, time 
intrudes as that in which a given being will alternately display or fail to display an aspect of 
their being. Of course, as it is activity or exercise that is characterised in terms of enetgeza, the 
'stasis' or 'discreteness' of the enetgeia aspect is not to be understood in the sense of 'unmoving' 
or 'unchanging'. Actively thinking can certainly be understood as a kind of process or kinesis, a 
point which Aristotle makes on several occasions. Rather the sense of 'static' ought to be 
somethmg more akin to 'm the present'. The temporal 'present' can be understood as a space 
in which both activities and thmgs can be determmed. To show that Aristotle on occasion 
describes certain processes as actual is not to refute a static mterpretation of actuahty. 
The centrality of the categories and the priority of actuality are integrated with the priority of 
the what question in Aristotle's thought; an aspect that is clearly continuous with Plato's 
thought. It is according to the prioritisation of the what question that time 1s rendered 
problematic, as it is ttme that shows up the contingency of any determination of a being as 
such and such a being. What type questions call for static answers, regardless of the subject 
matter. Thus, even a motion can be determined to be such and such a motion, and so present 
the same difficulty as a thing determined to be such and such a thing. The formation of 
actuahty-potentiality, and its characterisation as one of the four meanings of being, 
reconfigures the sense of this static answer while leaving the answer itself still intact. For, with 
the addition of potentiality, categonal being is given a more nuanced significance. The 
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categories are a table of all that can be defined, with the proviso that this exhaustive table 
cannot account for dynamism of the world that is the source of the beings under definition. 
Considered in terms of a visual metaphor, categorial being takes the form of an afterimage - as 
a static image remaining in spite of the interminable motion that is its material origm. The 
'afterimages' that are the reference for a tabulation of the intelligible are always almost precisely 
correct. Nonetheless, they are always after the fact, always descnblllg a circumstance that was 
'just a moment' ago. The confrontation between the stasis of the necessarily formal answer to 
the what question, and the continuity of the kinesis-phenomena, provides the theoretical-
phenomenal background out of which the actuality-potentiality dyad gains its function. 
Actuality-potentiality is often said to derive from the structure of change (kinesis). This is true 
only in a qualified sense. It is true in the sense that change phenomena, or more properly the 
temporal space in which they appear, in tandem with the pre-eminence of the what question, 
form the basic structure of the problem for which actuality-potentiality constitutes an attempt 
at a solution. It is a common feature of commentary on actuality-potentiality that the 
relationship between actuality-potentiality and kinesis is understood to be one that is not 
immediately and simply clear. In the Physics, Aristotle briefly approaches the difficulty in 
application of the actuality-potentiality model to kinesis proper. This passage was already 
quoted above, but a reminder may be useful: 
This 1s why 1t is hard to grasp what kmests is. It is necessary to class It with privation or with potentiality or with 
sheer actuality, yet none of these seems possible. There remains then the suggested mode of definition, namely, 
that 1t 1s a sort of actuality, or actuality of the kmd descnbed, hard to grasp, but not incapable of existlng.122 
122 Aristotle, Physics 201b33. 
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Aristotle refers to kinesis as the actuality of potentiahty as such. The exact sense of what this 
might mean is very difficult to apprehend, as evidenced by vigorous scholarly argument around 
1ts interpretation. However, one aspect that is rather clear is the sense in which kinesis reveals 
potentiality in fact. It is in kinesis that potentiality 1s evidenced in the present as a concept that 
relates to a worldly manifestation in some way. Kinesis renders potentiality as quasi-intelligible; 
as not entirely unavailable to intellectual apprehension. As such it is that through which 
potentiality is rendered as, or rather as though, actual. Motion is the 'evidence' for potentiality; 
and 'actuality' is the name given to the form of evidence as such. Still, kinesis is not eastly 
explained using these concepts. Aristotle's response to the Eleatic challenge as a problem 
involving sensible beings is given in the Pf?ysics, in the form of ills hylomorphic theory of 
change. Some commentators123 have sought to distance the hylomorphic physics from the 
theory of actuality-potentiality, preferring to understand actuality-potentiality as being more 
restricted to formal or logical matters. However, it is clear that Aristotle intends, at least by the 
time of Metapf?ysics ix, to include the hylomorphic theory under actuality-potentiality as one of 
its modes. Indeed, physical change is one of the components of his analogical definition of 
actuality. If one is to exclude any one of these analogical elements on the grounds that it 
doesn't seem to fit easily with the others, m01phe-hule (form-matter) would not be the last to go. 
It is precisely through the differences between the examples that actuality-potentiality is refined 
to such a point as it is. In any case, change in sensible objects is a good place to begin to 
consider the manner in which actuality modifies the inherited problem of coming-to-be. For 
Aristotle a particular being is, given the right circumstances (i.e. the right ahgnment of passive 
and active causes), potentially many other beIDgs. However, it is not presently any of these 
other beings and thus the general context can be understood in terms of a 'privation' of one 
123 Graham in particular. 
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potentially existing being or another. However, this privation is specific, unlike the not-being 
of Parmenides - there is no privation as such, no absolute not-being to render coming-to-be 
aporetic in the Eleatic manner. Qualified privation displaces absolute not-being. Privation, 
potentiality and actuality fall into one another about kinesis. They each grow in some manner 
from an interaction with change phenomena and take their place as concepts on the basis of 
this. 
Nonetheless, it 1s important to recall that one of the primary sources of the Parmenidean 
problem (and also its Heraclitean counterpart) and its Platonic equivalents, is still present in 
Aristotle; namely the primacy of the what question. Actuality-potentiality does not get to the 
root of the problem - but it does demonstrate it in far greater detail. Actuality-potentiality 
allows motion phenomena greater discursive manageability; it incorporates the continuity of 
kinesis into a structure according to which this continuity can be rendered in terms of stasis. 
Continuity is not completely absorbed into the structure of actuality-potentiality, but is 
dissected rather more precisely; at least in such a fashion as to remove any question about its 
havmg bemg or not. It is also important to remember that kznesis itself has categorial 
representation, divided into a set of 'accidents of intermediacy' (metaxu on). Thus, one must 
draw a distinction between the kinesis phenomena that forms the circumstance in which the 
problem of coming-to-be comes to light, and the categorial sense of kinesi's, by which a given 
motion or change can be determmed as this or that motion. In other words, where the name 
of a motion can be given in answer to a what question. As a determinate X, a given motion 
faces the same problems, from the perspective of the categories, as does a given substance; i.e. 
a change in motion is structurally identical to a change in substance (ousia) insofar as both are 
understood as they are tabulated ill the categories. Categorial being thus applies in two ways to 
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continuous things. On the one hand, a being in motion can be determined as X or Y at a 
given time. On the other hand, more significantly perhaps, a continuous thing can be taken 
categorially. With motion, for example, it is this motion, or a motion, that is continuous. If it 
is not a particular motion that 1s under investigation, it may be a motion of a particular kind, or 
motion as such, categorially identifiable in spite of the mherent phenomenal indeterminacy of 
the object. Motion 1s thus considered ill terms of the unity that 1s required for intelligibility. 
Though phenomenally continuous, motion is categorial and thus actual. Nonetheless, from 
the perspective of the categories, the phenomenal aspect of kinesis, a basic element of the 
problem situation for which actuality-potentiality is constructed, remains enigmatic. It is by 
the integration of the theory of the four causes, the structure of actuality-potentiality and the 
structure of the categories that the phenomenal continuity of kinesis in all of its forms is 
rendered intelligible. Although this 'continuity' gains intelligibility by this inclusion, it gains it 
at great expense. The continuity of the kinesis phenomena remains predictably at odds with the 
consummate intelligibility of the categories. It also remams at odds with the actuality-
potentiality concept that serves to render kinesis intelligible. The actuality-potentiality concept 
in this regard serves to fundamentally divide being as such and being as known. Aristotle 
acknowledges the primacy of potentiality qua being, whilst holding actuality to be prior qua 
intelligibility. In this way, Aristotle's integration of the continuous into the categorial structure 
of being (by way of constructing actuality-potentiality as a fundamental sense of bemg), 
continues a fundamental structural schism whilst obscuring it through the formation of finer 
distinctions. 
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5. Conclusion: From the Movement of Beings to the Movement of Structures of Knowledge 
The centrality of analogy in the determination of the actuality-potentiality concept leaves the 
final determination of 1ts specific applicability open. The applicability of actuality-potentiality 
is determined by the total set of beings determined as such (that is, determined as beings). 
This is because, as a structure of being as such rather than a determination of particular beings, 
actuality-potentiality must apply to all beings in some manner. As discussed earlier m this 
chapter, 'actuality-potentiality' names a relational structure, the function of which is to render it 
possible to account for an array of aporiai that arise from the schismatic relationship between a 
particular historical being-concept and the temporal-phenomenal situation in which it appears. 
This 'being-concept' itself 'moves', or is transformed, from one finite, nominally temporal 
moment to another124• The present chapter has been in part a description of one aspect of 
such conceptual-structural transformation, in particular of the transformation of the structure 
of the problem of 'change'125 from a Platonic to an Anstotelian one. The notion of a 'Platonic' 
or 'Aristotelian' being-concept is, in one sense, only nominal, though in another sense it has 
real meaning. Whilst a transformation of a concept structure126 might not be reducible to an 
mteraction between proper names, any set of actions attributed to such proper names, or even 
to an exhaustive set of propositions and their modifications, can in fact refer to a meaningful 
whole. Whilst the subject matter differs (the transformation in question is a transformation of 
the way in which thought is directed towards the world), the structure itself 1s no different 
from that which Aristotle posits to explain physical change. Consider the following passage 
from the Pf?ysics-. 
124 Such moments which might be associated with a person, a book, an action, etc. 
125 
'Change' here ought to be taken in its broadest possible sense, as described earlier in this chapter. 
126 By a 'concept-structure' is meant a structure of relationships obtaining between a given concept and the 
conceptual manifold in which it holds meaning. 
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Again, does lt follow that what is, if one, 1s motionless? Why should lt not move, the whole of 1t withm itself, as 
parts of it do which are urutles, e.g. this water? Again, why 1s qualitative change impossible? But, further, what 1s 
127 
cannot be one ill form, though 1t may be ill what 1t 1s made of. 
Aristotle's 'insofar as' is also applicable to structures of meaning, if only such structures are 
taken as beings in some determinate sense. If they are, then they are readily incorporated into 
the set of material from which the analogical demonstration of actuality-potentiality is bwlt. 
The structure of actuality-potentiality is open to such additions precisely in virtue of its a-
categorial nature and the analogical demonstration this necessitates. Insofar as one posits a 
nominally determinate concept-structure that is 'Platonic' and a nommally determinate 
concept-structure that is 'Aristotelian'128 , and as long as one recognises a residual 'identity' 
between the concepts (as well as a difference), the relation between these two being-concepts 
can be understood as one of transformation or change. Insofar as this is the case, the 
transformation of such structures is not outside the realm of the relation at the heart of the 
analogical demonstration of actuality-potentiality. Of course, the elements that participate 
causally are different in the case of changes in conceptual structures. Perhaps, indeed, the 
interplay of causal mechanisms might be too complex, or the nature of these mechanisms too 
obscure, to render an account of concrete transformation possible. Once again however, the 
structure of actuality-potentiality does not function to explam concrete transformations, but 
rather to account for the possibility of transformation as such. So, the possibly ineffable 
nature of concept transformation is no impediment to its analysis in terms of actuality-
potentiality. Another way to imagme the transformation of a concept-structure is through the 
127 Aristotle, Physics 186b16-20. 
128 Not that these particular proper names are only chosen for their being discussed in this chapter. It would 
be irrelevant to complain that there is no determinate 'Platonic' or 'Aristotelian' concept-structure, as these 
names are only chosen to illustrate a point. If one takes issue with their use, the determinate concept 
structure used as a reference could be refined to 'early Plato' or 'the Plato of Socratic dialogue X.' 
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paradigm of knowledge acquisition as it manifests in Aristotle's writing. One might begin with 
Aristotle in the Protrepticus noting that a philosopher remains a philosopher when sleepmg or 
distracted. The student, a 'learner', potentially a 'knower' actualises this potential and becomes 
a knower. However, the knower is still both potentially and actually a knower. The axis upon 
which potentiality and actuality functions has changed with respect to the particular knowledge 
gained. The first sense relates to an account of the transformation of a learner into a knower. 
The second relates to the transformation of one who is not actively engaged with a given 
knowledge into one who 1s. The knowledge as such, that which is transmitted from knower to 
learner, can also be considered on its own. In this regard, rather than questioning the being of 
the knower when thinking or sleeping or learning, one might ask about the being of the 
knowledge as such; in this sense, the knowledge itself has potential being when the knower is 
sleeping or distracted, actual being when the knower is thmking. Further, now that knowledge 
is understood in a quasi-determinate sense, one might ask about the relationship between 
several transmissions of such knowledge; that 1s, one may ask about the transformation of 
knowledge as such. 
Aristotle analyses localised instances of transformations relating to knowledge. However, 
these transformations are not of structures of knowledge as such, but rather relate to the 
transformation entailed by the gaining and transmission of a particular knowledge. In the 
Protrepticus the focus is upon the way in which using or failing to use knowledge modifies the 
value of a person as a knower. In De Anima he analyses the transmission of knowledge 111 
terms of the transformation of a student into a knower. These structures are, of course, 
independent of the nature of the knowledge in question. There is good reason for this. The 
Categories taken as whole represent a tabulation of logos. What 1s transformed when a form of 
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discourse 'moves' into another is, in part, logos itself. In order for a discourse to be 
categonsable in the Aristotelian sense, it must be determined in some sense and brought under 
a relevant category. The recursive nature of the possibility of a transformation of logos as such 
would likely be unfavourably viewed by one committed to the centrality of the Categories as 
Aristotle is. Further dtsturbing might be the idea that, if logos were understood to transform in 
some manner compatible with the analogy out of which actuality-potentiality formed, the 
Categories themselves would be at risk of being rendered contingent. The categories 
themselves, along with the entire structure of Aristotelian thought will be subject to the 
continuous/ discrete dichotomy at the heart of Aristotelian thought. Even while 'actual'129, i.e., 
having formed at the point of intersection of an array of passive and active powers, the 
structure could still be understood only as a snapshot of a continuous transformation of 
structure; as a representation ill logos of a determmate moment of logos already passed. Having 
passed, such actualities of structure are merely nominal, except insofar as they causally interact 
with such transformation as mere objects. So, for example, one might refer to a proper name, 
or to a piece of literature, a book, or to any point at which a given structure could be said to 
engage as a cause in its own right. Although such objects serve, in one sense, as mere indices 
of transformations past, they also engage with such transformation qua object. Such a 
structure is naturally recursive and, although not immediately obvious, analogous recursive 
structures are themselves central to the structure of Aristotelian thought. This will be the topic 
of the next chapter, on pros hen eqmvocation. 
129 The concrete sense of what an 'actualised' discursive structure might be is beyond the scope of this 
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chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
PROS HEN STRUCTURE AND NON-GENERIC UNITY 
1. Introduction. 
In Metapl?Jsics Gamma Aristotle establishes the possibility of a study of being qua being. The 
manner in which the possibility of this study is established integrates fundamentally with 
Aristotelian thought as a whole. In particular, the grounds for the possibility of a study of 
being qua being are integrated with Aristotle's notion of categonal being, with his quadripartite 
division of being, and with the multivocal sense of being he defends against Platonic univoc1ty. 
In order to urufy the subject matter of the study of being qua being whilst leaving its 
multivocity intact, Aristotle forms an analogy between the study of 'belllg' and several 
previously established subject matter, which themselves are individually unified in spite of their 
objects being shared among several genera. The very establishment of an episteme (or, loosely, 
'subject matter') according to this form of unity establishes it as a subject matter of a certain 
kind. That is, the demonstration of the possibility of the study of being qua being establishes 
'being' as a particular kind of subject matter. Although Aristotle does not directly consider it, 
the kind of structure that he uses to form this unity allows for the integration of the episteme it 
describes into the greater causal milieu. As such, an episteme of this kind has potential, not only 
to effect change in another, but to be the subject of change itself. The notion of actuality-
potentiahty is developed analogically, and as such remains open to further analogical extension. 
For this reason, and in consideration of the manner in which Aristotle unifies inter-categorial 
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subject matter, it is not inappropriate to attempt to extend actuality-potentiality to the matter 
of the transformation of a particular episteme. However, this becomes more difficult when the 
notion of the transformation of an episteme is brought to bear upon the episteme that studies 
being qua beillg; one may expect Aristotle to want to exclude the possibility of transformation 
in virtue of the kind of study that it is. Nonetheless, the possibility of the transformation of 
the study of being qua being can be drawn from its analogical instantiation, and can be 
theorised roughly according to actuality-potentiality. Whilst such an idea cannot be attributed 
to Anstotle, it can nonetheless be established by an imaginative extension of analogies 
fundamental to the construction of several major Aristotelian concepts. 
2. Pros Hen Structure as an Alternate Form efUniry. 
In several treatises of his Organon, Aristotle appears to argue against the possibility of a 
universal study of being130• However, in Metapf?ysics gamma he appears to make the case for 
the possibility of the very same study. In the secondary literature, several texts are often 
referred to in order to make this apparent contradiction clear. In Topic/31 Aristotle points out 
that demonstration begins from a small set of primitive principles. In the Posterior Anajytzcs he 
writes that, 
anthmetical demonstrations always include the genus about which the demonstration is, and so also do the others; 
hence it is necessary for the genus to be the same, either szmplzciter or m some respect, 1£ the demonstration 1s gomg 
to cross. That it is impossible otherwise 1s clear; for 1t 1s necessary for the extreme and the middle terms to come 
from the same genus132 
130 By the same arguments he also argued that there was no unified study of the good (Aristotle, Nie. Eth. 
1096a19; Bud. Eth 1217b25). 
131 Aristotle, Topics 100a30-b21 
132 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 75b7-16. 
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From this it has often been surmised that Aristotle in fact intends to show that any episteme 
(often problematically translated as 'science') must be restricted to a smgle genus. However, 
these arguments of Aristotle's are supposed to relate only to the epzsteme that results from 
demonstration (apodeixis). This single-genus notion of apodeictic knowledge is transferred to 
other senses of episteme and of acts of contemplation (theoriaz) with the help of a blanket 
translation of episteme, and occasionally theon'a (or theoresaz), as 'science'. This can be rather 
misleading, particularly as Aristotle on occasion appears to be drawmg fine distinctions 
between related notions surrounding the various aspects of study and knowledge. In this way 
the 'single genus' notion of episteme can be combined with passages from the Eudemian and 
Nicomachean Ethics, in which 'being' and the 'good' are shown not to be exhausted by a single 
kind of study, to create the impression that Aristotle has either contradicted himself or 
modified his position. Whilst either of these might be true133, one would be wise to take a 
moment before rushing to judgement. In the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle writes: 
Next, however much there are Ideas and m parncular the Idea of good, they are perhaps useless with a view to a 
good hfe and to action. For the good has many senses, as numerous as those of being For being, as we have 
divided lt ill other works, s1grufies now what a thrng 1s, now quality, now quantity, now tune, and agarn some of 1t 
consists in being changed and ill changrng; and the good 1s found in each of these modes, in substance as =d 
and God, in quality as justice, m quantity as moderation, ill tune as opportunity, while as examples of 1t ill change, 
we have that which teaches and that which 1s being taught. As then being is not one ill all that we have just 
mentioned, so neither 1s good; nor 1s there one science (epzsteme) either of bemg or of the good; not even things 
named as good ill the same category are the objects of a single science (theoresaz), e.g. opportunity or moderation; 
but one krnd studies one krnd of opportunity or moderation, and another: e.g. opportunity and moderation in 
regard to food are studied by mediCille and gymnastics, ill military matters by the art of strategy, and slffitlarly with 
133 It is not important to the goals of this chapter one way or the other. However, a brief investigation of the 
grounds (or lack thereof) of such a judgement will help to create a sense of the complexity of the subject 
matter. 
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other sorts of act10n, so that 1t can hardly be the provmce of one science (theoresaz) to study (scholez) the good per 
se.134 
The use of 'science' as a term is problematic, given that its meaning has been largely 
determined by events occurring two millennia after Aristotle lived. But further, the translation 
of both episteme and theoresai as 'science' creates a confusion between the contemplative act and 
its content. An act of contemplation must face a different test of unity than would be faced by 
a form of knowledge (itself an unperfect translation of episteme, but nonetheless broader than 
'science'). Nonetheless, two such measures of unity may be related. Consider Anstotle's claim 
that there is not 'one episteme either of being or of the good' and that 'not even things named as 
good in the same category are the objects of a single theoresai.' The first is a claim relating to 
something that can be taught and developed as a particular structure or approach to the world. 
Aristotle is saying that there can be no one form of knowledge that can exhaust 'being' or the 
'good'. On the other hand, the second claim relates to an act; that even where the usual 
grounds for demonstrative knowledge were met, the 'good' (and also being) is such that even 
in a categorially restricted sense, it will stlll exceed a given contemplative act. One ought to 
note that Aristotle is not claiming that there 1s no sense in which the 'good' or 'being' is united, 
but rather that neither can be unilaterally applied. Further, he does not argue that episteme is 
necessarily confined to a single category; rather that apodeictic knowledge is strictly categorial. 
He does not shut down the possibility of knowledge that extends beyond a single category. 
Indeed, in the above quote the examples of subject matter Aristotle provides (medicine, 
strategy, and gymnastics) extend across several categories. It is not clear from the above quote 
that Aristotle considers any of these as episteme, but neither is it clear that he doesn't. 
Aristotle's argument does not require such a positive statement. He is making the negative 
134 Aristotle, Eud. Eth. 1217b25-1218al. 
94 
argument that there is not one form of knowledge of either 'being' or of the 'good' msofar as 
such a knowledge is considered as applying to a unified object. This intersects precisely with 
Aristotle's general disavowal of univocal being. The above passage presents one of Aristotle's 
angles of attack upon this notion; in tlus case considered from the perspective of the 
interaction between categories of being and realms of study and action (subject matter). 
Aristotle makes a nearly identical argument m the Nicomachean EthicP5, with greater emphasis 
on the irreducibility of the particular senses of 'good' as it applies to a given subject matter. 
These passages in Aristotle's ethical treatises function broadly as arguments against univocal 
bemg. However, as the focus is upon practical matters, the arguments are derived from 
practical concerns. A more technical argument against univocal being is given in Metapf?ysics 
book ili.136 
The arguments given in Metapf?ysics iii are based upon the manner in which Aristotle 
understands definition to function according to the structure of categorial being. For Aristotle, 
'definition' is only possible within a single category, precisely because definition is a function of 
the relationship between genus, species and differentia137• The species brings a collection of 
particulars under a common idea. Further, a collection of species may be uruted under a 
common, higher level species, or finally a genus, the latter indicating the highest level of 
generality. So, for example, all particular dogs, in spite of their particularity, are united under 
the species 'dog', and further all appropriate species are united under the species 'animal', and 
finally under the genus ousza. In the other direction, genus and subordinate species are divided 
according to differentiae. So, for example, the species 'animal' rmght be divided according to 
several differentiae, but the differentia most relevant to the definition of the 'human' animal 
135 Aristotle, Nie. Eth. 1096al9. 
136 Aristotle, Metaphysics 992b22 - 998b26 
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would be (according to Aristotle), rational. That 1s, in predicating rationality of the species 
'animal', one defines an animal such that it could not be af!Ything else than human. Without 
differentia, it would still be possible to unite particulars and species under species and genera. 
However, without differentiae, definition would be impossible in the Aristotelian sense. The 
relationship between differentlae and the genera that they render particular is not, for Aristotle, 
one of containment. The differentiae do not hold the same relationship with the genera as do 
the species and particulars. For one thing, and most significantly, the genus is not predicable 
of the differentia. Aristotle writes in the Topics, 
It seems that the genus is predicated, not of the differentia, but of the objects of which the differentia is 
predicated. Animal (e.g.) is predicated of man and ox and other terrestnal animals, but not of the differentia itself, 
which we predicate of the speoes'. 138 
The genus cannot be predicated of the differentla (i.e. 'rational is an animal') for two reasons, 
as Aristotle continues: 
For if arumal is to be predicated of each of its differentiae, then many animals (po/la zoia) will be predicated of the 
species; for the differentiae are predicated of the species. Moreover, the differentiae will be all either species or 
mdividuals, if they are arumals; for every animal is either a speoes or an individual. 
What Aristotle most likely means is that, if 'animal' is predicated of its differentiae, those 
differentiae ('two footed', 'rational', and so on) will join the list of things called animals. Thus 
many non-existent animals will be produced, each of them - if functioning in the manner of 
differentlae - predicated of the species 'animal'. This differentia would then need to be either 
a species or an individual. As a species or individual, the differentlae could no longer be 
differentiae as such. So, aside from the absurd result that a 'rational' would be called an 
137 Aristotle, Topics 139a28-31. 
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animal, the differentiae would not function, thus rendering definition impossible. The 
categories would only function to orgaruse beings according to commonalities and would lose 
the function of dividing according to difference. One could still claim 'human' as animal and 
'horse' as animal, but one could no longer differentiate between human and horse. 
It is on the basis of this account of categorial function and structure that Aristotle argues 
against the possibility of being as a genus (univocal being). On several occasions in the 
Metapf?ysics Aristotle claims that, rather than univocal, being is in fact 'said in many ways'139. In 
Metapf?ysics Nu140 he compares the approach to the study of being considered as univocal to his 
own approach. The great benefit of Aristotle's approach, he seems to claltn, is that it serves to 
avoid tackling Parmenides head on. He argues that, in order to demonstrate the possibility of 
the many, those who take being as univocal are unable to avoid denying the truth of 
Parmenides', 'For never will this be proved, that things that are not are'. In arguing for the univocity of 
being, one 1s left with two options, each absurd if left unqualified: either the denial of the 
many, or the assertion of the existence of the non-existent. In Metapf?ysics ili 3 Aristotle makes 
a more forceful argument against the possibility of the univoc1ty of being. He argues that, "it 
1s not possible for either One or Being to be a genus of things"141 because, "it is necessary both 
for the differences of each genus to be and for each of them to be one" 142 , and "1t is 
impossible either for the species of the genus to be predicated of their own differences or for 
the genus to be predicated apart from its own species."143 This obviously connects with the 
discussion in the Topics, where Aristotle discusses the impossibility of predicating a genus of its 
138 Aristotle, Topics 144a32-b3. 
139 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1003a33; 1028a5; 1028a10. 
140 In particular at Metaphysics 1089a7. 
141 Aristotle, Metaphysics 992b22. 
142 Aristotle, Metaphysics 998b23-24. 
143 Aristotle, Metaphysics 998b24-26. 
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differentiae. In the case of 'being' and 'one', they must, ill fact, be applied to the differences as 
well as to the species and particulars, in order that it be said that they 'are' or that they are 
determinate (i.e. differentia x or differentia y, 'two footed' or 'rational'). As the genus cannot 
be predicated of the differentiae, yet the differentiae must be and be one, 'being' cannot be a 
genus and neither can 'one'. 
So when, at the very beginrung of Metapf?ysics iv, Aristotle states that 'there is a science (episteme) 
that studies bemg qua being', certain restrictions must be considered to be already in place with 
regard to the nature of this particular episteme. The two relevant factors are (1) that 
demonstration is only possible intra-categorially and (2) that being is not a genus. As such, for 
the sake of consistency, the study of being qua being cannot be an episteme in the apodeictic 
sense. Jiyuan Yu144 argues agamst G.E.L. Owen's position145 that Aristotle's notion of being 
changed from the 'earlier' sense of the Ot;g,anon to the sense implied in Metapf?ysics iv. Yu argues 
that Aristotle's notion of being did not have to change from the Ot;g,anon to the Metapf?yszcs in 
order to allow the study of being qua being. Rather, his notion of what counted as a subject 
matter for study (in the highest sense) expanded. That is, his notion of episteme146 expanded 
beyond the demonstrative. Yu sees the development of Aristotle's notion of episteme as 
expanding to include that which in the Ot;g,anon had been the stronger sense of 'dialectic'147• 
Thus, Yu understands that the strong or 'good' sense of dialectic, as presented in various texts 
of the Ot;g,anon, is continuous in several ways with Aristotle's later unification of certain mter-
categorial forms of episteme using pros hen structure. Aristotle does appear to want to argue for 
144 J1yuan Yu, 'What Is the Focal Meaning of Being in Aristotle?', Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient 
Philosophy and Science, 3413 (2001), 205-31. 
145 As presented in G. E. L. Owen, 'Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle', in I. During 
and G.E.L. Owen (ed.), Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century (Goteborg: Almquist and Wiksell, 
1960). 
146 Yu uses 'science' as a translation, but this will be avoided here. 
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the inclusion of the study of being under the notion of a unified study. In the Metaphysics he 
contrasts the obvious case of intra-categorial unification with another sense in which a study 
can be said to be unified: 
For not only rn the case of things which have one common notion does the rnvest1gat1on belong to one science 
(episteme), but also rn the case of things which are srud of one nature.148 
Jiyuan Yu may be correct in assuming that such a statement reflects an expansion of the notion 
of episteme, but far more significantly, it may represent an expanded notion of unification. 
Whilst in the Or;ganon Aristotle does note that there are both good and bad forms of dialectic, 
this difference does not correspond precisely with the difference between dialectic structured 
pros hen and dialectic structured other than pros hen. In the Or;ganon the difference between 
demonstration and dialectic is tied to the difference between Intra- and inter-categonal study. 
Dialectic, functioning inter-categorially, is uniformly defined according to its object's lacking 
uruty under a genus, and further, in the S ophzstica! Refutations, defined against sophistry 
according to the motivation of the practitioner. Pros hen structure is thus not so much 
continuous with dialectic, but is rather a structure according to which it can be unified and 
thus determined as either other than dialectic, or as a peculiar form of unified dialectic. Jiyuan 
Yu finds dialectic to possess a continuity with pros hen structured study by the fact that 
Aristotle's "description of dialectic sounds very similar to that of the science of being in 
Metaphysics iv 2."149 However, these descriptions may only sound similar because both define 
their objects negatively as not being restricted to one genus. Their continuity may thus only 
reside in the fact that neither is a form of categorial demonstration. If pros hen is related to 
147 On dialectic see Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 77a26-33; Sophistical Refutations 172al 1-15; Topics 
101a36-b4; also Rhetoric 1355b8; Metaphysics 1004b19-22. 
148 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1003bl2-14. 
149 Yu, 'What Is the Focal Meaning of Being in Aristotle?', pg. 228. 
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dialectic in any way it is only as a structure that dialectic might take up. However, this 
structure itself, as shown analogically at several junctures in Aristotle's work, is quite particular 
and more than just 'not demonstrative'. So, while Yu may be quite correct in stating that "[I]t 
could not be completely wrong to suggest a continuity from the positive dialectic m the 
Organon to the science of being in the Metapf?ysics,"150 this statement itself does not throw much 
light on the notion of pros hen structure itself. 
In Metapf?ysics iv Aristotle writes on the study of being qua being, 
There is a science wluch investigates belllg as bemg and the attnbutes wluch belong to this in virtue of its own 
nature. Now tlus is not the same as any of the so-called special saences; for none of these others deals generally 
with being as beillg. They cut off a part ofb=g and mvestigate the attributes of tlus part.151 
Discussing this, Jiyuan Yu counters the standard mterpretation that reads Aristotle as 
contrasting the universal metaphysics with the particular sciences. He understands Aristotle as 
primarily concerned with contrasting the 'single genus' notion of 'science' with the 'said of one 
nature' notion. 152 He backs this up with evidence from Metapf?ysics ill where Aristotle 
characterises the study he is undertaking in terms of 'the science which we are seeking'.153 
However, it is not clear from this passage whether Aristotle is seeking a notion of 'science'154 or 
a 'science' in particular. It could still be the case that he is seeking the study of being qua being. 
Further, in developing the notion of a study of being qua being in Metapf?ysics iv, Aristotle 
draws an analogy with 'health' and 'medical'. It may be possible to consider the universality of 
the study of 'being' as contrasting with the study of 'health' and the study of 'medical'. None 
150 Yu, 'What Is the Focal Meaning of Being in Aristotle?', pg. 229. 
151 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1003a20-5. 
152 Yu, 'What Is the Focal Meaning of Being in Aristotle?', pg. 226. 
153 Aristotle, Metaphysics 995a24. 
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of these would fall under the 'single genus' notion of 'science', yet still the subject matter of 
'being' might still be considered as, in relation to that of 'medical' and 'health', universal. The 
'universality' in question would be the universal relevance of all beings to its field; this would 
be opposed to the absolute universality of the object of study if the study of being were taken 
as the study of a highest genus. 'Being' may be a universal subject matter without being a 
uruversal object. In any case, Yu is mostly correct when he notes that, 
When Anstotle drums that the study of bemg can also be called 'science' accordmg to the focal meaning notion, 
he not only no longer msists on the reqrurement that a saence must be about a genus, but also no longer demands 
that a science has to be demonstrative. The study of being 1s called 'science', but 1s not demonstratlve.155 
This is because, whilst demonstration remains intra-categorial, the study of being must 
function intra-, mter- and extra-categorially. As beings are not adequately described by a single 
genus, or even mdeed as being is not exhausted by categorial being taken as a whole, the study 
of being cannot be demonstrative according to Aristotle's sense of demonstration. Yu's basic 
argument is that the expansion of Aristotle's notion of a subject matter for study moves from a 
sense held in the Prior Anafytics and the Topics, which is modelled on mathematics and 
geometry, to one which incorporates the 'better' elements of dialectic, such that the subject 
matter might be understood to expand beyond the boundary of a single genus. The first sense 
is axiomatic.156 The second expanded157 Yu understands the divergence of these two passages 
as a development of Aristotle's notion of episteme. However, it may be possible that Aristotle is 
merely showing that demonstration is only possible intra-categorially; a position that Aristotle 
154 Note: I only use the term 'science' in order to cohere with the standard translat10n and avoid 
multiplication of terms. The use of this term in this context ought to imply no more than that. 
155 Yu, 'What Is the Focal Meaning of Being in Aristotle?', pg. 226. 
156 
"Nor can the theorem of any one science be demonstrated by means of another science, unless these 
theorems are related as subordinate to superior" (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 75b8-16; see also 76a2; 
Sophistical Refutations 172a36-8). 
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would still hold in the Metapf?ysics. The examples given in the etlucal treatises do not state that 
there can be no study of being qua being, but rather that there can be no one study of being. 
Aristotle doesn't appear to contradict such a notion at any point. In any case, it is true that 
having rejected the notion of being as the 'highest genus', Aristotle finds another way to unify 
the study of being qua being. He needs to determine the nature of his object of study in some 
sense, if he 1s to successfully circumscribe the subject matter. This unification takes the form 
of a pros hen ('m relation to one') structure. In Metapf?ysics iv, this structure is introduced as a 
foundational element of the study of being qua being, philosophza prote. 
The expansion of the notion of a unified subject matter to include inter- and extra-categorially 
related material is enabled by Aristotle's usage of a structure of unification that differs from the 
containment model of the categories. As a result of this expansion beyond the categories, and 
similarly to the case of actuality-potentiality, the structure of the study of being qua being is 
revealed only analogically158 ; largely through a comparison with 'health' and 'medical'. The 
resulting structure is indicated in Aristotle's work by two phrases; namely, pros hen (with regard 
to one), and pollachos legetai (said in many ways). Anstotle never provides a direct explanation of 
pros hen. Rather he demonstrates pros hen as relating to various subject matter by drawing 
analogies with other subject matter, the status of which he apparently takes as being clear 
already. The subject matter he continually returns to in this manner are 'health' and 
157 
"For not only in the case of things which have one common notion does the investigation belong to one 
science, but also in the case of things which are said of one nature" (Metaphysics 1003bl2-14). 
158 It is unportant to note at this point that, in the context of this chapter, 'analogy' is meant in its most 
usual sense; as the relation characterised by Aristotle as, "as a is to b, so c is to <f'. Pros hen structure is 
not itself related to analogy understood in this way; it is merely demonstrated analogically. Although 
Thomas Aquinas characterises 'pros hen' in terms of analogy, his characterisation has absolutely no 
relevance to the context of this chapter. One ought not to be confused by this terminological accident. In 
this chapter, 'pros hen' will be used to describe the relation of several to one, and 'analogy' will be 
reserved for the ratio "as a is to b, so c is to d". 
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'medical'159• Neither 'health' nor 'medical' can be reduced to a single category, under a smgle 
genus, or considered a genus itself. Nonetheless, each represents a single subject matter that, 
in some way, is intelligible as a realm of study. As subject matter, 'health' and 'medical' are 
'particular' in the sense that only certain entities will appear as relevant to the field of each. 
This particularity does not suggest a static or completable act or idea - more that there will 
always be an array of beings not immediately relevant to the subject matter. It is this form of 
particularity that is opposable to the sense of 'universality' that Aristotle gives to the study of 
being qua being. The subject matter of the study of 'being qua being' is not universal in the 
sense that its object takes the form of a 'highest genus'. Rather 1t 1s universal because all 
beings must be relevant to its field of enquiry. 
Aristotle writes in Metaphysics 1v: 
There are many senses m which a clung may be srud to 'be', but they are related to one central pomt (pros hen), one 
defirute kmd of thing, and are not homonymous. Everythmg that 1s healthy 1s related to health, one thmg m the 
sense that 1t preserves health, another m the sense that 1t produces 1t, another in the sense that 1t 1s a symptom of 
health, another because 1t is capable of lt. And that which 1s medical 1s relative to the medical art, one thing m the 
sense that 1t possesses it, another m the sense that 1t 1s naturally adapted to 1t, another m the sense that it is a 
function of the medical art. And we shall find other words used sumlarly to these. So, too, there are many senses 
m which a thing 1s srud to be, but all refer to one starting-pomt; some thmgs are srud to be because they are 
substances, others because they are affections of substance, others because they are a process towards substance, 
or destructions or privations or qualities of substance, or productive or generative of substance, or of things which 
are relative to substance, or negations of some of these things or of substance itself.160 
159 Aristotle describes the structures of 'health' and 'medical' in some detail m Categories 5 and 
Metaphysics vii.I. These two chapters thus serve as an elucidation of pros hen, even though the term itself 
does not appear in either chapter. 
160 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1003a32-b10. 
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The overt function of this passage is to demonstrate the possibility of a study of being qua 
being that does not take being in the manner of a genus. As such, it functions to provide an 
account of a sense of unity that does not derive from a relation of containment. As already 
indicated, although tlus pros hen structure is fundamental to Aristotle's philosophia prote, he did 
not take the structure itself as an object of study in any of his extant works. Pros hen remains, 
in a way, merely descriptive; Aristotle uses 'pros hen' as a description of a relation of several to 
one. However, pros hen is given a more precise structure through the use of analogy. Although 
Aristotle does not take up pros hen structure as a theme, he does use the term (along with 'said 
in many ways') in a consistent way, allowing the formation of a sense of its meaning by 
observing its several analogous uses - in particular those of 'medical' and 'health'. As such, in 
Metapf?ysics iv, 'medical' and 'health' are treated as material for the creation of an analogy. The 
goal of this analogy is to produce an understanding of a possible study of being qua being that 
is united in a manner that does not render being univocal. What is called pros hen structure is 
the residual 'same' that unites the analogically related material of 'health', 'medical' and 'being'. 
'Health' and 'medical' are useful because each is an example of a subject matter that extends 
beyond the confines of a single genus. Consider 'health' for example; many things are said to 
be healthy in different ways. Walking is said to be healthy because it helps to bring about 
health, a ruddy complexion is said to be healthy or unhealthy as a sign of health or otherwise, a 
body is said to be healthy if it functions in a certain way. Each of these is related to health in 
some way and could be included under a study of the subject matter 'health', but neither 
exhausts or encapsulates the notion of health as such. Similarly with 'medical'; medical art, a 
scalpel, a hospital, a given practice, or a doctor all relate to 'medical' ill some way without 
exhausting it as a subject matter. Further, another thing that both of these examples have ill 
common is that they appear to have a central, or 'primary', sense about which the other senses 
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gather. So, for example, 'health' primartly refers to the healthy body, for the reason that 
without it, the other senses serve no function. Medical art takes on the same role with regard 
to 'medical', as all other instances of the medical persist in accordance with their relationship 
with medical art. 'Health' and 'medical' can be characterised as relational structures featuring a 
central element as well as a set of secondary elements. Each of the secondary elements is 
united under an overarching subject matter ('health' or 'medical') through a relationship with a 
central 'object' or 'primary instance'. It is due to this arrangement, whereby a primary instance 
stands in relation to several secondary instances, that pros hen (in relation to one) gets its name. 
Note, however, that even the primary mstance of the set does not exhaust the subject matter. 
Aristotle makes clear that the priority of the primary mstance does not confer universality 
whilst discussing friendship ill the Eudemian Ethics-. 
There must, then, be three kinds of friendship, not all betng so named for one thtng or as species of one genus, 
nor yet having the same name quite by mere accident For all the senses are related to one which is the primary, 
JUSt as in the case with the word 'medical'; for we speak of a medical soul, body, instrument, or act, but properly 
the name belongs to that pnmanly so called 161 
He continues, 
Everywhere, then, we seek for the pnmary. But because the umversal 1s a pnmary, they also take the pnmary to 
be a universal, and this 1s an error. And so they are not able to do JUStlce to all the phenomena of friendship; for 
since one definition will not SUlt all, they think there are no other friendships; but the others are friendships, only 
not slmtlarly so.162 
161 Anstotle, Eudemian Ethics 1236a15-20. 
162 Anstotle, Eudemian Ethics 1236a23-26. 
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The primary instance is the main object of study under the particular subject matter, and 
without which the subject matter would not be,163 but it does not coincide with or exhaust the 
subject matter. This fact forms a fundamental difference (one often missed, particularly by 
those taking their Aristotle from Thomas Aquinas) between the approach to the study of being 
undertaken by Plato and Aristotle. But more on this later. In general then, the pros hen 
structure refers to the arrangement of a set of related beings, where each instance of the set 
receives its determination as belonging to the set, under the subject matter, and in relation to 
the primary object towards which a study of the subject matter would be directed. Regarding 
this arrangement, three points are clear; (i) that the hen of the set is not something external to 
the other elements of the set, but is rather one of their number; (ii) that the distinguishing 
feature of the hen is its priority over the other elements of the set, and (iii) that the subject 
matter of the set is not reducible to any of the members of the set, including the hen. Of 
further relevance to each of these, is the consideration that 'priority' itself is structured pros hen. 
For this reason, 'priority' ought not to be taken to have an obvious meaning with regard to the 
hen. This will be dealt with in more detail later in this chapter. For now 1t ought to be noted 
that the pros hen structure of 'priority' renders any determination of the nature of the priority 
obtaining in any particular pros hen set as less than obvious and thus, minimally, requiring some 
form of justification. So, for example, it is not obvious that the relationship between 'primary 
ouszd and the secondary instances of ousza (many commentators consider ousia itself to be 
structured pros hen) is one of emulation - an assumption that is made by several commentators 
163 See Aristotle, Metaphysics 1070a22, 'it is when the man is healthy that health exists'. 
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who, following Father Joseph Owens164, utilise pros hen structure as evidence for the validity of 
a particular theologically insptted readmg of Aristotle. 
The examples of 'health' and 'medical' provide a pinion against which a reversed analogy can 
be made with 'being'. The analogy 1s 'reversed' because, with 'health' and 'medical' it is the 
members of the set that are ID question. This is because the subject matter is understood 
already. Aristotle uses 'health' and 'medical' as examples because their meaning is already 
apprehended in some way. In thinking through this pre-apprehended meaning, one is able to 
develop an understanding of the manner in which its field of relevant entities is related; the 
entities are understood insofar as they are determined according to these established forms of 
interrogation or study. However, with the subject matter of 'being', the situation is reversed. 
In setting up an enqUJ.ry into being qua being, as Aristotle does in book gamma, 1t is the 
subject matter itself that is in question. There is no need to define membership to the set 
because, as the subject matter is 'being', the relevant entitles will be all 'thmgs that are'. As 
membership of the set is not in question at this stage, it is the structure of the relations 
between members and the concomitant structure of the subject matter that is determined by 
the analogy with 'health' and 'medical'. As such, the central element, the primary instance of 
the pros hen set named being, is ousia. In keeping with the analogy, as 'health' is not reducible to 
a state of bodily health and 'medical' is not reducible to medical art, 'being' is not reducible to 
ousia. In general, in a pros hen set, the hen is not what the set 1s said to be. It holds a certain 
structural priority, but does not itself determine the meaning of the subject matter. It is that 
member of the set which is said to be prior to the others, but this priority does not establish 
164 In particular Ins book on the concept of 'bemg' in Aristotle's Metaphysics: Joseph Owens, The Doctrine 
of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics: A Study in the Greek Background of Mediaeval Thought 
(Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1951). 
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grounds for the reduction of the subject matter to its primary object165• The primary instance 
has priority over the secondary instances according to one of Aristotle's charactensations of 
priority in Metapf?ysics v - priority by non-reciprocal responsibility. This means that the primary 
instance is that element of the set without which the other elements could not be. The 
primary instance serves as a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for the secondary 
instances. The pnmary instance is not more 'in being', qua the subject matter, than the subject 
matter; nor does it carry the meaning of the set. In the case of 'being', ousia is the one central 
element, prior by non-reciprocal responsibility, about which all other being gathers, and 
without which it could not be. Although it shares a relation of some kind with all being/ s, 1t 
does not name the sense of commonality, which is reserved for the name of the subject 
matter, 'being'. Ousia can not name the sense of the set - for if it did, all relevant objects, both 
primary and secondary instances, would be ousiai. Ousia would thus correspond with 'being', 
considered as the highest genus. By dividing the study's subject matter from its objects, 
Aristotle creates an opportunity for a study of being in which being is not taken as univocal. 
Whilst the subject matter of the study is 'being', 1ts primary object is ousia, which in tum is 
related in some way to all other kinds of being. The subject matter of a pros hen set ('health', 
'medical' and 'ousid) is not an entity or idea. It is that which is, in any relevant sense, common 
to its instances. The subject matter is a particular framework according to which entities are 
investigated and mterpreted. It 1s, in this sense, the mterface of question and answer for a 
given interrogative practice, or a cross-section of such a practice, cut such as to demonstrate 
the relationships obtaining within the interrogation. Further, the pros hen structure itself does 
not determine the kinds of relations that obtam between the secondary and primary instances 
of any given set. Thus there is a certain ambiguity that is basic to pros hen structure, whereby 
165 Michael Ferejohn, 'Aristotle on Focal Meaning and the Umty of Science', Phronesis, 25 (1980), 117-28. 
108 
the subject matter itself is discovered only within its engagement with that which it determines 
as belonging to itself. The ambiguity is not in the logico-grammatical formation of pros hen 
structure, but rather in the manner which, in line with this formation, the subject matter and its 
instances come to determine one another. This ambiguity is transferred to the subject matter 
of 'being'. The construction of a possible structure for the study of 'being' also serves to 
present 'bemg' as a particular kind of subject matter. In this way, even if it can be said that 
Aristotle did not in fact produce a metaphysics, as has been argued elsewhere166, it can be seen 
that his discussion of the possibility of such a study itself comes to determine the subject 
matter of 'being' m some way. 
3. Equivocation, Par01rymi"!J and Pros Hen Structure 
There is some disagreement over whether pros hen structure ought to be taken as example of 
(an albeit modified) equivocity, univocity, paronymity or a combination of these. In fact, none 
of these is appropriate, as the pros hen structure differs from each and 1s not reducible to a fact 
of language. Though a common term for pros hen structure in recent literature has been pros hen 
equivocation, this primarily appears to reflect a desire for terminological consistency. That pros 
hen structure is most often called 'pros hen equivocation' does not necessarily indicate that 
anyone seriously considers pros hen structure to in fact be an example of equivocation or 
homonymy in an unqualified sense. 'Equivocation' suggests identity merely at the level of 
vocabulary; i.e. in the case of 'race' as a classification of a group of humans and 'race' 
indicating a sort of competition, the identical term 'race' indicates two unrelated notions. If 
pros hen structure is to serve the non-generic unifying function that it ought it will need to 
provide a unity that functions on a deeper level than mere convention. Yet there is still a 
166 A case m point being, Jonathan Barnes, 'Metaphysics', in Jonathan Barnes (ed.), The Cambridge 
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temptation to consider pros hen in terms of equivocation. As Aristotle rules out the univocity 
of being as an option, it may be quite natural to turn towards equivocity. If neither 'being', 
'health' nor 'medical' can be said to have one sense, then they must have several senses. 
However, the significance of pros hen structure lies not only in its not being univocal, although 
this is very important, but also in the specific arrangement by which it mamtains unity in spite 
of this. Martha Hussain is not wholly incorrect when she claims pros hen structure to operate at 
a mid-point between the univocal and the equivocal. If one must use these terms, tlus is 
perhaps the way one ought to use them. However, the characterisation of pros hen structure m 
logico-linguistic terms is substantially misleading. Both 'univocal' and 'equivocal' refer to 
particular relations that might obtain between a name, that which it names, and its status with 
regard to other names and things - but largely from the perspective of use deriving from 
convention. If pros hen structure is to be taken seriously as a structure that renders possible the 
study of being, 1t must not be allowed to be reduced to a feature of language. Pros hen structure 
is in fact quite different to the structure of ordinary equivocation, and extends beyond the 
bounds of language. J.L. Austin, an early Anglo-analytic mterpreter of Aristotle, understood 
pros hen structure as an instance of paronymity. Tbis is a little closer, as paronymity describes 
the relationship between a group of terms that share a common element. However, 
paronymity fails to accurately describe the pros hen structure for two reasons. It is for the most 
part a term used to describe the relation between terms that share a common linguistic 
element. For example, 'psychiatrist', 'psycho', 'psychometrics', 'psyche out' and so on share 
the element 'psych-', and this element is not irrelevant to their meaning (unlike the equivocal 
terms whose linguistic similarity is not matched by a similarity of reference). Aristotle writes, 
Companion to Aristotle (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 66-108. 
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Paronyrruty belongs to dungs that have dtfferent names, but denved from one of them, e.g. when the grammarian 
gets lus name from grammar, or the brave man gets lus name from bravery.167 
Although the structure of paronymity does superficially resemble that of pros hen, it 1s dissimilar 
in all ways relevant to the function of pros hen as a non-generic account of uruty. In fact, 
paronymity (as in the 'nuclear' account given by J.L Austin168) applied to an mterpretation of 
the pros hen unity of being allows Aristotelian metaphysics to devolve into a h.tghly specified 
Platonic account. If the 'primary nuclear sense' of bemg within each particular being is in fact 
identical, the basic structure remains one of containment. There is no functional difference 
between this 'nuclear' sense of paronymity and a generic account that considers the 'nucleus' as 
genus. In both cases the 'same' is predicated of many. Aristotle denies that this is possible 
with being, as noted above. The 'nuclear account' is in fact structurally identical to the overtly 
Platorusing account of pros hen given by Peter J. Cataldo. More on this later. 
It is generally accepted in the secondary literature that the pnonty of ousia within the pros hen 
structure of being 1s both logical and ontological. Further, most commentators agree that the 
relation between primary and secondary instances of the pros hen set in general must be more 
than logico-linguistic However, the degree to which and the manner m which the implications 
of this are considered vary considerably. The categories themselves are a table of being insofar 
as it can be tabulated, rather than simply a logico-linguistic construction. Thus, insofar as the 
pros hen structure of being can be said to describe the dependence-relationships of the 
categories, this structure must hold at least the ontological status of the categories.169 In his 
167 Aristotle, Categories lal2-15. 
168 J. L. Austin, 'The Meaning of a Word', in J. 0. Urmson and G. J. Warnock (ed.), Philosophical Papers 
by J. L. Austin (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961). 
169 I say 'at least' because the pros hen structure of being refers both to the structure of the structure of the 
categories with ousia as its focus, but also to the quadripartite structure of being as such. Thus, msofar as 
bemg exceeds the categories, the reference to bemg as 'said in many ways' also exceeds the categories. 
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paper, Focal Meaning, D.W. Hamlyn agrees that the linguistic and the ontological are united in 
Aristotle and that this unity is a feature of pros hen structure. However he takes this linguistic-
ontological unity as a failure on Aristotle's behalf. Tbis is not an uncommon sentiment among 
Anglo-analytic interpreters.17° For example, Bostock writes, 
One only has to read a few lines of tlus, or any other, book of Aristotle to see that he 1s utterly careless of our 
disttnction between usrng a word in the normal way, to speak of whatever the word stands for, and mentioning 
the word itself.171 
Although Aristotle does draw distinctions that are relevant to a description of something like a 
relationship between the 'intelligible' and the 'real', it ought to come as no surprise that these 
distinctions take a different shape to those that are formed in a context temporally separated 
by several thousand years. Surely, 1f the aim is to develop an understanding of Aristotelian 
metaphysics, it would be more profitable to investigate the grounds of possibility for the unity 
of being and word in Aristotle than to crude him for his lack of 20th century savvy. In any 
case, D. W. Hamlyn's first move in his critique of 'focal meaning' 1s to artificially disengage 
Aristotelian meaning and being. Hamlyn writes that for Aristotle, 'the linguistic and 
170 Most frustrating is a commentator hke Michael Ferejohn, who criticises such reductive interpretations 
and then proceeds to make such reductions himself. He upbraids Owen for importing 'an alien ontology 
into a philosophical system where it has no place' (Ferejohn, 'Aristotle on Focal Meaning and the Unity of 
Science', pg. 118.) and accordingly limits himself to explicat10n in terms of Aristotle's 'relatively lean 
ontology containing nothing more than pieces of language and the extra-linguistic entities they signify'. 
Yet he immediately goes on to interpret pros hen in terms of the 'pieces of language' alone (Ferejohn, 
'Aristotle on Focal Meaning and the Unity of Science', pg. 120.), allowing him to render his narrow 
interpretation of the pros hen unity of being given in book gamma as 'designed to remove but a single a 
priori objection formulated in the Eudemian Ethics (1217b25-35) against constructing such a science' 
(Ferejohn, 'Aristotle on Focal Meaning and the Unity of Science', pg. 126.). Such a limited interpretation 
must leave one wondering why Anstotle would bother to claim that 'there is a study of being qua being' if 
what he really meant was 'this one objection to the possibility of a study of being qua being can be 
removed'. In any case, his interpretation leads him back to paronymity with, 'What we are looking for. .. 1s 
a single phrase for each non-substantial category which (i) contains the 'name' ousia, and which (ii) is 
interchangeable with on in all of its applications within that category'. (Ferejohn, 'Aristotle on Focal 
Meaning and the Umty of Science', pg. 122.) 
171 David Bostock, Aristotle's Metaphysics: Books Zand H (New York, 1994) pg. 45. 
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ontological pursuits can proceed hand ill hand. That, however, does not make it right.'172 He 
argues, roughly, that as Aristotle's 'realist' metaphysics is obviously wrong, any merit to be 
found in pros hen structure will only exist on the level of meaning. He thus interprets the 
primary and secondary instances of the pros hen structure as primary and secondary 'meanings'. 
As such he 1s able to assert that a secondary case is only legitlmately such a case if 1ts meaning 
is derivative of the primary case. This further prevents h1m from recognising a difference 
between the subject matter 'healthy' and the instance 'health', as he refuses to recognise 
'health' as the index of a concrete bodtly state. Similarly he writes, 
[I]t surely seems that Anstotle intends to suggest that what 1t means for things m the secondary categones to be 1s 
173 to be explamed m terms of what lt 1s for a substance to be 
In fact, ousia does not transmit its 'meanmg' to the secondary categories. It is not 'formally' 
prior, i.e. it is not a genus under which the secondary categories are orgarused. It does, 
however, 'stand under' (this being the reason for the translation of ousza as 'substance') the 
secondary categories such that they have the opportunity to be what they are. It is a necessary, 
but not sufficient, condition for thett being. Further, insofar as it is understood as the focal 
element of a pros hen set that is purely logico-linguistic in nature, ousia itself 1s reduced to form 
or essence, thus fundamentally restricting its power as a concept. Between the tode ti (the 
particular 'this'), and the genus as such, Aristotelian ousza moves between logical, ontological 
and sensate. To reduce categonal being to a simple set of meanings is fundamentally 
antagonistic to Aristotle's project. As such, any critrque built upon such a reduction must be 
understood either as a crude mismterpretation or the construct1on of a straw man. The former 
is most likely in Hamlyn's case, particularly considering his unacknowledged reduction of pros 
172 D. W. Hamlyn, 'Focal Meaning', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 78 (1978), 1-18 pg. 4. 
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hen structure to a case of paronymity. In assessing the plausibility of the connection between 
ousia ('substance') and the other categones, Hamlyn writes, 
In part:Icular the linguisttc link between F-ness and F-tlungs (the common term 'F') 1s lost m the case of substance, 
etc., and lt therefore becomes obscure how the connection between substance and other beings could rest on 
meaning.174 
He assumes that the relationship between 'health' and a 'healthy thing' is captured by the 
linguistic similarity between the two terms, and goes on to search for such a similarity between 
ousia and the other categories. Of course, the relation between ousia and other beings does not 
depend on meaning. Martha Hussain is right in arguing that the tode tz alone 1s capable of 
supporting accidental being and undergoing accidental change. This is because firstly, the 
matter (hule) of the tode tz, or 'composite being' (the tode ti being a 'composite' of matter and 
form) is understood by Anstotle as being entirely within the category of ousia. As such, all 
change, even accidental change, must be dependent upon ousia as composite. Thus, secondly, 
as for Aristotle neither form nor matter has being separately, only the tode ti fulfils all the 
requirements for 'standing under' accidental being ('being' according to the secondary 
categories). Hussain argues correctly that a legitimate defence, or critique, of Aristotle's 
position would have to be conducted in such a way as to maintain pros hen as applying to beings 
rather than to disembodied meanings. Hamlyn's critique lacks legitimacy because it is only as a 
result of his reduction of pros hen structure to a logico-linguistic sense, that he is unable to 
recognise the dependence of the secondary upon the primary instances of pros hen sets. 
Apart from the logico-linguistic interpretation of pros hen, with its often implicit reduction of 
ousia to its formal aspect, the explicit denial of the tode ti as the central element of pros hen 
173 Hamlyn, 'Focal Meaning', pg. 7. 
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structured being 1s the hallmark of a Platonic or a theological interpretation. A significant 
representative of the sophisticated Platonising theological interpretation of the pros hen 
structure of Aristotelian being is Joseph Owens. His commentary on Aristotle's Metapf?ysic/75 
is an extremely erudite work, and physically large enough to rival the equivalent work of 
Thomas Aquinas. Owens demonstrates 'primary ousia', that is, 'separate' (pure form as 
opposed to a 'composite' of matter and form) ousia as being itself the hen of a pros hen structure 
called ousia. There is nothing, at this stage, problematic Wlth such a conception. However, this 
leads Owens to reduce the hen of the pros hen structure of being itself to separate substance. 
The argument being that, if ousia is primary as compared to other forms of being, then primary 
ousia must be even more prior. Owens interprets the 'priority' of the primary ousi'a in terms of 
exemplanty, as a model or purest instance. Thus he understands pnmary ousza as the purest 
form of ousza. He then allows this form of priority to determme the relationship between ousia 
(now reduced to 'separate' ousia) and other forms of being; with the result that separate ousia is 
understood as that form of being that all other forms of being strive to emulate. Naturally this 
. 
interpretation is happily concordant with the same author's doxic responsibilities. However, 
for Aristotle, primacy is delivered in several ways. Indeed 'priority' itself is structured pros hen, 
and as such comes in several variations. There is no reason to assume that primary ousza is 
primary as an exemplar rather than some other form of priority. Indeed, the highest form of 
priority Aristotle describes in book v is the kind of priority that ousia holds over the other 
beings. In any case, such an interpretation is far from obvious and eventually runs counter to 
Aristotle's own arguments. Enrico Berti offers an excellent and critical overview of the 
174 Hamlyn, 'Focal Meaning', pg. 17. 
175 Owens, The Doctrine of Being zn the Aristotelian Metaphysics: A Study in the Greek Background of 
Mediaeval Thought. 
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Platonising tendencies of theological Aristotelian interpretation in his paper, Multiplicity and 
Unity of Being in Aristotle. Here he writes, 
If pnmary substance were the purest IDstance of bemg, 1t would be the essence of beIDg. In other words, there 
should be a substance whose essence would be beIDg itself. llis is the concept of God as Esse ipsum subszstens, 
which 1s present ID all the rehgtous IDterpretations of Greek philosophy, 1.e. in the Jewish theology of Philo of 
Alexandria, in the Muslim theology of Avicenna, and ID the Christian theology of Thomas Aqumas. In general, 
the supporters of this conception do not pay enough attention to the fact that Aristotle not only knew this 
conception, but ascribed it to Plato and cnticised it by arguments which are closely connected to his doctrine of 
the multiphc1ty of the meanmgs ofbeIDg.176 
The arguments Berti mentions are found in Metapf?ysics iii and were discussed earlier in this 
chapter. As Berti shows, Aristotle's criticisms of Plato in Metapf?ysics iii.4 are grounded in his 
argument in lli.3 against the possibility of a generic or uruvocal sense of being. Berti 
summarises Aristotle's argument: 
[I] f pnmary substance 1s the essence of beIDg, being must be understood uruvocally. If bemg has an essence, 1t 1s 
this essence. It cannot be many essences. But this 1s impossible; because we see many thmgs, and their 
differences are existing and each of them 1s one.177 
Enrico Berti's central concern with pros hen is to demonstrate its incompatibility with several 
notions of univocal being. His three primary targets for criticism are (1) analytic philosophy 
accounts that take 'being' purely in its existential sense, (2) J. L. Austin's characterisation of pros 
hen in terms of paronyrmty or 'nuclear meaning' and (3) the theological account of the pros hen 
structure of being that takes the primary instance of 'being' as primary substance, or God. 
According to Berti, each of these positions is based upon, or devolves to, a notion of being 
176 Enrico Berti, 'Multiplicity and Unity of Being in Aristotle', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 101 
(2001), 185-207 pg. 204. 
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that Aristotle attributes to Plato and criticises. Berti agrees with G.E.L. Owen and others that 
the prionty of ousia is both logical and ontological. Furthermore, he agrees with Owen's 'focal' 
account of the relationship between the primary and secondary instances, against the 'nuclear' 
account (by paronymity), whereby the primary instance is essential to all other mstances. 
Owen's argument against an interpretation in terms of paronyrruty is based on the idea that 
paronymity is purely an element of language, and fails to account for the ontological pnority of 
ousza. Berti goes further and suggests that, even if the paronymity account of pros hen 
incorporated both the logical and the ontological, it would nonetheless be inconsistent with 
Aristotle's thought. Tlus is because, if ousia is considered to be 'contained as a part' in the 
secondary bemgs, as it would be according to Austin's 'nuclear' account, ousia would be 
functionally equivalent to a genus of being. The other meanings attaching to each 'nucleus' 
would merely specify the generic sense of ousia. Aside from the arguments already given above 
regarding ousza's lack of suitability for the role of 'highest genus', such a structure would 
ultimately amount to a Platonism 'from the ground up'. That is, Anstotle's notion of being 
would differ from Plato's only ill Aristotle's emphasis on particulars rather than genera. In any 
case, Berti is correct that, by the nuclear account, the secondary meanings of ousia would 
'specify the genus without modifying it'.178 Regardmg the common Anglo-analytic defence of 
the uruvocity of being, Berti notes that it is usually defended by noting that in ordinary 
language stating that':>( does not exist is effectively the same as stating that the number of 'x7s 
is zero and that the opposite claim is identical to the claim that the number of x7s is at least 
one. 179 However, Berti notes that, as the univocity of number itself does not hold inter-
categorially, it cannot be used as a foundation for an argument for the uruvocity of bemg, 
177 Berti, 'Multiplicity and Unity of Being in Aristotle', pg. 207. 
178 Berti, 'Multiplicity and Unity of Being m Aristotle', pg. 195. 
179 Berti, 'Multiplicity and Unity of Being m Aristotle', pg. 188. 
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which must hold inter-categorially if it is to be correct.180 Berti notes that Aristotle appears to 
be well aware of this himself, as Aristotle writes of the multiple senses of 'one': 
For tlus reason to be one is to be mdivisible (being essentially a 'tlus' and capable of existing apart either m place 
or in form or thought); or perhaps to be whole and mdivisible; but it is especially to be the first measure of a 
kind[.]181 
and 
The measure 1s always homogeneous with the measured; the measure of spatial magrutudes 1s spatial magrutude, 
and m partlcular that of length 1s a length, that of breadth a breadth, that of articulate sounds an artlculate sound, 
that of weights a weight, that of units a unit.182 
'One' is no more appropriate as a highest genus than is 'being', and for the same reasons. This 
is why Aristotle specifies ill Metapf?ysics iii, that the differences under the genus need not only to 
be but to be one. In any case, it seems that Berti takes the theological stream of Platonising 
interpretations of Aristotle more seriously than the other Platonising accounts he offers 
criticism of. He shows in the first instance how they are all structurally sunilar before devoting 
significant critlcal attention to the Joseph Owens' interpretation in pamcular, and mainstream 
theological interpretation more generally.183 
Father Owens' commentary on the Metapf?ysics, and in particular his interpretation of pros hen, 
has itself become doctrine of a sort for several other interpreters, who share his conclusions 
but fail to consider the finer details of the argument. The result may be sophis11cated after its 
180 Berti, 'Multiplicity and Unity of Being in Aristotle', pg. 192. Berti also notes that several modem 
analytical philosophers have endorsed this position on the matter of number, including P.T Geach, M. 
Dummett and C. Wright, and that each of these attribute the doctrine to Frege. 
181 Anstotle, Metaphysics 1052b16-18. 
182 Anstotle, Metaphysics 1053a24-27. 
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own fashion, but often loses all connection to Aristotle's texts, devolvmg the covert 
Platonismg of the interpretation of Owens into an overt statement of all out similitude 
between Aristotelian and Platoruc being. Peter J. Cataldo's paper, Plato, Aristotle, and Pros Hen 
Equzvocity is a case in point184• Aside from being an admirer of Father Owens' account of pros 
hen structure, Cataldo argues that the pros hen structure originated in Plato; in particular in 
Plato's Sophist. In support of this argument he quotes Plato: 
Stranger. D1vidmg accordmg to kinds, not taking the same form for a different one or a different one for the same 
- 1s that no the business of the dialectic? 
Theaetetus. Yes. 
Stranger: And the man who can do that discerns clearly one form everywhere extended throughout many, where 
each one hes apart, and ma'!Y forms, different from one another, embraced from without by one form, and again 
one form connected ill a uruty through many wholes, and ma1!J forms, entirely marked off apart. That means 
knowmg how to distingmsh, kind by kind, ill what way the several kinds can or cannot combme.185 
Cataldo argues that Plato's phrase 'embraced from without by one' is equivalent to Aristotle's 
'with reference to one' <pros hen) 186• He understands the Aristotelian and Platonic accounts of 
this structure to be objectively identical. He claims their difference lies only in the direction of 
approach; i.e. coming from the perspective of 'the many', pros hen is most appropnate, from the 
perspective of the 'one', 'embraced from without' is most appropriate. Plato writes from the 
perspective of commonality, Aristotle from difference. His argument is fundamentally and 
fatally flawed. Firstly, one rmght wonder what this form, 'embracing' all beings 'from without' 
might be. The two candidates are ousia and 'being'. It cannot be ousia as the irreducibility of 
183 I will not run through all of his arguments here. Needless to say perhaps, I am sympathetic to his 
position and find his arguments against the sophisticated theological interpretation of pros hen compelling. 
184 Peter J. Cataldo, 'Plato, Aristotle, and Proz En Equivoc1ty', Modern Schoolman, 61(1984),237-47. 
185 Plato, Sophist 253dl-el. 
186 Cataldo, 'Plato, Aristotle, and Proz En Equivocity', pg. 244. 
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one category to another is what gives them their necessity. If all beings were 'embraced from 
without' by ousia, then all beings would be ousiai. Nor is being an appropriate candidate, for 
the somewhat obvious reason that this would render being as a genus; a Platoruc notion that 
Aristotle rejects time and time again. Secondly, the structure of pros hen as brought out by 
Aristotle's analogies with 'health' and 'medical' is clearly devised precisely to avoid a relation of 
containment between the subject matter and its objects. The subject matter of 'medical', for 
example, brings unexpected entities into its field of objects by way of discovery - a tool 
devised for a non-medical purpose does not find its categorial status modified when it is 
discovered to have a medical use. It simply comes to be relevant to the subject matter, 
'medical'. Neither the subject matter nor the primary object of 'medical' is a form, able to 
'embrace' the many from without. The fact that it is something other than this is precisely 
what makes it useful to Aristotle as an example of unity that does not require containment. 
This ought to be enough to show that Cataldo's argument is flawed. The similarities between 
Plato and Aristotle are profound and interesting. However, in this case it is a difference rather 
than a similarity that is most enlightening. 
4. 'Priority' as a Pros Hen Structure 
The arrangement of pros hen structure is at least nominally dependent upon a concept of 
'priority'. For Aristotle, 'priority' is not a univocal notion. Its various senses are laid out in 
Metaprysics v, m which he provides definitions for a range of terms. He also makes it clear that 
'priority' itself is 'said in many ways'; that it is structured as a pros hen set. At Eudemian Ethics 
1236a15-20 Aristotle lays out the relationship between several sorts of friendship, which he 
considers to be united pros hen. In order to describe this relationship he once again makes use 
of an analogy with 'medical'. Further, Aristotle utilises 'priority' to describe the relationship 
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between the central sense of 'medical' and its secondary senses. He does this seemingly in 
order to make a description of pros hen structure in terms of known subject matter, such that it 
might be passed on to 'friendship' by analogy. He writes: 
For all the senses are related to one wruch IS primary, JUSt as Is the case with the word 'medical'; for we speak of a 
medical soul, body, mstrument, or act, but properly the name belongs to that properly so called.187 
Michael Ferejohn notes correctly that the two conclusions essential to an understanding of pros 
hen structure to be drawn from thi.s passage are that (1) there is one member of a pros hen set 
that is 'prior' to the others and, (2) that this 'prior' element is one of the members of the set, 
rather than being external to it188• However, immediately after noting this, Ferejohn calls the 
exegetical value of the passage from the Eudemian Ethics mto question, considering the pros hen 
structure of 'priority' as a problem for an explication of pros hen structure itself m terms of 
priority. However, he understands Aristotle to have solved this problem in the next line: 
The primary IS that of wruch the defirutlon IS contamed In the defirutlon of aJl.189 
1bis he mterprets as Aristotle specifying the kind of priority he considers to be relevant to pros 
hen; namely a variety that Fereiohn interprets as 'logical primacy' (to logo protos). There are 
several problems with this. Firstly, it means that 'focal meaning', as Ferejohn (following 
Owen) terms pros hen, effectively devolves into paronymity /nuclear meaning as described by 
Austin, with all of its attendant problems. Secondly, such an account of pros hen contradicts 
Aristotle's own account of the relationship of priority obtaining between ousza and the other 
categories. Finally, it is based upon a correction to the Greek text made by Bonitz, presumably 
as it appeared to cohere more readily with contemporary interpretation. Enrico Berti notes 
187 Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics 1236a15-20. 
188 Ferejohn, 'Aristotle on Focal Meaning and the Umty of Science', pg. 120. 
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that only with Bonitz's190 replacement of en hemin with en pasin at 1236a20-21 is it possible to 
read the sense of priority it references reductively.191 Without the replacement, the passage 
would need to be translated quite differently - Berti suggests the more literal translation to be, 
The pnmary 1s that of which the notion 1s present in us. 
He goes on to interpret the sentence: 
ThlS means that the pnmary 1s only a term of reference, i.e. that to which the others stand ill relation (pros), and is 
common to all just for this reason, and not because it is a uruversal ill conformity with which (kata) the others are 
said.192 
This interpretation certainly coheres with the use of pros hen m the Metapf?ysics as a way of 
providing unity specifically without having to create a genus. It also coheres with the senses of 
priority that ousia 1s said to have over the other categories. It only leaves the 'problem' of pros 
hen's being structured according to a notion that is itself structured as a pros hen set. However, 
this is not a problem for the account of pros hen to be presented in this chapter - rather, the 
recursive nature of pros hen structure is considered a fact that must be taken into account. As 
such, Ferejohn's (and Owen's) interpretation of the passage on priority in the Eudemian Ethics 
will be discarded in favour ofBerti's. 
In Metapf?ysics v Aristotle discusses four separate notions of priority. However, he takes one of 
these senses of priority to be necessary for the others. He writes that some things are said to 
be prior, 
189 Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics 1236a20-21. 
190 Hermann Bomtz was a famous Aristotle commentator of the 19th century and wrote the Index 
Aristotelicus. 
191 Berti, 'Multiplicity and Unity of Being in Aristotle', pg. 196. 
192 Berti, 'Multiplicity and Unity of Being in Aristotle', pg. 196. 
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1Il respect of nature and substance, 1.e. those wluch can be without other thlilgs, while the others cannot be 
without them, - a chst1Ilc1lon wluch Plato used.[ ... ] In a sense,[ ... ] all thlilgs that are called pnor and posterior are 
so called according to tlus fourth sense; for some thlilgs can eJUst without others 1Il respect of generation, e.g. the 
whole without the parts, and others 1Il respect of chssolu11on, e.g. the part without the whole. And the same 1s true 
in all other cases.193 
The 'primary' sense of priority, which here will be called priority by 'non-reciprocal 
responsibility', is also the sense which is most relevant to the pros hen structure as such. As 
Anstotle mdicates in the above passage, non-reciprocal responsibility indicates a kind of causal 
relationship, whereby one or more beings stand as a necessary (but not sufficient) condition 
for another, and where this relationship only functions in one direction (i.e. it is not 
reciprocated). This can be seen to relate clearly to both of the senses of ousia that Aristotle 
notes. Also in Metapryszcs v, Aristotle writes: 
[S]ubstance (ousza) has two senses, (a) the ultlmate substratum, which 1s no longer predicated of anything else, and 
(b) that wluch is a 'this' and separable. 
Of the first sense, one could say that ousia is non-reciprocally responsible insofar as it forms a 
substrate for all predication. Regarding the second sense, ousia is non-reciprocally responsible 
as the substrate of all composite being. These two senses are not strictly separable, except that 
they represent the two poles between which stretches a continuum. The first is considered to 
be prior in knowledge according to 'formula' and the second prior in 'perception'. 
Nonetheless, each within its own (perhaps only nominally separate) space takes up its role 
based upon its priority according to non-reciprocal responsibility. Further, ousia is not 
considered prior in terms of non-reciprocal responsibility exclusively. According to Aristotle, 
ousia is prior according to all senses of priority: 
193 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1019al-15. 
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Now there are several senses ill which a thing is srud to be primary; but substance (ousza) is prunary ill every sense 
- in formula, in order of knowledge, in time. For of the other categones none can exist illdependently, but only 
substance. And ill formula also this 1s prunary; for m the formula of each term the formula of its substance must 
be present And we think we know each thmg most fully, when we know what 1t 1s, e.g. what man 1s or what fire 
1s, rather than when we know its quality, its quantlty, or where it is; sillce we know each of these thmgs also, only 
when we know what the quantity or the quantity zs.194 
Each of these senses of ousia's priority is relevant to its status within the pros hen structure of 
bemg. Tbis is particularly important to recall when one becomes tempted towards a reductive 
reading of pros hen. From both perspectives of ousia proper (in 'formula' and in 'time/ as a 
separable 'thts''), it is non-reciprocally responsible for the other aspects of being. Also, as 
Aristotle notes, ousia is prior in knowledge. Most significantly, one ought to note that this 
passage suggests again that the tode ti, a 'this' something or other, the concrete object in time, 
serves as at least one of the forms of ousia accordmg to wmch it is the primary instance of the 
pros hen set of 'being'. Once again, given that the full range of possibilities for priority applies 
directly to ousia insofar as it is a member of the set 'being', there 1s no obvious argument for 
the reduction of pros hen (particularly regarding 'being') to a logico-lmguistic aspect. 
Considered as a pros hen set, 'priority' does take on some strange features. Non-reciprocal 
responsibility is the hen, the primary instance, of this set; the subject matter being 'priority'. As 
such, an odd circularity is created. The relationship between the primary and secondary 
instances of any pros hen set 1s itself the hen of a particular pros hen set. Although 'priority' 
conditions the relationship between the primary and secondary senses of 'being', or mdeed of 
any other pros hen set, 'priority' itself 1s structured ill this same way. It would thus appear, upon 
first consideration at least, that 'priority' is structured according to itself. Perhaps, however, a 
194 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1028a30-28b3. 
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slightly better reading would interrupt the apparent circularity by way of inserting a level of 
contingency, perhaps m the form of a judgement. In this manner one might say that non-
reciprocal responsibility appears to gain its status as a 'primary instance' by way of a judgement 
regarding the hierarchical ordering of entities, and that this ordering is in fact described by the 
structure within which it 1s primary. The notion of 'priority' as a contingent relational structure 
informmg the content of a judgement would appear to be supported by Bertr's translation of 
Eudemian Ethics 1236a20-21, describing the 'primary' as 'that of which the notion is present in 
us'. The 'notion' of that which is primary may derive from somewhere other than 'us' of 
course, but it does appear on this reading that Aristotle's mterest in assessing the primary in 
the context of pros hen does not extend beyond the extension of primacy to some being or 
another. In other words, he does not direct his attention to 'priority' itself. The description he 
does give appears to suggest a certain requirement of knowledge for its assessment. Further, it 
seems simpler to understand 'priority by non-reciprocal responsibility' in terms of srmple non-
reciprocal responsibility itself rather than attempting to recast it in terms of priority. Consider 
the application of 'priority by non-reaprocal responsibility' to the relationship between ousia 
and other being. What this expresses is ousids necessity for other forms of being. This 
relationship does not innately express priority; in fact priority itself is structured accordmg to 
this relationship of dependence. Pros hen structure may not in fact be conditioned by 'priority', 
but rather by non-reciprocal responsibility as such. In this case 'priority' can be understood 
strictly as an addition to the description of pros hen. An essential feature of non-reciprocal 
responsibility is that it functlons in one direction; yet this need not confer 'priority'. Priority is 
conferred, as an addition to the structure of non-reciprocal responsibility, by a judgement. The 
judgemental schema applied to the relatron obtaining between ousia and the other categories is 
structured pros hen. It 1s this judgemental schema that is most appropriately investigated under 
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the subject matter 'priority'. Non-reciprocal responsibility finds its strongest representation in 
the ontological necessity of ousia. This necessity appears to be transformed into the central 
element of the pros hen set 'priority' by way of a judgement on the association of necessity v.rith 
primacy. What grounds 'priority' as a relational structure is not the particular set of relations 
suggested by its definition in Metapf?ysics v, but rather the regularity of the relation between ousia 
and the other manifestations of being. Ousia, as the bearer of being, lends its necessity to the 
structure of priority as such; it adds 'weight' to its centre, distracting from its contingency. The 
fact of non-reciprocal responsibility manifests as a particular pattern v.rithin a meaningful 
milieu. Its association v.rith 'priority' is contingent. In fact, the structure of 'priority' itself is 
dependent upon this fact and must be explained accordingly. As such, if the pros hen structure 
itself is to be explained, it v.rill not be in terms of priority, which supervenes upon non-
reciprocal responsibility. Non-reciprocal responsibility, the binding element of the pros hen 
structure, which is best represented by the relationship between ousia and other forms of being, 
is only superficially transformed by the notion of 'priority', and is the simpler concept. 
5. The Pre-apprehension ef Subject Matter and Its Integratton znto the Causal Milieu 
In his paper titled Focal Meaning, D.W. Hamlyn writes of 'healthy things': 
[W]e could not understand what lt was for these kinds of things to be healthy 1£ we did not know what health 
was.195 
On this matter he is absolutely correct, and in fact this must be true of all pros hen sets 1f they 
are to be understood as ways of approaching and interpreting beings. This because a member 
of such a set only presents as such in terms of a given episteme or interpretive schema. 'Health' 
195 Hamlyn, 'Focal Meaning', pg. 2. 
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for example, must be apprehended in some way pnor to its application as a subject matter. 
However, the form of this apprehension is different to that wruch would apply to a 'thing' or 
an object. There is no thing called 'health', 'medical', 'priority' or 'being' with which a simple 
relation might be had. That which is apprehended as a subject matter is the notion of the 
potential or actual awareness of the relevance of a set of entities to a given set - and the nature 
of that relevance. The unity that is achieved under a pros hen set is thus also only possible in 
terms of given form of pre-apprehension. It is only because the subject matter of the pros hen 
set 1s already understood as a manner of approaching beings that the subject matter can be 
unified pros hen. The unity of such a subject matter 1s based both upon the relationship of non-
reciprocal responsibility holding between the primary and secondary instances, and upon the 
partlcular knowledge-structures that inform the interaction between the subject matter and its 
objects. For example, 'health' must be understood in some way if one is to appreciate how 
one thing, act or circumstance can be healthy, while another cannot. This is even the case with 
the primary mstance, the healthy bodily state, which can also only be recognised as such 
against a background of an awareness of 'health'. Llkewise, 'medical' must be understood in 
some way if beings and practices are to be understood as either medical or not. Membership 
only becomes recognisable through engagement with the subject matter; 'learning' is this kind 
of engagement. The transformation of a 'learner' into a 'knower' is theorised by Aristotle in 
terms of the conceptual schema provided by actuality-potentiality. The 'knower' 1s one who 
pre-apprehends the subject matter in the interrogative act. Each subject matter represents a 
different mode of interrogation. Within the subject matter, beings are mterrogated according 
to their relevance to that subject matter. Each pros hen structure is found, upon being known, 
pre-arranged in such a fashion as to be taken according to the 'meaning' of its subject matter, 
but this subject matter has no sense outside of the notion of the interrogative relationsrup that 
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the subject matter is said to describe. Note that the borders between each subject matter 
cannot be rigidly defined; consider in particular the close relationship between 'health' and 
'medical'. The subject matter 1s determined, and determines, according to the form of the 
interrogation, which is itself determined both by the beings themselves under interrogation and 
by the accumulation of prior interpretive theory, practice and associated meaning that informs 
the expectation of what beings are relevant to the study and in what ways. So the pros hen unity 
of a subject matter functions only insofar as there is a pre-existing acquisition of relevant 
knowledge. This is seen clearly in the 'health' and 'medical' examples, and is extended to the 
study of being qua being by analogy. With pros hen extended to 'being' in this way, ousia, though 
non-reciprocally responsible for the other senses of being, does not determine the meaning of 
the subject matter 'being', and in fact only comes to have a relationship with 'being' insofar as 
the subject matter 'being' has been broadly unified and pre-understood in some way. 
The difference between any two kinds of subject matter is marked by the content of what 
might be called its 'field'; the array of relevant entities and the particular senses in which they 
are relevant. It is a difference in the structure of the space of engagement in which the 
members of the field are revealed as 'what they are' qua the subject matter. As the acquisition 
of familiarity with a given subject matter 1s subject to the continuity of the relationship 
between 'learner' and 'knower', and further extends toward the horizon of discovery, the 'field' 
can only be softly determmed. Central to the field is the 'primary' instance of the pros hen set; 
the object without which the proper function of the investigation according to the subject 
matter could not viably proceed. The subject matter can also only be softly determined. 
Although the subject matter, as that into which a 'learner' is apprenticed, plays a fundamental 
role in determination of its objects, it remains somewhat indeterminate. As an illustration of 
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this, consider 'health'. 'Health' is the name of a subject matter organised pros hen. The name 
serves to indicate the organisation of a field of beings insofar as they relate to an investigation 
centring on the healthy bodily state. The notion of this state is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for the other instances of 'health'. In terms of its broader meaning, 'health' takes 
many forms. It may be understood as an index of a state of the body (e.g. body temperature), 
or it may be understood in terms of the causal significance of another being or act upon that 
state, depending upon the aspect of 'health' brought to bear on the interrogative act. 'Health' 
as a subject matter informs the notion of the healthy state in myriad ways. It supplies the 
determination of the healthy state as a state, as opposed to a continuum of bodily arrangement. 
It brings the apparatus of secondary instances; significations causal relationships, kinships, and 
other relations of various kinds. Although these secondary instances are not directly 
responsible for the existence of the primary instance as an idea, they nonetheless modify the 
subject matter (in particular by modifying its field) - in terms of which the 'primary' instance 1s 
determined as its central concern. Withm the study of 'health', the healthy body, its 
indications, causes and function will largely exhaust the subject matter. In this context, the 
meaning of 'health' is associated with notions of the difference between the healthy and the 
sickly. However, the difference between healthy and sickly bodies 1s not simply that one is 
healthy and the other sickly. Rather, the differences are concrete differences in spatial 
arrangement and function. The determination of the relevance of a difference or set of 
differences is the province of the study of 'health'. When 'health' is considered in terms of a 
set of differences between bodies, or in terms of a set of practices and objects that might have 
a bearing on these differences, a pre-apprehension of 'health' must already be in play. The 
array of facts and understandings pertaining to bodies, relating to things and actions insofar as 
they are healthy, is an insufficient explanation for the unity of 'health' as a subject matter. Nor 
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is it sufficient for the explanation of the circumstances under which healthy beings and 
practices are understood according to the meaning of 'health'. The meaning of the subject 
matter is not found solely in that which is met in the interaction, or solely in the subject matter 
considered in the abstract. Rather it is found in the relation that each instance holds with an 
enquiry according to the meaning as pre-apprehended. Although the field of relevant entities 
is determined qua the subject matter in terms of an already functioning mode of interrogation, 
the form of this interrogation is not static, and can itself only be understood in terms of this 
relation. The manner in which the pre-apprehension of 'health' appears will depend both 
upon the state-of-the-art in 'health' at a given time, and upon the interactions that obtain 
between this state-of-the-art of 'health' and the greater causal manifold. Clearly a 'subject 
matter' is not an object in the ordinary sense. As was discussed earlier in this chapter, 
attempting to give a subject matter meaning according to the kinds of classificatory schema 
appropriate to ordinary objects tends to fail in two broad ways: by advertently or inadvertently 
Platonismg Aristotelian 'being', or by rendering Aristotle's account of being senseless. 
Confusion over the meaning of a given subject matter comes about with the attempt to define 
it according to standards more appropriate to objects. That the subject matter is not brought 
to absolute definition need not mean that it is misunderstood (nor also need 1t mean that 1t 
cannot be brought to some form of unity); perhaps rather that it is not amenable to a form of 
definition that particularly suits a definiendum with the characteristics of an object. For 
example, the subject matter 'health' is more or less well understood depending upon the 
quality and quantity of one's involvement with 'health' as an interrogative practice. Further, it 
is according to the notion of this interrogative practice that each subject matter can be 
considered a unity. 'Health', 'medical', and 'priority' remain as separate subject matter, and 
each is thus unified in some way, in virtue of the limit that the notion of the particular 
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interrogative practice applies to membership of the field of its subject matter. The limit of 
each subject matter must shift according to the conjunction of the subject matter and its 
objects - neither one nor the other in isolation. It is in terms of this lirmt that the study of 
bemg qua being can be considered universal, i.e. as universally applicable. 
The interrogation, or study, of beings under any subject matter can have causal/transformative 
power. The relevant transformation is of a given episteme or subject matter. This 1s occasioned 
both by the interaction between the process of discovery (according to the study of a given 
subject matter) and formal/theoretical requirements of the subject matter. This causal 
interaction runs in at least two directions; i.e. from objects to subject matter and subject matter 
to objects. The subject matter holds sway over its objects msofar as they are held to belong 
together, are named, and given causal reference in terms of the set. However, the members of 
the set must also contribute to the nature of the subject matter. If this were not the case, then 
discovery would not be possible under a subject matter. Beings have the opportunity to be 
modified with respect to a subject matter through the process of discovery. As they move into 
the range of the interrogation and become significant for it, they are recognised and 
determined as such. Yet at the same time the subject matter must be subtly modified. This 1s 
because the subject matter is in part constituted by the relations between objects within its 
field; if these change, then the subject matter must change. The study of 'health', for example, 
is changed as the significance of its objects change. This change is persistent, in that it is a 
change in that which will be taught to the student of 'health'. Thus, the outward manifestation 
of such a change is a change m that which is transmitted between the teacher and the student. 
Further, between becoming a knower and becoming a teacher the person remains a site of 
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continuing causal interaction196, such as to occasion the potential for transformation of a given 
episteme. Such transformations may be central to the function of a given pros hen set; being 
included under the notion of 'discovery'. However, bringing mto consideration the relations 
ancillary to a given subject matter, the sense of unity of a given pros hen set becomes even more 
fluid. Such ancillary relations might include interactions between multiple episteme within the 
one knower, differences in pedagogical practice, intellectual interests, the modification of 
objects of a subject matter according to a set of causes external to the subject mat~er, and so 
on. The point being that the particular subject matter is not isolated from the greater causal 
manifold, and is as such subject to the same 'insofar as' as other manifestations of determinate, 
or actual being. Taking a given pros hen set on its own is an abstraction of sorts. The particular 
pros hen set can be thought of as the image of a particular interrogative practice as defined by a 
subject matter. However, the creation of this image must be considered as an abstraction as 
long as the continuity of the interrogative act is left out of consideration. The subject matter, 
considered as a unity, is a hypostatisation of a continuous act. Carrying tlus idea forward, 
categorial being can be reconsidered somewhat. The categories, where ousia and other aspects 
of being are splayed out statically are, taken as a whole, a table of being insofar as beings can 
be questioned as to what they are. As such, and in light of their being united pros hen about 
ousia, the categories can be considered as a hypostatisation of a set of possibilities that reside at 
the interface of question and answer under the subject matter of 'being'. Within this 
interaction, the relation between question and answer operates tangentially to the structure of 
the pros hen set. So, to construct a visual analogy197, if the pros hen set is imagined to operate 
two-dimensionally, accordmg to the X-:J axes of Cartesian geometry, the relation formed by the 
196 It is as a modification of such a site of 'continuing causal mteraction' that the Cartesian method will be 
considered in the next chapter. 
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mterrogative act contributes the z axis. By this analogy, the pros hen set can be imagined as a 
cross-section of a three dimensional structure, modified 1n time by causes both internal and 
external. 
Whether or not one considers Aristotle to have had a 'metaphysics' as such, the status of being 
is determmed in some way by the demonstration of the nature of its possibility as a study. As 
such, the begmning of Metapf?yszcs iv is more than a preliminary discussion. In determining 
'being' as study-able in a certain way, by analogy with 'health' and 'medical', 'being' is 
determined as a particular kind of subject matter. The determination of 'being' accordmg to 
book 1v 1s done in such a way as to avoid the reduction of bemg to ousia, and also to avoid the 
construction of a notion of 'being' as a genus. Regardless of how precise the analogy with 
'health' and 'medical' is, the study of being qua being must be significantly different simply in 
virtue of its universality. The study of being qua being requires a form of pre-apprehended 
subject matter to which all being has some relevance. Consider Aristotle's discussion of the 
transmission of a given episteme from teacher to student, by way of incorporating the 
transformation of a learner into a knower into the notion of actuahty/potentiality. In this 
situation it is the student that is the subject of change. However, as discussed in this chapter, 
the episteme itself can be taken as the subject of a change or transformation. This is because, in 
spite of its not havmg the character of an object, a given subject matter or epzsteme is both 
unified (pros hen), and mtegrated with the greater causal structure. In 'pros hen' Aristotle has 
established an inter- and extra-categorial way to theorise the unification of an episteme. 
Aristotle's notion of transformation accordmg to actuality-potentiality allows for peripheral 
transformations leading into larger-scale transformations, and allows for multiple levels of 
197 A visual or geometrical analogy can be a useful simplification. Such a simplification is partlcularly 
useful when attemptmg to integrate indrrectly related material. 
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analysis, through the 'insofar as' that is central to the function of actuality-potentiality. Under 
such a subject matter as 'being', the notion of its own constitution will be relevant. Its 
universality does not render it stable, as it is subject to the same forces as any other subject 
matter. The difference lies in the fact that consideration of itself is one of its potential sources 
of modification. The recursion resultmg from this is difficult to make sense of in terms of 
Aristotelian theory. Nonetheless it appears to be a peculiarity to the study of being qua being if 
its founding analogy is followed consistently. It is not the aim of this thesis to pronounce 
upon the extent or scope of Aristotelian metaphysics. However, it does seem as though this 
moment, where first philosophy appears to potentially become its own object, lies just outside 
of the deepest level of discourse possible according to the Aristotelian paradigm. Nonetheless, 
many of the elements of such a discourse are present. The notion of a basically Aristotelian 
account of the processes and causes of the transformation of a given episteme is not entirely 
implausible. Aristotle's use of pros hen structure to set up the possibility of a study of being qua 
being borders on the meta-philosophical. He examines (albeit in a cursory manner) the 
manner in which two uncontroversial areas of study ('medical' and 'health') function as subject 
matter in relation to their objects, and how their objects interact with one another internal to 
the subject matter. By way of analogy, Aristotle extends the same structure to the proposed 
study of being qua being. However, there is no clear point at which the explanation of the 
possibility of the study of being qua being, and the study of being qua being proper, diverge. 
The meta-philosophical discussion at the beginning of Metapf?ysics iv is an instance of the very 
study 1t is ostensibly rendering possible, insofar as it determines its subject matter and its 
objects as bemg of such and such a kind. Being is a special subject matter; this is true insofar 
as the whole notion of the subject matter of 'being' and the act of its own study are withm its 
purview. So the analogy with 'health' and 'medical is not perfect, at least on this one point. 
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Although one might happily discuss the structure of these realms of study without actually 
engaging in their study, the study of being qua beillg will naturally bring the conditlons under 
which it is a study into itself. Unlike the study of 'health' or 'medical', a study of being qua 
being must be a component of 1ts own object. 
6. Conclusion 
Several aspects of pros hen have been extended in this chapter ill order to form a scaffolding for 
the integration of actuality-potentlality with the account of Cartesian metaphysics to follow. 
There are four aspects of particular relevance. (1) Regardlllg the possibly recursive structure of 
Aristotle's proposed study of being qua being, a related recursion will be shown to obtain 
withlll the relationship between the Cartesian method and Descartes' metaphysical system as a 
whole. (2) The universality of subject matter, as opposed to the uruversality of object. (3) Pros 
hen structure and the Cartesian method both describe, from differing perspectives, the 
relationship between a subject matter and its field. ( 4) Both Aristotelian pros hen and Cartesian 
method suggest, when pushed, the fundamental integration of subject matter into the greater 
causal milieu. These points of intersection are not intended to demonstrate any possibility of a 
reduction. Rather, it is intended that they will allow more and less peripheral connectlons 
between these distinct arrangements of concepts to be drawn out in some detail, in order to 
expand the imagmed context of each. There is no suggestlon here that there is anything less 
than a fundamental and irreducible difference in entire conceptual structure between the works 
of these two philosophers. Nonetheless, in order to facilitate an interaction one has been, and 
one will be, respectfully extended ill such a manner as to create some common ground. Still 
several relevant differences remain even within this common ground; two of particular note: 
(1) Aristotle's use of pros hen is, considered most generously, a description of a form of 
135 
structure, whereas Descartes' method describes a change in structure, and (2) pros hen is used 
by Aristotle to establish unity, whereas the Cartesian method is in part an attempt to escape the 
imposition of subjective unity. 
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Chapter 4 
THOUGHT AND PHENOMENA IN THE CARTESIAN METHOD 
1. Introduction 
Descartes' Rules for the Direction ef the Mind begins with the statement that, 
the rum of our studies should be to direct the mind with a VIew to forming true and sound judgements about 
whatever comes before it.198 
This sentiment, with the addition of the notion that such 'true and sound judgements' 
constitute absolutely certain knowledge199, form the core of Descartes' overt characterisation 
of the proper value of method. The Cartesian method is, from this perspective, that set of 
practical and theoretical principles that allow for the ready attainment of knowledge. In Rules 
for the Direction ef the Mind the sixth rule200, Descartes claims, 'contains the main secret' of his 
method, as it, 
198 Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind, AT X 359, CSM I 9 
[Note: All references to Cartesian texts are to "Rene Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 
trans. John Cottingham & Robert Stoothoff & Dugald Murdoch, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985)." I will provide both page references to the appropriate Cottingham, Stoothoff and Murdoch 
volume (CSM I, II or ill) and the references to the Adams and Tannery text.] 
199 Descartes wntes at the beginning of rule two in the Rules for the Direction of the Mznd that, "All 
knowledge is certain and evident cognition." (AT X 362, CSM I 10). 'Knowledge' (scientia) is, for 
Descartes, necessarily certain, so 'certain knowledge' is, stnctly, tautological. 
200 
"In order to distinguish the simplest things from those that are complicated and to set them out in an 
orderly manner, we should attend to what is most simple in each series of things in which we have directly 
deduced some truths from others, and should observe how all the rest are more, or less, or equally removed 
from the simplest." Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind, AT X 381, CSM I 21 
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mstructs us that all things can be arranged serially 1Il various groups, not in so far as they can be referred to some 
ontological genus (such as the categones !Ilto whtch philosophers chvide thmgs), but m so far as some thmgs can 
be known on the basis of other thmgs.201 
Notmg later on that the "greatest advantage of our method lies ID this progressive ordering."202 
Descartes considers such 'ordering' is useful insofar as it allows one to make best use of 
limited human capacities. It allows for a reduced possibility for error, as one need only ever 
consider the relationship between one term and the next within the constructed order. So far, 
this is not so far removed from the geometrical method of Euclid. It is the way in which 
Descartes sets about establish the first principles (or axioms) of a possible sequence, and the 
fundamentally reduced ontology that results, that is usually understood as uniquely Cartesian. 
Whereas the geometrical method begins from 'self evident' first principles, the Cartesian 
method ought to be understood as the process Descartes establishes for the grounding of self 
evidence itself. Descartes ostensibly demonstrates a concrete articulation of lus method, from 
a first person perspective (that is, from the perspective of the limited human intellectual 
capacities), in his Meditations on First Philosopf?J. Here Descartes provides a first-person account 
of the transformation of a broadly Aristotelian structure of knowledge into something else. 
This transformation, as 1s well known, is structured according to Descartes' founding of 'self-
evidence' in hyperbolical doubt; transforming 'self-evidence' into 'certamty' by way of 
indubitability. 
The focus of this chapter will be on the detail of Descartes' characterisation of 'certainty' in 
terms of 'indubitability'. This focus ought to be understood as occurring within the greater 
context of a transformation of a structure of knowledge, conceived as an extension of the pros 
201 Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind AT X 381, CSM I 21 
202 Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind, AT X 452, CSM I 65 
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hen structure outlined in the previous chapter. In Metapf?yszcs iv Aristotle describes prote 
philosophza as the study of being qua being, and shows this study to be structured pros hen. The 
title of Descartes' Meditations on First Phzlosopf?y suggests at least a nominal connection between 
these two enterprises. However, the form of engagement each takes with fundamental 
philosophy is qmte different. Aristotle's engagement with pros hen as a structure of knowledge 
is part of a demonstration of the possibility of first philosophy, as he conceived it, as a form of 
study. As was shown in chapter three, the use of this structure opens up the possibility for 
integrating forms of knowledge into a larger causal theory, allowing knowledge to function as 
both cause and effect. A 'structure of knowledge' should thus be understood as only a partial 
aspect of the greater sense of thought, and world, as such. Just as a 'theory' should only be 
understood as an adumbration, as a set of indices pointing towards a greater causal situation, a 
structure of knowledge should be understood as only the most obvious aspect of thmking. In 
describing changes in structures of knowledge, or perhaps after Descartes, 'structures of 
th_ought', one is describing snapshots, incomplete even when considered only synchrorucally, 
of a greater process of thinking in all of its aspects. In characterising the study of being qua 
being in terms of pros hen structure, first philosophy itself becomes a possible subject of 
transformation. Descartes' project appears to be motivated ill part by a desire to put a halt to 
such transformation, or rather, to produce a cotTect transformation. It 1s in his association of 
indubitability and certainty that Descartes finds the principle of such correct transformation. 
In this chapter, the relationship between indubitability and certainty will be laid out, with 
particular attention given to the way in which Descartes translates an aspect of psychic life 
such that it might form the foundation of a theoretical structure; how he moves from the 
recognition of a concrete inability to doubt (an aspect of 'psychic life' or 'enacted thought'), to 
a 'certain' foundation of 'the sciences' ill a set of concepts and prillciples. 
139 
The sense of 'priority' that informs Descartes' notion of 'first philosophy' differs significantly 
from that according to which Aristotle characterised the study of bemg qua being. Descartes 
claimed two motivations for the Meditation.r, the demonstration of the existence of God and the 
certain foundation of the sciences, 203 and these relate to priority ill being and priority in 
knowledge respectively. Whilst it is more probable that Descartes' use of the expression prima 
philosophia in the title of Meditationes de Prima Philosophia relates to his discussion of God as an 
ontological foundation, the sense of priority that has been most closely associated with 
Descartes is priority in knowledge. It is according to this sense of priority that, in particular 
within the Anglo-analytic tradition, Descartes is often linked to the rise of epistemology as a 
foundational enterprise. However, if Descartes is said to have instantiated a modern notion of 
epistemological foundation, this only partially indicates the senses in which his method ought 
to be considered primary within the totality of the Cartesian metaphysical structure. 
Nonetheless, Descartes arguably occupies his present position within the philosophical canon 
as a result of an overtly practical sense of priority appearing to dominate his thought. For 
example, one of Descartes' central interests is in the proper ordering of tasks. Descartes may 
not be the first thinker to consider the proper order in which tasks of thought ought to be 
performed. However, with Descartes, the principles of such an ordering and the ordering 
itself must be included within the material to be ordered. This is because he constructs a 
system, based upon the proper ordering of tasks, that must finally provide the ontological 
support for the very act of system-building. When Descartes' system is complete, the 
Cartesian method and the principles produced by its action, and also the use of such principles, 
are all explained systemically. He does not only argue from knowledge to being, but his system 
also provides the ontological foundation for the specific knowledge structure by which it was 
203 Descartes, Meditations, AT VII, CSM II 3 
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born. As such, Cartesian prima philosophia is recursive at its foundation - as with Aristotelian 
prote philosophia by way of its pros hen structure. Cartesian prima philosophia (at least as 
represented by the Cartesian method) and Aristotelian prote phzlosophia converge at three 
essential points: (1) their integration, as structures of knowledge, into the greater causal milieu, 
(2) their recursive structure and (3) the sense of their uruversality. In both cases the 
universality of the subject matter relates to its uruversal applicability rather than the universality 
of its object. This is not exhaustively true for Cartesian metaphysics, as Descartes characterises 
God in terms of universality. Nonetheless, from the perspective of method (and it is from this 
perspective that pros hen structure can be understood as relevant to Cartesian thought) the most 
relevant sense of universality is universal applicability. 
In order to articulate Descartes' strategic movement between 'indubitability' to 'certainty', his 
utilisation of 'enacted' or 'lived' thought2°4 must be taken with complete seriousness. Because 
he claims to found ms system in an aspect of psychic life, this foundation can only be honestly 
considered and assessed by attempting to think through the moment of enacted thought he 
describes. For this reason, the following chapter will possess an almost phenomenological 
character; not so much as an indication of the theoretical investments of its author, but rather 
because this is what is directed by the material under discussion. The method will thus be 
animated, or thought through, ill such a way as to respect the kind of thing that it is. As such, 
the method will not be taken solely as a set of principles for action, with an argument at its 
centre that merely indicates a 'subjective' element. Rather, it will be taken accordmg to its 
concrete functioning, enabling its 'subjective' aspect to be given greater attention than 
Descartes provides, so as to follow through the movement between 'indubitability' and 
'certainty', between experience and concept, as closely as possible. This chapter will thus 
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constitute, primarily, an attempt to think through the Cartesian method, insofar as one can do 
such a thing, in order to view more closely the manner in which concepts, and perhaps whole 
knowledge structures, might be transformed between its mput and its output. 
2. The Cartesian Theory oj]udgment and the Cartesian Method 
Whilst one ought to try to go along with Descartes as far as possible, this need not mean 
accepting his own characterisation of his project. For one thing, the narrative of the 
Meditations, with its 1.mplied temporal ordering, need not be accepted as fundamental - least of 
all because Descartes himself upsets the necessity of this ordering by recastmg the same set of 
arguments in the absence of this narrative structure in the Princi.ples of Philosopf?y. Rather, the 
'priority of method' can be readily reduced to its being considered as a first task. This basic 
assumption enhances, and is enhanced by, the first-person narrative structure of the 
Meditations. It is a simple matter, given that the narrative style, considered only as a s!Jle, makes 
no claims and reqwres no argument, to let it simply 'wash over' without critical engagement. 
However, the result is often a profound interpretive neglect; the unchecked assumption that 
the linear structure of the narrative tends to mirror the genetic and/ or logical-metaphysical 
structure of Cartesian philosophy. Such assumptions can be left unchecked precisely because 
they have the general air of self-evidence about them. However, this self-evidence, as will 
become clear, amounts to little more than a generalised epistemological 'mood'. This mood, 
encouraged by the device of the Descartes-narrator of the Meditations, allows the Cartesian 
systemic structure, of which the method is only a facet, to be reduced to a single aspect. 
Though the mode of presentation of the Meditations is rarely reflected on m the secondary 
literature in terms of its 1.mplications as a 'device', it regularly becomes the measure by which 
204 That is, engagement with the phenomena. 
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the ordering of ideas is assessed. The Cartesian method thus becomes a relatively strict 
sequence of events in wruch the appearance of a particular idea is given an ordinal value with 
which it is associated fundamentally. As the first-person narrative itself connects the order of 
events to the temporality in which the thought that it describes operates, the systemic elements 
found therein obtain an odd pseudo-temporal quality. Thus such complaints from Peter 
Markie as, "He [Descartes] takes the proposition that he exists to be a moral certainty and a 
true metaphysical certainty for him at the start of Meditation Two; he doesn't know that all ms 
clear and distinct perceptions are true until the end of Mediation Four." 205 There is not 
anything per se wrong with an assessment of Cartesian philosophy that begins from a modern 
epistemological perspective. The issue pertains rather to the reductive tendency that tends to 
come along with such an approach. The Cartesian system as a whole shares many, often 
structural, elements with the Scholastic philosophy it is in part designed to dislodge; an 
example being the basic structure of the relation between God and human. The methodology 
and method serve in several ways to renew and preserve, through a transformation of context, 
existrng structures of priority, the demonstration of which will form a significant element of 
the later sections of this chapter. 
Descartes constructs and animates his method from the perspective of a particular theory of. 
judgement. The central function of the method is to anchor a conceptual apparatus, built 
from a set of axioms, in enacted thought. However, Descartes mterprets enacted thought 
itself in terms of a particular conceptual apparatus, namely, his theory of judgement. The 
Cartesian theory of judgement is structured according to Descartes' understanding of the 
interaction between the 'will' and thd 'intellect', the division between wruch Descartes 
205 Peter Markie, 'Descartes' Theory of Judgement: Reply to Tlumak's Judgement and Understandmg in 
Descartes' Philosophy', Southern Journal of Philosophy, 21/supp (1983), 101-10 pg. 107-8. 
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conceives as a fundamental division in thought as such. 206 Descartes does not make a 
significant attempt to argue for this particular theory. Whilst he is keen to demonstrate the 
existence of thought, as this will form the foundation for further arguments, he appears to take 
the structure of thought as being self-evident. It is in terms of this structure, this 'image of 
thought' as Deleuze might refer to it, that Descartes interprets certain phenomena as 
'indubitable', and in terms of which he integrates them into his greater system as the source of 
'certainty'. For this reason one must appreciate the basic structure of the Cartesian theory of 
judgement in order to appreciate Descartes' translation between phenomena and concept, and 
this is what the remainder of this section will be devoted to. The standard account of the 
relationship between the Cartesian will, intellect and method is not particularly controversial, 
except on a few small but significant points, as Descartes describes its structure in quite a 
straightforward manner.207 The account provided below is quite uncontroversial and coheres 
with most of the secondary literature, except on several points that will be made clear. The 
theory of thought that Descartes utilises, insofar as it applied to judgement, is structured 
broadly as follows: 1) The concept of 'thought' is exhausted by the concepts of 'will' and 
'intellect', whereby the intellect 'perceives' various things (some of which may be characterised 
as 'clear and distinct), and the will exercises a valuing function. The three modes of will most 
206 The structure of Cartesian 'thought' will be considered in detail in a later section of this chapter. What 
follows in this section will require only a basic account of the relationship between its two major divisions. 
207 In particular as is a common understanding made more or less explicit in Jeffrey Tlumak, 'Judgement 
and Understanding in Descartes' Philosophy', Southern Journal of Philosophy, 21/supp. (1983), 89-100., 
Markie, 'Descartes' Theory of Judgement: Reply to Tlumak's Judgement and Understanding in Descartes' 
Philosophy'., Claire E Dierckes, 'Descartes and the Unlimited Freedom of the Will', Dialogue, 23 (1980), 1-
13. and Anthony Kenny, The Anatomy of the Soul (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973). This account finds little 
resistance in the literature, save on points of detail. I have omitted references to 'belief that usually appear 
in an account of Cartesian judgement and/or method. This because, in the secondary literature, 'belief is 
often opposed to 'doubt', rendering doubt as a state rather than as a mode of the will. The common 
language sense of 'belief is merged with Descartes technical sense of 'assent', forming the basis of an 
unsympathetic account of Cartesian method that is open to many easy criticisms. Remaining largely within 
the Cartesian vocabulary, or at least avoiding highly suggestive terms, is not particularly difficult and ought 
to aid clarity at least to some degree. 
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relevant to the method are assent, denial and doubt.208 2) Assent, denial and doubt each refer 
to a positive action. That is, though assent and denial are mutually exclusive with respect to 
the same intellectual content, the lack of one does not imply the presence of the other. The 
inactive state of each is simple passivity of the will. Furthermore, doubt is not opposed to 
'belief, but is rather an active capacity whereby material either denied or given assent can be 
rendered neutral with respect to the will. Thus, the function of doubt 1s to induce a neutral 
state rather than a state of disbelief.209 3) Some kinds of perceived intellectual material are able 
to determine the action of the will. In particular, perceived content characterised as 'clear and 
distinct' will naturally compel the will to assent. In absence of 'clear and distinct' ideas, assent 
and denial are determined by other factors; they are, in a sense, optional. Being 'optional' does 
not mean they are freely chosen, but rather that they are not determined necessarily one way or 
the other by the intellectual content's 'clarity and distinctness' and are thus open to doubt.210 
4) Some level of understanding is required for a judgement to be made. The level of this 
understanding need not in fact be adequate. However, if it is known to thought that its 
understanding of a matter is not adequate, then judgement will likely be suspended. Most 
208 
"All the modes of thinking that we experience within us can be brought under two general headings: 
perception, or the operation of the intellect, and volition, or the operation of the will. Sensory perception, 
imagination and pure understanding are simply various modes of perception; desire, aversion, assertion, 
denial and doubt are various modes of willing." Descartes, Principles of Philosophy 1.32, CSM I 204, 
ATVIIIA17 
209 For example, the supposition that there existed "some supremely powerful author of our being who was 
attempting to deceive us in every possible way" (Principles 1.39, CSM I 206, ATVIIIA 20), is used not to 
induce assent to that very thing, but rather to remove the assent given to its negation. The supposition, 
taken on its own, does not imply a contradiction. Nor does the supposition that this is not the case (a 
supposition which, prior to doubt, had been taken as belief). That neither of the opposing positions implies 
a contradiction, and that neither has (yet) been recogmsed as conformmg to the requirements of certainty, 
renders a neutral judgement psychologically feasible. 
210 
'Freedom of will' means determined by the will, as opposed to determined by God. It does not 
necessarily refer to a capacity for 'conscious' choice. 'Freedom of the will' is at bottom a concept that 
allows for the coexistence of human error and divine creation. Thus, "The fact that we fall into error is a 
defect in the way we act or in the use we make of our freedom, but not a defect in our nature. For the 
nature remains the same whether we judge correctly or incorrectly. And although God could have endowed 
our intellect with a discernment so acute as to prevent our ever going wrong, we have no right to demand 
this of him." Descartes, Principles 1.38, CSM 205, A VIIIA 19 
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error is the result of inadequate understanding being taken as adequate or, rather, not being 
questioned as to its adequacy. 211 5) The role of the method is to render inadequacies of 
understanding clear and thus potentially eliminable. Further, it serves to train the mind to 
recognise clear and distinct ideas. As this involves renouncing formal assent to many strongly 
held instinctual beliefs and prejudices from childhood, the actualisation of the method in 
thought is by nature very difficult.212 6) The voluntary aspect of judgement does not relate 
directly to the assenting to or denying of any intellectual material. Rather it relates to the 
decision to tram one's mind such that it is capable of recognising both inadequately conceived 
and clear and distinct ideas. Judgement per se happens somewhat autonomously, but the 
development of the ability to judge well can be chosen.213 
Jeffrey Tlui:nak, ID his paper entitled Judgement and Understanding in Descartes' Philosopf?y 214 , 
manages to produce a sympathetic, ngorous and sophisticated account of the functions 
immanent to the Cartesian method. Yet the question of Cartesian foundationalism, central to 
his paper, reveals a narrowly epistemological interpretation of Descartes' philosophy. In spite 
of this, his explication of the relationship between judgement and method, taken on its own, is 
211 
"In order to make a judgement, the intellect is of course required since m the case of somethmg which 
we do not in any way perceive, there is no judgement we can make. But the will is also required so that, 
once something is perceived in some manner, our assent may then be given. Now a judgement - some kind 
of a judgement at least- can be made without the need for a complete and exhaustive perception of the 
thing in question; for we can assent to any things which we know only in a very obscure and confused 
manner." Descartes, Principles 1.34, CSM 204, ATVIIIA 18 
212 This difficulty is precisely why there is such a requirement for the supposition of destabilising ideas. It 
is not a technical requirement (given Descartes theory of judgement) that doubt require a supposition (such 
as the evil genius) as a doubt-maker. Rather it is simply the case that such suppositions render doubt easier 
as a matter of fact. 
213 Descartes writes, "[W]hoever turns out to have created us, and however powerful and however deceitful 
he may be, in the meantime we nonetheless experience within us the kmd of freedom which enables us 
always to refrain from believing things which are not completely certain and thoroughly examined. Hence 
we are able to take precautions against going wrong on every occasion." CSM I 194, ATVIIlA 6. Note 
that we must 'take precautions' against going wrong. It is not simply a case of choosing the right or the 
wrong, but rather choosing a path that will allow the latent potentialities of thought as such to function such 
as to bypass error necessarily. 
214 Tlumak, 'Judgement and Understanding in Descartes' Philosophy'. 
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broadly compatible with the aims of the present study. This for three reasons: (1) Tlumak 
appreciates that the structure of the Cartesian will, with its potential for passivity, renders many 
common criticisms of the Cartesian method irrelevant; (2) he draws a distinction between two 
senses of volttion that can be found ill Descartes (both the usual sense, meaning something 
like 'choice', and a technical sense which in Descartes' writing means something more ltke 
'self-directed', describing the material ongm of an operation of the will, rather than the 
[related] moral origin); and (3) the 'certainty' that Tlumak considers as central to the Cartesian 
method is direct!J intuited rather than mediated by propositions215• 
Regarding (1) and (2), many commentators interpret Descartes' claims pertaining to the 
compulsion of the will by the intellect as suggesting that, in absence of such compulsion ill the 
form of clear and distinct perception, one can choose to believe or disbelieve what one wants. 
For example, Oswald Hanfling216 claims that there are two kinds of 'reasons for doubting' 
embedded within the structure of methodological doubt, which Descartes nonetheless 
conflates. The first reason for doubting relates to reasons for which the beltef itself is 
doubtful. It is this kind of reason with which a discussion of the similarities between wakmg 
and sleeping would be concemed. The second kind of reason for doubting refers to the 
outcome of doubt. In this case doubt is motivated; that is, it has a motive (such as the 
acquisition of certainty). According to Hanflmg this second kind of reason for doubting 
requires that doubt be understood as an act of will (where 'will' is understood as 'choice'). 
215 Peter Marlae published a critique of Tlumak's paper Markie, 'Descartes' Theory of Judgement: Reply to 
Tlumak's Judgement and Understandmg in Descartes' Philosophy'. His critique is well wide of its mark 
however, precisely because he consistently interprets clear and distinct ideas as propositions. For example, 
where Descartes writes, "I am of such a nature that as long as I understand anything very clearly and 
distinctly I am naturally rmpelled to believe it to be true," Markie reads, "Whenever we perceive a 
proposit10n clearly and distinctly, we are naturally compelled to believe it." To be sure, the axioms derived 
from the method may need to be presented as propositions, but the clear and distinct ideas that authorise 
them as certain are by no means propositional. Rather, they are unmediated ideas of 'things' - Descartes 
characterises 'things' as substances or modes of substance, such as extension, quantity, thought, etc. 
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According to Hanfling, the conflation of these two reasons for doubting obscures the fact that 
Descartes also conflates clear acts of the will (choice) with belief, so that rather than doubting, 
Descartes is often actually supposing. Thus, Descartes conflates belief and doubt with 
affirmation and negation. However, while affirming and denying are overt speech-acts, 
believing and doubting are more fundamental psychological acts that cannot be so readily 
shifted. While the speech acts are subject to the will (choice), the beliefs are not. Thus, 
according to Hanfling, there can be no method of doubt, as the affective psychological 
components are not under the control of the will and thus unable to be recruited for the 
attainment of a goal, be it 'certainty' or any other. 
However, Hanfling's position 1s based on several fundamental mistakes. His most 
fundamental error lies in the casting of doubt and belief as antinomies. He fatls to take 
account of the technical differences between his and Descartes' accounts of the faculties of 
thought and their interrelation. He does not consider the Cartesian account of the will on its 
own terms, and thus fails to understand the will in its integrated psychological and 
metaphysical aspects. Cartesian doubt cannot rightly be considered as opposed to belief for 
several reasons. Firstly, doubt is a purely active potentiality of the will with no opposite. It is 
not a judgement per se, but rather remains as the possibility of 1ts annulment. Descartes does 
not mention 'belief'217 as such as a component of judgement, but its analogue in his theory of 
judgement would be the determination 'that :x! or 'that not-:x!, i.e. assent or denial applied to a 
given product of the intellect, between which is a passive volitional state. Assent and denial 
216 Hanfling, 'Can There Be a Method of Doubt?'. 
217 He does occasionally refer to belief as such in passing, but not when judgement as such is receiving 
technical explication. When Descartes uses the term 'belief' it seems to refer to 'preconceived ideas', i.e. 
to the set of judgements made without reflection. The term 'belief does not refer to any particular element 
in Descartes theory of judgement. Rather, it is used in a superficial ordinary language sense; i.e. when 
148 
are no mere speech-acts for Descartes. Indeed between intellect, assent, denial and the 
memory created through their continued interaction is to be found the life-world of a concrete 
human; not a mere store of statements about the perceived world. Speech-acts are merely 
ancillary in the method, as its role is cognitive training in the lfilmediate perception of certainty. 
Secondly, the sense of 'volition' that Hanfling applies to the Cartesian will is inappropriate. 
Descartes does not hold that a person can give assent to or deny anything at all as a matter of 
choice. Rather, the choice a person is faced with pertains to the manner in which they train 
their thinking to operate (their cognitive training) and, connected to this, the evidential 
framework that they accept. The 'cognitive training' inherent in the method allows for an 
appreciation and recognition of phenomena (characterised by clear and distinct perception) 
that are, considered onfy in terms of the greater Cartesian metaphysic, inherently certain. The 
evidential framework utilises this phenomena as a benchmark for knowledge. For Descartes, 
judgement operates largely without 'choice' and indeed without reflexive thought. The greater 
part of judgement (and thus the greater part of error) manifests as 'pre-conceived ideas' 
deriving from childhood or tradition. The role of doubt is not to transform a concrete belief 
in a thing's existence into a concrete belief in a thing's non-existence, but rather to remove the 
ideas of some things from the circuit of reflexive thought. 
Considered from a larger perspective, Hanfling's paper can be understood as an 
unacknowledged battle between two technical notions of 'will', neither of which is properly 
articulated. The Cartesian will-concept is represented in his paper only by one of its effects -
namely methodological doubt - while the will-concept used by Hanfling is named simply and 
unreflectively as 'will'. It is perhaps no surprise that methodological doubt fails to function 
speaking loosely, one might speak of 'belief', but more precise terminology will be required if one wishes 
to examine 'what is really going on'. 
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when its theoretical base is replaced by a set of concepts derived from twentieth century 
Anglo-analytic philosophy of mind. For Hanfhng, 'doubt' and 'belief' refer to opposite sides 
of the same capacity. They are non-volitional, as they are largely determined by their content, 
and thus not under complete control of the will (understood as the capacity for choice). 
However, as already mentioned, Cartesian doubt is not opposed to belief. Indeed, 'belief' is a 
mode of neither the Cartesian will nor intellect, and is thus strictly not a feature of Cartesian 
thought as such, whereas 'doubt' is a mode of the Cartesian will with no opposite. It is a mode 
of the Cartesian will that is simply operating or not - it has no opposite operating state. One 
might compare Cartesian 'doubt' with other modes of Cartesian will, such as assertion or 
desire, which do come along with opposite active states - aversion and denial respectively. 
Consider assertion and denial for example; either side of judgement can only be actualised to 
the exclusion of the other, yet the absence of either assertion or denial does not rmply its 
opposite. Thus, there remains the possibility of an inactive state - a suspension of judgement. 
The function of doubt is not to transform affirmation into negation, or belief into non-belief, 
but rather to break the bonds of judgement as such. It is precisely when a judgement cannot in 
fact be suspended, i.e., the nature of a particular 'perception of the mtellect' itself demands a 
certain judgement (thus wresting power from the will) that certainty is achieved. By definition, 
Cartesian certainty, and thus knowledge218, is found through an operation of the intellect that 
compels the will to assent. The will is technically involved, and thus exercises its technically 
'volitional' function, but 'choice' is not a factor. This process does not involve a belief-concept 
of the kind used by Hanfling. Belief is simply not, at least in the form it takes in Hanfling's 
paper, a concept relevant to the Cartesian system. In fact the notions of 'knowledge', 
218 Cartesian knowledge is necessarily certain. Since the faculty of knowledge is identical to the 'natural 
light' by which one gam direct access to the real, and thus an (albeit infinitesimal) aspect of God, 
knowledge always has a somewhat revelatory character. 
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'certainty' and the 'clear and distinct' are so tightly wound that this concept of belief is 
superfluous as a technical term. Knowledge, via the natural light (the name for the capacity to 
recognise phenomena as 'certain' and thus as 'knowledge') is direct awareness of the real - it is 
not mediated by a belief-concept (or by propositions, as per (3), above). This remains an issue 
for commentators who, like Hanfling, only assess the Cartesian system from an Anglo-analytic 
epistemological perspective. The role of the method, considered systemically, is to tram the 
individual to recognise particular phenomenal states as certain - but ultimately certain only 
given faith in a creator God. The key is that in the attempt of thought to doubt itself, thought 
is brought into contact with, and thus taught to recognise, the 'natural light'. The 'natural light' 
itself is the first-person manifestation of a larger object of systemic faith. 
At the point where the phenomenal priority of the 'natural light' (and the clear and distinct 
ideas found therein) interacts with the ontological priority of God, Tlumak's account and the 
present account diverge sharply. According to Tlumak, the reason for Descartes' adoption of 
a theory of judgement that divides intuition (the natural light) and 'belief across the two ma1or 
modalities of thought, is to stem the mfinite justificatory regress inherent in internalist 
foundatlonalism (of which he suggests the Cartesian system is an example). Tlumak writes: 
The founda11onahst alterna11ve to externahsm 1s intu.t11orusm, which purports to solve the regress problem not by 
appeal to other behefs, but to mtuition, direct awareness or acquamtance, or lffimediate apprehension. An 
intu.t11on of state x allegedly supports the founda11onal behef about x. But mtu.ttiorusm faces the followmg, 
powerful dilemma: If the mtuition 1s not a cogrutrve grasp of x, 1t cannot support the behef about x. [ ... ] What 1s 
Descartes' response to this challenge? First, he makes clear that the mtu.t11on is not 1den11cal with the behef. 
Intu.ttron 1s an act of understanding; belief 1s an act of will. [ ... ] [I]here are intu.t11ons of psychological states, 
thoughts. They are de re. But 1f de re, [ ... ] their authentica11on requires a cntenon. But a cntenon 1s reqmred only 
if we need to distrngmsh real from ostensible mtu.ttions, and this need to distrngmsh presupposes that the object of 
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rntuitlon is somehow distinct from the act, and that the act may or may not succeed rn apprehending its object. 
Tlus is JUSt what Descartes denies.219 
The suggestion appears to be that by dividing thought into several modalities, Descartes has 
overcome both the problem of infinite regress native to 'internalist foundationalism', and the 
problem of intuition as a non-cognitive foundation for cognitive states. 1bis is internally 
problematic for several reasons. Firstly, it is not clear how the division of intuition and assent 
across two faculties solves the problem of infinite regress, if there is such a thing. 1bis 
division allows for greater clarity in the explication of the operation of a judgement, 
understood in terms of function, but it 1s not a division m substance. That 1s, thought is 
divided into various modes, considered as operations of the same substance. The divisions of 
thought are given in terms of possible operations or actions of the one thing. Thought is not 
divided materially, as Tlumak's position requires, but merely functionally. Thus, it makes little 
difference, in terms of a problem of infinite regress, whether assent is given by a 'different' 
mode of thought or the 'same'. Secondly, it is true as Tlumak claims that for Descartes the act 
and the object of intuition are identical. It is thus rendered clear in the course of an intuition 
that the mtuitton 1s a 'real' intuition. That the intuition is given attention in thought 1s 
sufficient to grant its status as intuition. However, it is not clear that the compulsion to assent 
with which the intuition affects the will is sufficient as a foundation in itself. Indeed, it does 
not seem that Descartes takes it to be so, as he himself allows thought to reflect upon 
intuition, to take it up as a concept as such and consider the nature of certainty found therein. 
He considers it to be a certain enough feeling that it would be incompatible with the notion of a 
benevolent Creator for it to misrepresent the real. Thus, Tlumak fails on two fronts: he fails to 
demonstrate the efficacy of the internalist foundationalism in terms of which he interprets the 
219 Tlumak, 'Judgement and Understandmg in Descartes' Philosophy', pg. 96-97. 
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Cartesian system, and he fails to demonstrate that Cartesian philosophy is an example of 
internahst foundationalism as such. 
3. Method and Methodology 
Although Descartes does not formally differentiate methodology and method, his writing on 
method can be divided into two categories - those that pertain to method as such and those 
that pertam to the articulation of a particular method. None of Descartes' individual writings 
could be said to be devoted entirely to one or the other of these approaches. However, as 
might be expected, earlier work (such as Rules for the Direction ef the Mind) tends to display a 
greater interest m the development of method than later work (in particular the Meditations and 
Pnnciples ef Philosop0;). For the sake of clarity, those parts of Descartes' writing that take 
method as such as their subject, will be classified as relating to methodology, and those parts in 
which the telos of the methodology ('certainty') becomes the subject of analysis will be 
classified as concrete instantiations of the method. For example, Rule 4 in Rules for the Direction 
ef the Mind is clearly focused on the subject of method itself. Here Descartes writes: 
By 'a method' I mean rehable rules wluch are easy to apply, and such that if one follows them exactly, one will 
never take what 1s false to be true or frmtlessly expend one's mental efforts, but will gradually and constantly 
mcrease one's knowledge till one amves at a true understandmg of everythmg withm one's capacity.220 
This passage (and those surrounding it) describes both what a proper method consists of and 
the end for which it ought to be devised and enacted. In the first mstance at least, it seems 
that a method consists of a set of rules devised according to an end. The end in this case is 
scientza, translated as 'knowledge'. Scientia is the term Descartes uses (as distmct from cognztio, 
220 Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind, CSM I 16, ATX 371-2 
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wluch refers to any sort of belief or sensation about the world, true or false) to signify 
knowledge which 1s absolutely indubitable and certain.221 Several elements are required to be 
in place before a discussion about method can become an enacted method of the kind 
proposed by Descartes. (1) A theory, either latent or overt, about the state of affairs obtaining 
before the operation of method is required; (2) an end or telos is required; and (3) finally, a set 
of guidelines to enable a transition from the onginal to the final state of affairs - these become 
the rules that constitute the method in the abstract. 222 In this case, the theory about the 
original state 1s a theory about knowledge (scientia), partially latent and partially overt. This 
theory is, and must be, integrated with a larger theory pertaining to thought as such. Without 
this integration, any set of rules constituting the method will fail to integrate the praxis they 
describe with the capacities they are designed to facilitate and maximise - or else they will do 
so by accident, and so doing annul the reflexivity in the relationship between methodology and 
method that allows for the production of Cartesian certainty in the first place. Descartes in 
fact utilises a modified Scholastic theory about thought, judgement and knowledge - a fact that 
both enables the method and renders it problematic (and which will be discussed at length in a 
later section of this chapter). Technically, the telos, the end of the methodology, is the 
production of a set of rules the following of which will guarantee certain knowledge. 
However, for the sake of convenience, and to avoid a further division of Descartes' thinking 
on method (i.e. into meta-methodology, methodology and method) it is better for the moment 
to consider the methodological telos as simply being the attainment of certainty.223 Along these 
221 
'Certainty' and 'indubitability' are not interchangeable terms. 'Indubitability' refers to a functional 
limit of the capacity for doubt - a mode of the will. Certainty is only gained when it is recognised that the 
benevolence of God renders the indubitable as necessarily true. This will be discussed further. 
222 This, it ought to be noted, mirrors the structure of Aristotelian actualisation - initial state/telos/causal 
environment/final state. 
223 
'Certainty', taken as an end, cannot be given a simple place within the division method/methodology. 
The object of the methodology is the method, whilst the object of the enacted method ought to be particular 
truths. So where is the proper place for 'certainty' considered as an end? I would be inclined to say that 
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lines, one may charactense the initial Cartesian state, prior to the operation of the method, in 
terms of two states - one present and on projected; i.e. there is a theory about an original state 
that is given in terms of 'thought' and there is a characterisation of a final state understood as 
the attainment of certainty. For there to be any relationship between these two states (i.e. a set 
of rules; a method), they must be commensurable in some way. In the case of the Cartesian 
method, their commensurability is given in terms of the telos (certain knowledge) being a 
possible outcome of the inherent properties of the relationship between the two major modes 
of thought - intellect and will. For this reason the method itself, or rather the set of rules that 
characterise the method as praxis, can all be referred back to the Cartesian theory of 
judgement. Thus, the theoretical grounding for the method consists essentially of the theory 
of judgement mentioned above - a theory that is historically contingent and taken up largely 
without reflection. However, the sense of certainty that develops out of the actual operation 
of the method is a rather different concept entirely. It is on this point of difference, that one 
might characterise as the difference between method and methodology, that two very different 
forms of priority (each characterised nonetheless as certainty) converge and interact. This 
interaction is what will be investigated below as the translati~n between 'indubitability' and 
'certainty'. 
The methodology sets up the key philosophical problem as being the sorting of information 
into the categories of 'certain' and 'uncertain'. In Part ID of the Discourse on the Method, 
Descartes writes, "[M]y whole aim was to reach certainty - to cast aside the loose earth and 
the overarchrng Cartesian goal is the attainment of certainty and that Descartes' system is coloured by this 
at every level. However, in this case, as Descartes thinking on methodological matters is itself driven by 
the demands of certainty, and his search for rules is itself conditioned by his prior understanding of 
certainty, it is safe to say that the teleological 'essence' of the methodology is certainty rather than 'rules 
the followrng of which will bring about certain knowledge'. The rules can be ignored as an element of the 
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sand so as to come upon rock or clay."224 This 'whole aim' is thus given according to a very 
practical metaphor - understood literally this is indeed a very good aim for one who wishes to 
build a house. The relationslup between the methodological telos, certainty, and the 
metaphorical praxis, "to cast aside ... etc." is structurally identical to the relationship between 
the methodological telos and what becomes the actual method; that is, they are precisely 
analogous. In both cases, a large and amorphous concept (certainty) is given a simple and 
particular determination according to a readily accessible practical analogy - the sorting of 
material into the 'movable' and the 'immovable'. The physical side of the analogy is readily 
intelligible, but the extension of the movable/immovable comparison to thought is less 
obviously coherent. The certainty of the method is to be found in sortlng the material of 
thought - a far less familiar conceptual space. The sorting is performed according to an 
ostensibly factual relationship obtaining between doubt (a mode of the will) and intellect; i.e., 
there are some products of the mtellect that cannot be doubted, simply as a matter of fact. If 
one attempts to doubt, then one is destined to fail. Thus the 'rock or clay' of the intellect is 
that which cannot be doubted. 
However, the indubitabtlity of these intellectual products is not sufficient to render them 
'certain'. The relationship between indubitability and certainty is a metaphysical one. Rock or 
clay are not classified qua foundation according to any higher attribute than being 'suitable for 
building' - the fact that they are relativefy immovable, as compared to the material surrounding 
them, need not render them necessarify immovable. LlkeWlse with indubitability - though the 
indubitable idea is indubitable given available means, it need not be necessarify indubitable. In fact, 
within the Cartesian system, certamty is only afforded by imbuing the Creator (the existence of 
methodological telos because their appearance is itself based on the assumption that a set of rules of a 
particular kind will produce certam knowledge. 
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which Descartes demonstrates as indubitable) with particular moral attributes, and doing so 
whilst maintaining a particular theory about thought. So for the sake of dividing the form/ s of 
priority inherent in the method from those that are made manifest by the integration of the 
method into a system, the term 'certainty' will be dropped in favour of 'mdubitability', at least 
until the character of 'certainty' as a form of priority has been adequately assessed. To put 1t 
another way, 'certainty' will be saved for use as a term for a concept that is not local to the 
method, but is related to several systemic structural elements. 
Again, m Discourse on the Method: 
I observed that there is nodung at all in the proposition 'I am tlunktng, therefore I exist' to assure me that I am 
speaking the truth, except that I see very clearly that 1n order to clunk it is necessary to exist So I decided that I 
could take it as a general rule that the dungs we conceive very clearly and very distmctly are all true; only there is 
some difficulty m recogrusmg whtch are the dungs that we distmctly conceive.225 
There are two distmct arguments described in this passage. The first is that it 1s by clanty of 
'vision' that the relation of necessity between thought and existence becomes convincing. The 
second argument generalises the power of the first to all such clear vision. This pair of 
arguments 1s in fact the inverse of the argument according to indubitability - it is its positive 
counterpart. Indubitability, quite literally an inability, a limit, receives a positive 
characterisation by the connection Descartes draws with his rock and sand metaphor. The 
phenomena as such, however, are essentially negative Considering the metaphor of the sand 
and rock once again: the significance does not lie in the fact that the sand can no longer be cast 
aside (which could result from many accidental factors, mcluding the failure of the tools in 
use), but rather that the rock has been found. This same moment can be descnbed both 
224 Descartes, Discourse on the Method III, CSM I 125, ATVI 29 
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negatively and positively, but it is only according to the positive description that something 
determinate is posited as existing. Llkewise with thought: it is not enough for Descartes to 
find a limit for the modality of the will that 1s doubt (this could be a simple privation) - he 
needs to positively determine intellectual content qua existence. The intermediary between 
positively existent things, and the inability to doubt, 1s the 'clear and distinct perception', the 
'natural light' of reason, the faculty of knowledge. The clarity of vision forms a bridge by 
relating (in different ways) to each. From 'doubt', it is the positive characterisation of the 
phenomena of indubitability, understood as the way this moment 'feels', rather than the way it 
fits into a theory about thought. In terms of its relation to the 'existent thing', the natural light 
is a faculty that is devoted entirely to the positive determination of truth. As such, it is no 
privation and is thus subject to validation according to the notion of a benevolent creator (i.e. 
if the faculty were inaccurate its only role would be a deceptive one - the positive yet incorrect 
determination of truth). 
4. Method and Phenomena 
Within the Cartesian method (and wider system) two faces of doubt can be described; the 
theoretical doubt that is a mode of the will, and the experience of doubt as it manifests in 
enacted thought. Doubt as it manifests in enacted thought is, ostensibly at least, the 
theoretical subject matter for 'theoretical' doubt. Nonetheless, it is by the theoretical sense, 
and the wider theory of Cartesian thought, that the results of the 'enacted thought' sense of 
doubt are interpreted. Still, the sense of doubt that is most appropriate to the actualisation of 
the method is not theoretical. When Descartes writes, for example, that it "feels as if I have 
fallen unexpectedly into a deep whirlpool which tumbles me around so that I can neither stand 
225 Descartes, Discourse IV, CSM I 127, ATVI 33 
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on the bottom nor swim up to the top,"226 he is describing an experience of doubt that is not 
yet theoretical. This "deep whirlpool" does not reqwre a theory of judgement. Rather, it 
comes as the result of a concrete act of thinking. The 'concrete act' is not simply a product of 
the first-person narrative structure of the Meditations. It 1s central to the method for several 
reasons: 1) It is required naturally accordmg to the terms of the method - i.e. only the concrete 
act of doubting is indubitable227 , 2) it is by founding the system on a concrete act that 
Descartes seeks to avoid infinite regress of behef,228 and 3) it provides the method with a 
structural function after its enactment - i.e. it secures the God-human dyad, which 1s entirely 
systemic, to an extra-systemic element. 
The extra-systemic 'concrete act' and attendant phenomena are necessary as well as 
problematic. In particular, the extra-systemic nature of the fundamental elements of the doubt 
process makes for significant difficulty in transferring the positive gains of the actualised 
method to the system. When 'doubting' runs up agamst a limit it does not necessarily follow 
that it has found an mdubitable entity. Several moves are reqwred in order to integrate this 
failure of doubt into the Cartesian system as its 'Archimedean point'229• The first move is to 
determine the failure of doubt in terms of existence. In this way, doubt 1s reduced from 1ts 
226 Descartes, Meditations, CSM II 16, ATVII 24 
227 It is only whilst doubting (present continuous) that the proof is evident. Descartes writes m the 
Principles (CSM I 195, AIBIA 7), "for it is a contradiction to suppose that what thinks does not, at the 
very time when it is thinking, exist." In the Mediations (CSM II 17, ATVII 25) he wntes, "if I convinced 
myself of something or thought anything at all, then I certainly existed," and, "I am, I exist, is necessarily 
true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind." Each of these refers to a particular 
temporal space defined by a concrete act - the concrete act (and attendant phenomena) is the natural 
operating space of the method. 
228 By allowing the phenomena, rather than propositions, to underpm his set of axioms, infinite regress is 
avoided (perhaps unsuccessfully) because the foundation of the axioms is not of the same nature as the 
axioms themselves. 
229 Descartes does not make these arguments directly, as he moves directly from the phenomena to clarity 
and distmctness. Nonetheless they are present as assumptions or unstated premisses, the discovery of 
which requires consideration of the detail of the phenomena and the historical/philosophical situation 
within which they were interpreted. 
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active/phenomenal sense to a simple operation of negation. There is no more whirlpool, but 
rather an array of plausibly negated things. In the Meditations-. 
So, for the purpose of rejectmg all my opiruons, 1t will be enough 1f I find m each of them at least some reason for 
doubt. And to do this I will not need to run through them all individually, which would be an endless task. Once 
the foundations of a buildmg are undermmed, anythmg butlt on them collapses of 1ts own accord; so I will go 
straight for the basic pnnc1ples on which all my former behefs rested.230 
Thus, Descartes begins without the benefit of particulars. In undermining all former 
knowledge, he has also undermined the structure according to wlu.ch it is divided. In this 
sense, his whirlpool analogy is quite apt. However, when the limit of doubt is reached, it is 
immediately interpreted in terms of the ideas that had been excluded. In particular, the limit is 
interpreted as the boundary of a 'thing' having an 'existence' of a certain technical/historical 
type, and this 'thmg' is interpreted according to a concept of 'thought' of a certain 
technical/historical type. This is a precise reversal of the essence/ existence dichotomy 
favoured in the medieval post-Aristotelian tradition. Rather than 'existence' serving to explain 
the relationship between essences and entities (in terms of an act of God), in this case an 
essence ('thought') is projected upon an existence in order to produce an entity. As an aside, it 
ought to be noted that there is a subtle difference between the two basic formulations of the 
result of the initial action of the method. In the Second Meditation 1t is formulated positively 
as, "this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever 1t is put forward by me."231 In 
this formulation, the being of the 'I' is given no partlcular determination. True, the 'I', 
understood as a marker of first-person subjectrvity, locates the being that exists proximally 
local to a single body. However, the scope or content of the 'I', that which is to be included 
230 Descartes, Meditations, CSM II 17, ATVII 18 
231 Descartes, Meditations, CSM II 17, ATVII 25 
160 
under its concept, is left aside. However, the negative formulation in the Principles is far more 
careful: "It is not possible for us to doubt that we exist while we are doubting[.]"232 This 
formulation divides the world into those thmgs that can, and those thmgs that cannot in fact be 
doubted. This division thus negatively defines the space of the 'existence' onto which 
'thought' is to be projected as the concrete act. It is the second formulation that is of interest 
here, as it is more fundamental. The positive articulation does in fact carry precisely the same 
meaning as the second, but only assuming that the nature of the 'I' has been defined in 
advance. The negative formulation, m tandem with an historical thought-concept233, provides 
this definition. 
The relationship between doubt and certainty is conditioned by an historical existence-
concept. It is by the mediation of this existence-concept that the phenomena encountered 
within the concrete act of doubting are rendered compatible with the simple affirmation and 
negation of entities. It is thus in terms of this historical existence-concept that I think is 
claimed as certainly true. Doubt is understood by Descartes as applying to determinate 
entities; its function applies to the question of existence as opposed to essence. As such, the 
demonstration of its possibility takes shape as a demonstration of the possibility of the denial 
of the existence of determinate entities - and inversely, the failure of doubt becomes the 
demonstration of the existence of a determinate entity. Existence is thus demonstrated by the 
inverse of the limit-experience that accompanies the attempt to think the negation of thought. 
Confounded, thought fmds a surface against which to project its own necessary existence - the 
limit of negation in thought is interpreted as the boundary of its existence. Thought cannot 
continue beyond the limit set by the attempt to think its own negation. One considers the 
232 Descartes, Principles, CSM I 195, ATVIIIA 6 
233 Which, incidentally, Deleuze might have called an 'image of thought' 
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non-existence of the very 'thought space' in which the consideration operates and one fails to 
produce a coherent image. Thought cannot continue beyond the limit set by the attempt to 
think its own negation. This limit is interpreted (because it is considered in terms of 'negation' 
characterised as 'non-existence') as a boundary rather than a limit. It is interpreted as the 
boundary of a given phenomenal 'space', as the edge of a thing that cannot be passed. Once 
again the guidance of the 'rock and sand' analogy is evident. This analogy, in partnership with 
the prevailing existence-concept, conditions the experience of a limit of thought such that it 
can be reversed and revealed as a positive discovery- an 'Archimedean point'. The 'material' 
of this Archimedean point is phenomenal-theoretical. It is the actual confounding moment 
when thought reaches the limit against which its own necessary existence is projected as an 
historical theoretical thought-structure. The obvious clarity of this failure renders possible the 
next reqmred move - the integration of the Archimedean point into the system at large by 
means of a mediate concept. 
A mediate concept is required in order to render certainty of the 'Archimedean point' 
transferable. If the certainty of the phenomenal limit is to be transformed into systemic 
certainty, the phenomena must be reinterpreted in terms of suitably 'transferable' concepts -
that is, concepts that will be commensurable with the final systemic structure. In order for the 
'certainty' that is considered to apply to the limit phenomena to be carried over, traniferred, to 
the system as a whole, the phenomena are brought under suitable Cartesian concepts. The 
'suitability' of these concepts depends upon their ability to appear to form a seamless link 
between phenomena and structure. The basic concept that is brought to bear on the 
phenomena ID this way is 'clarity'. Descartes does not render 'clarity' very clearly, but insists 
that there is no trouble recognising a clear thought as "the minds of all of us have been so 
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moulded by nature that whenever we perceive somethmg clearly, we spontaneously give our 
assent to it and are quite unable to doubt its truth."234 'Clarity' thus can only be rendered 
through its exemplary case, where it becomes understood as the essence of the moment of 
'being confounded'. The moment of 'bemg confounded' is 'clear' precisely because it is such a 
thorough confounding. As a result, thought is only able to proceed in a single direction - to 
retreat. In terms of certainty, the method has two essential functions: to instantiate a moment 
of certainty (as described above), and to extend it. These are technically two very different 
acts. The first 1s characterised by the discovery of the certainty within the concrete act of 
doubt, and the second by the characterisation of the essence, qua certainty, of that act in terms 
of clarity and distinctness. Begmning with the failure of doubt (characterised as negation), 
Descartes determines the quality of the experience found at the point of failure as clarity of 
'vision'. 235 Distznctness 1s its quantitative counterpart and is directed at the object of the 
experience rather than the experience as such. The existence of thought 1s thus recognised as 
certain because it can be seen clearly and because it is distinct - i.e. it is simple or unmixed.236 
Having thus assessed this particular limit-experience as an' exemplary case of certainty (as 
characterised by clarity and distinctness), Descartes reconfigures it as a category of psychic life. 
He extends the notion of certainty across other limit-experiences via the concepts of clarity 
and distinctness, regardless of the precise content of the experiences as such. The 
negation/limit-experience 1s reduced to being for the most part an experience of clarity and 
distinctness, and it is in terms of these that the concrete act is mtegrated mto the system as a 
whole. Specifically, clarity and distinctness are integrated into the Cartesian theory at large by 
234 Descartes, Principles 1.43, CSM I 207, ATVIIIA 21 
235 Descartes, Principles l.45, CSM I 207, ATVIIIA 22 
236 Given the projective nature of the conceptualisation of the phenomena, perhaps one need only to ensure 
that one projects 'distinctly'. It seems to me that the distinctness Descartes refers to is rendered only by a 
failure to engage deeply with the phenomena, but this is another matter. 
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way of the concept of the 'natural light'. The natural light is a faculty of thought, specifically of 
the intellect. The Cartesian theoretical account of 'thought' is thoroughly enmeshed with the 
greater system. Thus, 'thought' forms a bridge between system and phenomena. The positive 
content (including, if only as an idea, all that which has been removed by the reduction to 
clarity and distinctness, i.e. the phenomenal content per se) of the original revelation is extended 
to all experiences that can be said to be characterised by clarity and distinctness. The concepts 
of clarity and distinctness allow the central experience of the limit of the negation of thought 
to be extended elsewhere by a simple, if problematic, argument: given that clarity and 
distmctness constitute the necessary and sufficient condition for certainty, anything 
characterised by clarity and distinctness must be certain. Descartes frames this argument ill the 
Third Meditation: 
I am certain that I am a dunking dung. Do I not therefore also know what 1s req=ed for my being certrun about 
anything? In this first item of knowledge there is srmply a clear and distinct perception of what I am assertlng; this 
would not be enough to make me certain of the truth of the matter 1f it could ever turn out that something which 
I perceived with such clarity and distmctness was false. So now I seem to be able to lay lt down as a general rule 
that whatever I perceive very clearly and distmctly is true. 237 
The argument is problematic for several reasons. The collection of 'clear' perceptions is a set 
of particulars brought under a universal. The power of the universal is derived from a 
concrete instantiation of one of the particulars, and there is no evidence that this power ought 
to be considered as genus rather than a difference. Certainty qua clarity may be merely 
accidental. Furthermore, even if clarity were necessary for certamty, there is no argument for 
its sufficiency. Finally, in spite of the mediate concepts of clarity and distinctness, there still 
remains a fundamental difference in kind between the concrete act within which the 
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phenomenal certainty is discovered, and the concepts that it supports. 'Clarity' and 
'distinctness' are the names given to the phenomena as they are to be mterpreted intra-
!JSfemical!J - i.e. not on their own terms. The pure phenomena are necessary, 1f only as an idea 
of extemality, for the production and maintenance of the Cartesian system. They serve as the 
touchstone for the entire edifice, but are strictly incommensurable with it. 
5. Revelation and the Integration if Phenomena 
The incommensurability of phenomena and system results from their being fundamentally 
different in kind. This difference is not textually recognised by Descartes, but 1t 1s 
recognised [JSfemical!J. That is, there are structures built into the Cartesian system that enable 
the bridgmg of this gap. The difference in kind itself is the result of an anachronous 
application, in two fundamental ways, of the Scholastic existence-concept and the 
concomitant essence-concept. Firstly, these two concepts retain their proper Scholastic 
function, their sense, only in terms of an explanatory structure organised primarily with 
regard to fmal causality. 'Existence' is precisely that which is superadded to the 'essence', in 
the act of rendering the Real. It thus represents the subordination of the efficient to the 
final cause. Secondly, and following on, whilst the concept of the efficient cause can serve 
to unite temporally dislocated actualities through actualisation, the final cause can only be 
given ill terms of complete entities, thus drawing in formal causality. The existence-essence 
dichotomy is a sensible concept pair only when understood in terms of a system doffiillated 
by fmal and formal causality. The actualisation of world, enacted thought or the concrete act 
- indeed transformation and change generally - are incompatible with a simple integration of 
essence-existence as fundamental concepts. Actualisation is only mtegrated through 
237 Descartes, Meditations, CSM II 24, ATVII 35 
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exclusion - that is, it is integrated into the system as the idea of an external ground. The 
criteria for certainty must be grounded in something external to the method in order to 
avoid infinite regress. However, the confounding moment, the lirrut of the negation of 
thought that is found in the concrete enactment of universal doubt, is not truly reducible to 
this idea, the internal representation of which is the natural light of reason. This difference, 
founding the incommensurabtlity of phenomena and system, renders the occasion of the 
grounding central to the Cartesian method as functionally equivalent -to revelation. 
Two senses of revelation function in the Cartesian system; a private sense, understood as 
divine grace, and a public sense, given by Scripture. They differ in manifestation but are 
covered by the same rule, i.e., "we must believe everything God has revealed, even though it 
may be beyond our grasp."238 Descartes writes in the Second Set efReplze.J. 
It should also be noted that the clarity or transparency will.eh can mduce our will to give its assent 1s of two 
kinds: the first comes from the natural light, while the second comes from divme grace. Now although it is 
commonly said that faith concerns matters which are obscure, this refers solely to the thmg or subiect-matter to 
will.eh our faith relates; It does not rmply that the formal reason will.eh leads us to assent to matters of faith 1s 
obscure. On the contrary, this formal reason consists m a certrun inner light which comes from God, and 
when we are supernaturally tllurrunated by it we are confident that what is put forward for us to believe has 
been revealed by God hi.mself. And It 1s qwte rmpossible for him to lie; this 1s more certrun than any natural 
light, and 1s often more evident because of the light of Grace 239 
It would be easy to conclude from this passage that the natural light and divine grace were 
somehow m competition when it comes to matters of knowledge. This would be a mistake, 
as in fact they are in complete accord. Their apparent difference merely reflects their 
238 Descartes, Principles 1.25, CSM I 201, AT VIIlA 14 
239 Descartes, Second Set of Replies CSM II 105, AT VII 148 
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difference in distance from the objective source of certainty that is Scripture. It is by faith 
according to doctrine derived from Scripture that faith in the natural light is derived (via 
God's supreme benevolence). For this reason it must be assumed that the contrast between 
these two is to be understood in terms of the direct object of faith - on the one hand the 
natural light, and on the other, Scnpture. Were these levels of faith to come into conflict for 
some reason, their clear hierarchical ordering would bring a swift resolution. In fact, the 
natural light is functionalfy identical to a manifestation of divine grace, where the subject matter 
is not covered by doctrine. In terms of the development of certainty in the method, 
revelation takes on a more restricted role. It is no longer to be understood as the immediate 
attainment of knowledge, but rather as the immediate perception of a necessary relation 
between developed concepts. In this case between indubitability, clarity and distinctness, 
and certainty. It is a particular instance of the private sense of revelation that is relevant to 
the method, but it only attains its objective certainty according to the sense embodied in 
Scripture and related doctrine. Doctrine is the distant source of the transformation of 
indubitability into certainty, but it has no relationship with the method in and of itself. 
The principle that serves as the cnteria of certainty, the principle that 'the things we conceive 
very clearly and distinctly are all true', is integrated into the method as its central revelation. 
It is precisely the revelatory nature of the clarity and distinctness criterion that allows it to be 
generalised on the strength of one example. Equally, the demonstration could be 
characterised as simply a bad inductive argument. Nonetheless, the revelatory interpretation 
does appear more convincing from a whole structure perspective, given that the 'natural 
light' eventually becomes the de facto focus for faith in the Christian God. In any case, the 
moment of the generalisation of 'clarity and distinctness' from being a phenomenal 
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characteristic of a particular moment of certainty, to being a phenomenal characteristic that 
guarantees certainty demonstrates a fundamental problem-structure internal to prima philosophia 
- the problematic relationship between containment and excess, in this case characterised by 
system and phenomena, elsewhere by systemic change (i.e. system and system), and 
elsewhere again by stasis and transformation. The basic structure of this problem-situation 
is analogous to that out of which the concepts of actuality and potentiality developed, where 
the operation of tlme interrupted and confused the prevailing static being-concept. Here, 
however, Descartes has access to the concepts of God and phenomena, which allow 
continuity to be determined as external to the system. Descartes will ultimately attempt to 
shore up this problematic relation in Principles of Philosopf?y by rebuilding the whole system in 
reverse, i.e. from cause to effect (or from God to world). Difficulties notwithstanding, the 
incorporation of the revelatory element into the method allows for the possibility of the 
transition from the indubitable to the certain. After describing the four ways that one comes 
to acquire knowledge, Descartes writes in the preface to the French edition of the Principles, 
"I think that all the wisdom which is generally possessed is acquired in these four ways. I am 
not including divine revelation in the list, because it does not lead us on by degrees but raises 
us at a stroke to infallible faith."240 Although divine revelation is only one of five sources of 
wisdom that Descartes provides, it is in fact the only source of certainty. The natural light is 
the fundamental manifestation, within thought, of the confluence of Gods good will and his 
omnipotence. It is given by God in accordance with his benevolence - and it is as this gift 
that the concept of the natural light allows the phenomena, and the concepts under which 
they are subsumed, their revelatory unity. 
240 Descartes, Principles CSM I 181, AT DCB 5 
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In spite of the difference in kind between phenomena central to the method and the system 
that they ostensibly found, the phenomena must nonetheless possess particular qualities that 
allow them to be incorporated into the system - even if only as revelation. That is, though 
the phenomena function precisely through their being ostensibly a-systemic, they must 
nonetheless retam an aspect that gives at least the appearance of systemic integration. So, 
for example, the relation between a phenomenal limit of thought and certainty is made partly 
by way of an analogy with rock and sand. The shared element of the analogy is that 
'movement' is restricted ill some way. This 'restriction of movement' is a very vague notion 
on its own; in particular, it does not seem to be suggestive of a foundation. However, with 
the continuation of the analogy, the movement and limit become sand and rock. The 
relation between sand and rock and house-building allows the extension of a further analogy 
between house-building and system-building. However, the mediation of the analogy in the 
determination of the systemic role of the phenomena also actively determines the 
phenomena as such. Thus, in one sense the material underpinning the criteria of certainty 
has two parts - the recognition of certain aspects of psychic life as being amenable to 
hierarcrucal ordering according to a principle, and the recognition of the principle itself. 
However, tills is a view that is strictly internal to the method - one must be sold on the 
method and inhabit the method to hold this view. More accurately, the recognition of the 
possibility of the hierarchical organisation of phenomena, and the organisation itself, is the 
same moment - the phenomena are cast, after the fact of the instantiation of the method, ill 
a manner that reflects the method's ends and outcomes in fact. Considerillg revelation purely 
as a structural element of the Cartesian system, it can be understood in two ways: 1) as an 
intra-systemic event, uruting phenomena and system under a concept, and 2) as the 
revelatory experience as such, where the phenomena and a systemic element are brought 
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mto view simultaneously. The first way represents the inclusion of the phenomena in the 
system, determined as the system's a-systemic ground. The second way represents the 
experience of, and justification of, this inclusion in thought. Or perhaps, given in terms of 
the greater structure of the Cartesian system, the first way shows revelation from God's 
perspective, whilst the second is from the perspective of thought. 
6. From Method as Effect to Method as Cause 
The method, considered as a set of guidelmes (such as displayed in a general form in Rules for 
the Direction ef the Mind, and in a more refined and precise form ill part one of the Principles), can 
be understood as an effect of the collection of ends and assumptions that make up the 
methodology. However, as an effect of a methodology, the method is already considered as 
potentially a cause. The method 1s formed out of a methodology precisely as a set of 
guidelines that, when put into action, work as the organising principles of an efficient-causal 
mechanism. Thus, even insofar as 1t 1s considered an effect, the method is an effect that is 
prunarily a potential cause. Considered as an effect that is a potential cause, the method is 
understood as charged with the expulsion of uncertainty from knowledge; or more precisely, 
since all knowledge is certain, the purification of knowledge. As such the Cartesian method is 
only one, albeit important, element within a greater teleological schema. The method, 
considered solely in terms of its potential to affect (that is, in terms of its most essential 
characteristic), is not strictly teleological. 'Certainty' is the telos of the methodology, where 
'methodology' is understood in the abstract as precisely that set of considerations and 
assumptions that led to the production of the method. The method is crafted with certainty as 
its end (but only insofar as it is constructed), and according to a specific set of assumptions 
(regarding the structure of thought in particular) relevant to its potential affective capabilities. 
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Thus the method, whilst not of itself teleological, retatns the teleological mark of its cause. At 
its most basic, the creation of method in general requires a goal or telos, an idea that expresses 
the nature of the need for a method in the first place, as well as a prior understandmg of some 
aspect of the nature of the goal. The method is thus, considered as an effect, a concrete 
representation of a prior understanding of both an end or telos, and of the material 
circumstances under which this prior understanding determines it to act. Ostensibly, the 
method operates between these two points, a beginning in fact and a projected end, in such a 
fashion as to merely theoretically cohere with them. However, the Cartesian method is not 
purely theoretical - it is actualised in the space of enacted thought, and its significant objects 
include concrete acts.241 Within the space of enacted thought, the guidelines of the method are 
themselves transformed into concrete acts, each affecting in some manner the actualisation of 
the method as a cause. Considered according to its concrete functioning, the method is no 
longer an effect. Insofar as it is a tool devised under the direction of methodology, the 
method must be considered as an effect, but considered as a tool that has presently been put 
to use, the method must be considered as a cause. It is the highest actualisation of the 
methodology, but is nonetheless no longer tied to its causal origins - in Aristotelian terms it 
thus represents the unity of ener;geia and entelecheia. As a cause, the method cannot be 
considered as a set of rules or procedures, but rather as the characterisation of a concrete act. 
Thus it becomes a principle abstracted from a continuous movement. Insofar as the method 
is an effect, it is simple, a set of rules and procedures - and as a set of rules collected around an 
end, it is a unity. Nevertheless, once the method is enacted, and it can come to be considered 
241 As an aside, 'enacted thought', as opposed to theories about thought, is a central assumption of the 
Cartesian method. However, it always tends to be subsumed under a theory about thought. The first 
person narrative of the Meditations brings Descartes closest to illustrating this central concept. It, however, 
sull consistently subsumes the concrete acts of thought under the theory and its concepts. Nonetheless, the 
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a cause, it is so in an entirely different sense to that sense in which it was an effect. As the 
method gains its status as cause, it loses its status as determinate - that is, understood as 
presently functioning, the method 1s characterised by the determinations that flow from its 
action, rather than by its status as a determinate product of methodology. Insofar as it 1s 
considered a cause, the method is not primarily prescriptive; this is its status as an effect; i.e. 
the effect of the methodology is to produce a prescriptive and proscriptive framework. 
However, insofar as the method is considered as a cause, it can only be understood as a 
pattern found in movement actually taking place temporally. Thus, insofar as it is considered a 
cause, the method is strictly no longer 'method' or any other determination - the term 
'method' is simply an index for an indeterminate: operation of thought. That through which 
the Cartesian method moves, insofar as it is considered a cause, is the world in its fullness, 
brought under the concept of 'thought'. From this perspective, the method can be considered 
'method' only as a rough abstraction, as a determination of a state characterised in terms of a 
potential transformation m knowledge. The method 'in motion' takes similar shape to the 
Aristotelian concept of motion, as the actuality of the potential as potential - 'a sort of 
actuality, or actuality of the kind described, hard to grasp, but not incapable of existing.'242 
7. Distinctness, Reduction and the Expansion ojideas 
According to Descartes, all output of the perceptive intellect must be regarded "either as 
things, or affections of things, or else as eternal truths which have no existence outside our 
thought."243 This division, between thing and relation, corresponds precisely with the division 
of the intellect into imagination and understanding. Accordmgly, the imagination projects 
structure of the Meditations at least suggests or implies the contmuity of the concrete act withm enacted 
thought. 
242 Aristotle, Physics 201b25-202a4. 
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'things' and the understanding creates relational structures. As the class of perceived objects is 
exhausted by things and relational structures, it follows that it is they that are brought into view 
to be evaluated according to the method. The result of tlus operation is a set of foundational 
ideas, divided according to the intellectual faculty from which they originate. The relational 
'objects' that remain indubitable after the operation of the method are termed 'common 
notions' or axioms. Descartes writes in the Principles-. 
[W]hen we recogruse that 1t 1s =possible for anything to come from nothing, the proposltlon nothzng comes from 
nothing 1s regarded not as a really exisung thing, or even as a mode of a thing, but as an eternal truth which resides 
1n our m1nd. Such truths are termed common notions or axioms. The following are examples of this class. It zs 
zmposszble far the same thzng to be and not be at the same tzme; what zs done cannot be undone; he who thinks cannot but exzst whzle 
he thznk.r, and countless others. 244 
The set of axioms is thus a proposed list of propositions, of undefined length, according to 
which the relations that necessarily obtain between 'things' generally and 'things' specifically 
are descnbed. The products of the imagination that are certified by the method, the 'clear 
ideas of things' are equally foundational. Of these Descartes writes: 
The most general items wluch we regard as things are substance, duratzon, order, number and any other items of this 
krnd wluch extend to all classes of things. But I recognise only two ultimate classes of things: first, mtellectual or 
thinkrng things, i.e. those things wluch pertain to mind or thinkrng substance; and secondly, matenal things, i.e. 
those wluch pertain to extended substance or body. Perception, volition and all the modes both of perce1vmg and 
of willing are referred to thinkrng substance; while to extended substance belong size (that 1s, extension n length, 
breadth and depth), shape, motion, position, divisibility of component parts and the hke.245 
243 Descartes, Principles 1.48, CSM I 208, AT VIIIA 22 
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These axtoms and clear ideas form the foundation of the Cartesian system once their 
indubitability has been established. One ought to be able to construct the remainder of the 
system from this set of basic principles, corresponding to the ideas of things and the ideas of 
relations between things. A clear comparison can be drawn between these two foundational 
forms on the one hand and the mtegration of algebra and geometry, perhaps Descartes' signal 
achievement, on the other. Both are related directly to the two aspects of the intellect 
(geometry/imagination, algebra/understanding), and in both cases their integration constitutes 
a foundational moment in their respective field (i.e. mathematics and metaphysics). 
An idea that is to be considered indubitable must be distinct as well as clear. In fact, 
distinctness is the more important feature for, according to Descartes, all distinct ideas are 
necessarily clear but not vice versa. [Again, he generalises this rule from one mstance: "The 
example of pam shows that a perception can be clear without being distinct, but cannot be 
distinct without being clear."241 In order to be rendered distinct, ideas must be separated from 
one another to the point where they can no longer be understood as containmg parts of a 
different nature. For example, the necessary existence of thought is easily rendered distinct 
because of the manner in which it is determined (i.e. negatively, and in conformity with the 
rock/sand analogy). Because, insofar as the method of doubt is in operation, 'thought' as 
discovered has no internal dimension (i.e. it is defined precisely in terms of its impenetrable 
surface), it is thus readily conceived as an indivisible idea. The effects of the requirement of 
distinctness are demonstrated rather differently for relational ideas as compared to ideas of 
things. Relational ideas, of the kind shown by Descartes in any case, tend to be simply and 
positively reducible, in same manner that the arc of a projectile can be reduced to the 
operation of two differently directed forces. Furthermore, relational ideas are not in question 
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with respect to their existence, as they exist only in thought, which has been shown to exist. 
The status of the abstractions of the understanding is thus related to truth rather than 
existence, and their truth is measured by their being inconceivably false. The process of 
methodological doubt will excise several relational ideas (i.e. the final cause), but on the whole 
their abundance is not the source of their power, and indeed those that remain, remain in 
much the same form as they began. On the other hand, the enforced separation of ideas of 
things, almost universally beginning as idea-complexes (thus the value of Aristotle's categories), 
has the result of a profound reduction in number. As the Cartesian method is already 
fundamentally reductive, the separating out of idea-complexes simply leaves more opportunity 
for reduction, as the transitory clarity (and thus indub1tability) that a part may gain as a 
member of a whole is lost in the division. By the strict, albeit indefinite, requirements for a 
judgement of 'clarity' to be given, great portions of such idea-complexes are discarded or 
reduced. The Cartesian method is systematically reductive. First, ideas are discarded for their 
lack of 'clarity', and second, ideas are separated into simpler elements to be judged individually. 
The overall tendency as a result beIDg one of an extreme reduction in the quantity of available 
ideas. However, this reduction in number is matched by a simultaneous increase in scope. 
Although the number of available concepts is reduced, there are no significant 'empty spaces' 
left in the remaining explanatory framework. That which is submitted to the method for 
evaluation is, for the most part, the product of the philosophical schools Descartes seeks to 
displace. The method itself is not creative in a simple sense. It is best viewed as a sort of 
machine, designed to transform that which appears at its input accordillg to a given process. 
For this reason, the great mass of Scholastic learnIDg is of great value to Descartes - even 1f he 
regards it as largely false. The conceptual schema of the Schoolmen, the material that 
246 Descartes, Principles 1.46, CSM I 208, AT VIDA 22 
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Descartes cuts away and reshapes is, like any well-developed philosophical system, an array of 
logically/ causally interdependent elements - rather than a mere shopping list of self-sustaining 
ideas. Simply to remove an element without regard would be to throw its neighbours into 
disarray in terms of both their meaning and systemic context and, even more so, to remove 
mal!J would likely render the remaining elements orphaned and senseless. Thus, in order to 
satisfy Descartes' desire for cohesion and unity (locally, let alone across the entirety of the 
sciences), the remaining concepts must be forced to connect in new ways to each other and to 
the whole. Compared with the Aristotelian category of substance, for example, the Cartesian 
version no longer tells of the nature of a particular entity, but rather of the basic nature of the 
world. With respect to this basic nature entities are only modes, defined according to one 
sense of quantity or another.247 This comes ostensibly as a result of Descartes finding nothing 
in the concept of substance save the notion of 'independent' existence that satisfies the 
strictures of the method. It (substance) is reduced in terms of the breadth of its meaning, but 
the reduced meaning is extended in terms of its applicability. In the Principles Descartes writes: 
By substance we can understand notlung other than a tlung which exists m such a way as to depend on no other 
tlung for its existence. And there is only one substance which can be understood to depend on no other thing 
whatsoever, namely God. In the case of all other substances, we perceive that they can exist only with the help of 
God's concurrence. Hence the term 'substance' does not apply univocaf!y, as they say m the schools, to God and to 
other thmgs; that is, there 1s no d!sunctly mtell!gtble meanmg of the term which is common to God and h!s 
creatures.248 
So the substances other than God are such only ill a qualified sense. In spite of Descartes' 
claim, aside from the exception of God, Cartesian substance must be considered basically 
univocal. After the reduction, substance comes to mean essentially separate-, and as such, it 
247 Descartes, Principles 1.48, CSM I 208, AT VIIIA 23 
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loses its primary Aristotelian sense. It no longer refers to the thing insofar as it is what it is, or 
to the thing as such (tode tz) and retains only one attribute, namely the 'separateness', of the 
Aristotelian sense. Although historically the notion of substance grew out of the consideration 
of entities, for Descartes entities as such are merely displacements of substance - to be 
explained by mathematical science. In relation to entities, and defined by its systermc function, 
Cartesian 'substance' is the entire space in which entities are determined by their neighbours to 
act. It 1s the 'unity' of the causal matrix. For Descartes, entities can be deterrmned, and 
determined to act, in two irreducible ways - in a thinking way and an extensive way. Thought 
and extension are counted as attributes rather than substances. However, they are the first point 
of contact for method and the substances themselves are enumerated in terms of the method. 
The method begins with a concrete human, and as a result of this limiting fact, mznd and borfy 
are named the basic substances - but they could in fact be named any way at all as, in spite of 
their metaphysical significance, at the moment of narmng they are merely postulates. The 
substance itself is not directly intuited, but is rather discovered by way of a deductive 
mteraction between certain axioms and clear ideas of things. The manner in which this is 
deemed to evolve is indicative of the manner in which Cartesian axiomatic foundations ought 
to function more generally. Along these lines Descartes writes: 
However, we cannot l!lltrnlly become aware of a substance merely through its bemg an existmg thmg, smce this 
alone does not of itself have any effect on us. We can, however, easily come to know a substance by one of its 
attributes, 1ll virtue of the common notion that nothmgness possesses no attributes, that 1s to say, no properties or 
qualities. Thus, if we perceive the presence of some attribute, we can mfer that there must also be present an 
existmg thing or substance to which 1t may be attributed.249 
248 Descartes, Principles 1.51: CSM I 210: AT VIIIA 24 
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The purpose of the reduction is not the simple removal of ideas, but the reclamation of the 
space of knowledge with a different set of concepts gairung ascendancy. Thus the remaining 
ideas take on a greater extension. This increase in scope is facilitated by the newly ascendant 
concept of 'quantity'. In rule fourteen of the Rules for the Direction ef the Mind, Descartes puts 
forward a novel definition of 'unity': 
Unity 1s the common nature which, we said above, all the thmgs we are comparing must part1opate in equally.zso 
This definition is given as part of an argument for the utility of res extensa as a problem solving 
media. The argument is based pnmarily on an understanding of extension as being the space 
of thought in which the imagination and the understanding are able to collaborate most fully 
(the reason given being that extension is sunultaneously abstract and concrete). 'Unity' in this 
context means something like 'that common element with which all things to be compared are 
commensurable'. Cartesian unity is not, as it was for Aristotle and Plato, the form of the single 
and the multiple; the basic form of separation and discreteness. On the contrary, it refers, in a 
metaphysical sense at least, to the possibility of smoothing borders between things. This push 
for commensurability is coupled with assertions regarding the specific nature of its possibility. 
Descartes writes, "There are but two kinds of things wluch are compared with each other: sets 
(multitudes) and magnitudes."251 The basic form of comparison is thus in terms of quantity, 
and it is only by comparison that the problems of extended substance are to be solved. When 
the problem-solving media that is the res extensa comes to acquire metaphysical significance as 
one of two created substances in the Meditations and the Principles, what previously represented 
its uruty is determined as its whole nature. The problems of the relations between 'entities' 
both abstract and concrete occasioned the development of the problem-solving framework of 
250 Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind, CSM I 63: AT X 449 
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Cartesian geometry and the centrality of extension therein. However, once extension gains 
metaphysical significance, the entities become merely modes of modes of extended substance 
(the determination 'thing', qua extended substance, now belongs only to properly numerical 
beings, such as size, shape, motion, position, divisibility, etc., which are themselves modes of 
extended substance. Entities such as houses, trees, and so on are, qua extended substance, are 
aggregatrons of these modes).252 The centrality of quantity is of course only possible if its idea 
survives the reduction central to the method. On this Descartes writes in the Fifth Mediation: 
Quantity, for example, or 'contlnuous' quantity as the philosophers commonly call it, 1s something I distinctly 
=agme. That is, I chst!nctly =agme the extension of the quantity (or rather the thmg which 1s quantified) in 
length, breadth and depth. I also enumerate various parts of the thmg, and to these parts I assign various sizes, 
shapes, positions and local motions; and to the motions I assign vanous duratlons.253 
Thus, the primary characteristic of the extended substance 1s determined as quantlty. But what 
of thinking substance? In the Principles-. 
All the objects of perception we regard either as things, or affections of thmgs, or else as eternal truths which have 
no existence outside our thought. The most general items which we regard as thmgs are substance, duratzon, order, 
number and any other items of this kind which extend to all classes of thmgs.254 
Although the 'things' that are modes of t:hinkmg substance are perceived by the same 
apparatus as the 'things' of extended substance (in fact, in part they perceive themselves, as the 
'things' of thinking substance are faculties of thought) they are not mentioned here. This 1s 
perhaps because m this passage Descartes is focusing on the sense in which these 'things' offer 
'unity' to that which they subsume - and the problem with thinking substance is that it is 
251 Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind CSM I 64: AT X 450 
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perhaps only nominally unified. Whereas the subsumption of the entirety of the physical 
world under the notion of quantity may appear plausible, and may indeed srmplify and solidify 
an understanding of the relations between extended beings, the idea of thinking substance 
merely brings a set of species under a genus. Thinking substance is, both theoretically (this will 
be discussed further on) and structurally, still fundamentally Aristotelian in that its components 
are grouped as a set of specific differences under a genus - culminating in the concrete act, the 
Cartesian equivalent of the tode ti. 
The transformation of factual indubitability into certainty is a fundamental metaphysical event. 
Cartesian 'indubitability' refers a theory of knowledge to a set of factual circumstances 
interpreted according to a particular historical psychology. That is, 'indub1tability' relates 
merely to one's factual inability to doubt a given perception. Thus, it has no overt 
metaphysical character as a concept. The indubitable becomes certain on the back of the 
concept of 'clarity'. Clarity refers (in the manner described in the previous section) to the 
'feeling' of certainty; a feeling that comes along with a given perception, appearing to grant it 
certainty. If one assumes a creator-God, then the failure of such a feeling of certainty can be 
interpreted to constitute a lie. If one assumes a benevolent creator-God, and further assumes 
that truth-telling 1s a necessary condition for benevolence, then that which is seen clearly must 
be interpreted as certain. Descartes does in fact make these assumptions. Thus Cartesian 
indubitabtlity, clarity and certamty are simply representations of the same systemic moment 
from different structural perspectives. From the perspective of the theory of judgement, 
indubitability is most relevant; from the applied method - clarity; and from the whole-system 
perspective - certainty. Furthermore, with certainty one gains direct access to the real. To the 
degree that a perception is clear, it must be real. This comes as another direct result of the 
254 Descartes, Principles 1.48: CSM I 208: AT VIIIA 22-23 
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attribution of perfection to the creator-God. 255 His perfection necessitates both his 
benevolence and his omnipotence. The confluence of these two perfectlons render his perfect 
acts of benevolence as necessarily perfect qua the specific nature of the act. That is, if God is 
benevolent, his benevolent acts must be perfectly executed. Thus, if one is able to purify 
knowledge such that one only possesses knowledge that is indubitable, and thus clear, and thus 
certain, then that which one knows (in the strictest, purest sense) is not merely a collection of 
ideas, representations, perceptions or images. Rather, under these circumstances one directly 
and necessarily interfaces with real being. The pomt at which thought mteracts with real being 
is the same point at which it discovers certainty - the faculty of the natural light of reason. As 
such, the distinction between real being and knowledge in the Cartesian system is one of scope 
rather than kind. Knowledge is real being as limited by finite human capacities: from the 
perspective of thought, knowledge is a ghmpse of real being; from the perspective of God, 
knowledge is the point at which real being and the human reflective capacitles intersect. The 
reduction of the method is thus highly significant. It is not so much a bracketing of 
knowledge of the world, as it is a fundamental reconstruction of the world as such. The realm 
in which the method functions is that of knowledge, but the metaphysical simultaneity of 
knowledge and real being leaves their difference as largely one of perspective. 
It is indeed a 'world' that Descartes' method works to transform, if one takes the Cartesian 
systemic structure seriously. There are elements within the perceived environment that 
connect directly with real being. These elements are 'mixed' with others in such manner it 
seems as to both weaken and enhance one another, depending on their respectlve stature. 
This is made clear by, among other things, the reqmrement of distinctness. If the experience 
of certainty was not transitory, then distinctness would be irrelevant - it would be a concept 
255 Descartes, Principles 1.14-1.31, CSM I 197-203, AT VIIIA 9-17 
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identical to clarity. The Cartesian 'world', it seems, is an admixture of differently sourced 
projections. In tlus context, the role of the method is to sort those projections into those 
which have their origin in God (and are thus certain), and those which have their origin in the 
structures and lunitations of human thought. Those elements of the projected world that are 
shown to originate in God directly must subsequently be re-imagined in such a way as to 
constitute a totality. However, the world appears to be resistant to the redistribution of its 
concepts according to Cartesian certainty. This seems clearly enough understood by 
Descartes, given the necessity of powerful doubt-makers in the early stages of the method.256 
The pool of ready-made concepts takes effort to keep at bay - and this is preasely the 
difficulty in the method's application that Descartes mentions on several occasions. It takes a 
great effort of thought to avoid the surreptitious reintroduction of methodically barred 
concepts. The new structure must be forced upon the world. More significantly, the world 
must be held in line according to a set of principles that both assume and deny a radical 
disconnect between phenomena and system. The phenomena that are central to the method, 
and essential to its power to divide the world appropriately, are systemically determmed only as 
a-systemic. Thus, the central moment of the method is fundamentally interpretive. This 
interpretive moment provides a conceptual ambiguity that serves to hide the fact that the 
instantiation of the method is itself essentially a creative act. The ambigmty is covered over by 
a concept of its own construction when 1t is interpreted in terms of clarity. The method is, 
from the perspective of the complete final structure, a justification rather than a cause. 
Through the Cartesian method, the ambiguity of change is reduced to a single point - the 
concrete act of thought - and subsequently brought into the system under a determinate 
concept. Thus, in being disguised as a simple program of reduction and expansion, the 
256 The 'malicious demon', for example, mentioned in the First Meditation. (Meditations CSM II 15, AT 
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method serves to cover over the essentially creative and contingent nature of the work of 
system building with a veneer of necessity. 
8. The Priority ef 'Thought" within Methodological Doubt 
In the Cartesian system, there are two fundamental senses of 'thought'. Each sense 
demonstrates a particular modality of systemic prionty fundamentally different from the other, 
yet the two are nonetheless conflated by a 'sleight of hand'. The first is enacted thought, or the 
concrete act, the basic function of wluch is to provide an a-systemic source of certainty that is 
nonetheless amenable to a degree of systemic integration. An epistemological counterpart for 
the necessity provided by God, enacted thought provides an object of faith that may be 
descnbed and determined without risk of blasphemy. The second sense of Cartesian thought 
is that of its systemic representation as such. The role of this second sense is equally 
important, as it provides the basic form of the systemic structure - and it is this basic form that 
provides the theoretical grounding for the method and thus for the pnority of the first sense of 
thought. 
The basic structure of the positive Cartesian concept of thought is taken from the Aristotelian 
tradition extending through Averroes at one end and Suarez at the other. One might also 
argued that Descartes ought to be considered as one of this group 1f 1t were not for several 
sigruficant divergences, pertaining to both the nature and scope, of Descartes' notion of 
thought. Ignoring the fine differences between the pre-Cartesian accounts, their structure was 
basically the same. The reason for their shared structure is closely related to the reason for the 
divergence of the Cartesian account. The function of the 'psychology' of these basically 
VII 22) 
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Aristotelian thinkers was to integrate sense perception with the mtellect and thus with the 
essences of things. In this way, they urufied the structure of the categories with the structure 
of thought, with the concepts of 'external' and 'internal' sense sharing in the accidental species, 
and the intellect presiding over the attribution of essence. As the 'problem' was shared by the 
Scholastic philosophers, and Aristotle himself had already provided a draft of a solution, there 
was little reason for radical change; rather more appropriate was a continual finessmg, a 
continual restating of both the problem and the solution to create a closer fit. On the other 
hand, Descartes was committed to abandoning both the categories and the hylomorphic 
physics. Thus, in many ways, the Scholastic Aristotelian psychology, at least considered 
according to its overall position within the basic prevailing theoretical framework, is largely 
Irrelevant to Descartes. The problems of Scholastic psychology are not the problems of 
Cartesian psychology, yet nonetheless they remain structurally almost identical. On the other 
hand, in spite of this similarity of structure, the divergence of Cartesian physics and 
methodology force a modification of the functions of the elements within the structure. 
The Scholastic philosophers divided sense perception into an external sense and an internal 
sense, the latter of which served as an interface between the external sense and the intellect. 
There were some differences regarding the internal structure of each of these and of their 
divisions (i.e. disagreement over the specific faculties belonging under each heading), but this 
basic structure was shown by Aquinas and still defended by Suarez. On the account of 
Suarez257, the primary role of the external sense is to interact with external species (colour, etc. 
- sensory elements derived from Aristotle's categories) and form them into a unified whole 
257 I take much of my understanding of Suarez's account of the relationship between internal and external 
sense from a paper by James B. South entitled Francisco Suarez on Imagination - James B. South, 
'Francisco Suarez on Imagmation', Vivarium, 3911 (2001), 119-58. He discusses the account of internal 
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(via the common sense), while the internal sense (imagination) produces and retains images 
that relate to the activity of the external sense. The intellect operates on the products of the 
llllagination and determines them to fall under a particular essence or another, thus 
incorporating them into the categorial structure and the greater metaphysics of substance. 
Each level, from that which is sensed to the eventual intellectton, gives occasion for the next to 
function according to its kmd. They are all brought into contact in a rather obtuse manner 
under the notion of the umty and harmony of the soul, a concept which serves to fill any 
causal gaps. For several reasons, Suarez does not consider the transition from externally 
sensed species to mtelligible essence as one of efficient causality. The concept of 'harmony' is 
used to wall up the causal story. 
Descartes on the other hand has abandoned the categories and replaced the hylomorphic 
explanation of physical change with one based upon geometry. He keeps the basic structure 
of the psychology of Aqumas and Suarez but must, in keeping with the centrality of thought to 
the opening movements of the method and in keeping with his alternate physical science, 
reconfigure their roles somewhat m terms of their content and m terms of their relationships 
to one another. However, the basic structure [of sense, imagination, intellect (which Descartes 
terms the 'understanding')] remains. This structure itself never seems to be submitted to 
Descartes' method for verification - rather it seems to be taken as self evident. Indeed, when 
'thought' (in the sense of 'enacted thought') is verified by its failure to doubt itself adequately, 
it is this basic structure, this theory about thought, rather than the amorphous sense of thought 
as sustaming action in time, that is taken as certain. It 1s taken by Descartes as obvious that the 
nature of thought can easily be known - and when 1t is known, 1t seems, it is known according 
sensation given by Suarez m his commentary on Anstotle's De Anima (Francisco Suarez, Commentaria 
una cum quaestwnibus in libros Aristotelis De anima, ed. Salvador Castellote, 3 vols., Madrid 1978-1991.) 
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this tradition. Apart from two fundamental transformations of function, the difference 
between Descartes and the Scholastics, on the topic of thought, is not so much greater than 
that between Aquinas and Suarez. The first difference, as already mentioned, 1s that the 
intellect no longer serves to integrate the senses with the categories. This 'problem' (that of 
the production of essences), given Descartes' divergent physics, is no longer a problem. The 
second, and this is a requirement of the method, is that there is no longer an internal and an 
external sense, but rather all become modes of thought. What was considered as the external 
sensory component is now 'sensation', a mode of thought. As a mode of thought, sensation is 
no longer able to integrate the material of perception (colour, etc.) with the intellect. Whereas, 
prior to Descartes, the external sense formed a bridge between the internal sense and the 
physical world, for Descartes, sensation 1s a mode of thought with the characteristic feature 
only that 1t m part refers externally258• 
Cartesian 'thought', in its positive sense, indicates a complex of interrelated capacities or 
faculties. The precise notions of these capacities or faculties are derived from the Aristotelian 
tradition, with modifications performed where the Aristotelian theory of perception tends to 
contradict others of Descartes' theoretical comrmtments. The result is a. categorial structure, 
with 'thought' as genus encapsulating several levels of species. That is, 'thought' is the name 
given to the entire array of primary human capacities, and it is subsequently divided into 
several species that are each further divided according to their various modes of action. The 
first division is between perception of the intellect and operation of the will259 • Beyond this, 
258 I wnte in part as the 'passions of the soul' (emotions, etc.) are also sensed. It seems that Cartesian 
'sensation' includes a limited interpretation of the sense data in terms of its mtemality or extemahty. 
259 
"All the modes of thinking that we experience within ourselves can be brought under two general 
headings: perception, or the operation of the intellect, and volition, or the operation of the will. Sensory 
perception, imagination and pure understanding are simply various modes of perception; desire, aversion, 
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perception is characterised by several modes, including understanding, imagination, and 
sensory awareness - whereas modes of willing include desire, aversion, assertion, denial and 
doubt. By far the most significant elements, in terms of the production of axiomatic concepts, 
are the understanding and the imagination, as they are productive rather than simply 
evaluative. Indeed the fundamental difference between an axiom as such, and a clear and 
distinct idea of a thing, should be understood in terms of their being products of the 
understanding and the imagination respectively260• Early on in Descartes' writing, in the Rules 
for the Direction ef the Mind, rmagination is not precisely determined in terms of its content.261 
The imagination is that faculty that serves to explain the production of images. It is most 
naturally able to produce extensive images, but is not strictly reduced to their display. Because 
indeed, at this early stage Descartes seems to consider the primary importance of extension as 
a pragmatic one, i.e. it is useful to characterise a problem in terms of extension, as this will 
most fully utilise the power of the faculty of imagination for the solving of a problem. 
However, by the time of the Principles ef Philosopf?y, extension is precisely that which 
assertion, denial and doubt are vanous modes of w1llmg." Descartes, Principles of Philosophy I.32, CSM I 
204,ATVIDA 17 
260 Whilst most of the modalities of thought are somewhat 'dirty' (i.e., tend to refer to a cause external to a 
particular thinking thing), the understandmg is relatively pure (meaning that it interacts only with other 
modalities of thought). This, taken along with the status of the axiom as being a pure product of thought, 
suggest that it is the role of the understanding alone to produce axiomatic propositions. In Principles of 
Philosophy Descartes writes: "But when we recognize that it is impossible for anything to come from 
nothing, the proposition Nothing comes from nothing is regarded not as a really existing thing, or even as a 
mode of a thing, but as an eternal truth which resides m our mind. Such truths are termed common notions 
or axioms." I.49, CSM I 209, AT VIDA 23-4 
261 In Rule 14 of Rules for the Direction of the Mind (CSM I 56, AT X 438-52) Descartes gives a detailed 
account of the relationship between intellect (in his later writings, what is called here 'mtellect' will be 
renamed 'understanding', and 'mtellect' will refer to the combination of imagination and understanding), 
imagination and extension. Much of this account is broadly compatible with Descartes later view, though 
he never again goes mto so much detail. One commonality is his characterisation of imagination as that 
faculty which projects extensive images. This appears to be somethmg that Descartes takes up as simply 
obvious. He gives little argument, and the transition from his pos1t10n Rules for the Direction of the Mind, 
where the imagination is most comfortable dealing with extensive images, to that in Principles of 
Philosophy, where the imagmation deals only in extensive images, is both significant and unexplained. 
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characterises the output of the imagination262• The imagination is finally, and only, the faculty 
that projects extension; whether in response to sense unpressions or the understanding; and 
extension itself is understood as the representation of quantity by the imagination263, ultimately 
providing a space v.rithm which the understanding and the imagmation can function fully and 
in cooperation. The understanding is, of course, no longer defined by its ability to determine 
the essence of a thing, but is the faculty that serves to explain the facts of abstraction, pattern 
recognition, comparison and the production of axioms. 
The unagination produces a unified extensive representation based upon diverse input. 
Sensory awareness264, the name given to that mode of thinking that refers the body to an 
external world, is understood as the form of input that stimulates the imagination to project 
real extensive space265• Note that sensory awareness only refers externally- it is in fact internal 
262 
"[T]he objects of the imagination are restricted to those which have extension, motion and shape, 
whereas there are many other things that are objects of the understanding." Principles I.73, CSM I 220, AT 
VIIIA 37. Note that motion and shape need not have been ment10ned, as they are both modahties of 
extended substance. Thus, "extension in length, breadth and depth constitutes the nature of corporeal 
substance[.] Everythmg else which can be attributed to body presupposes extension, and is merely a mode 
of an extended thing[.]" Principles I.53 CSM I 210 AT VIIIA 25 
263 It seems that Descartes considers that the greatest power of geometry lies in the fact that it aligns the two 
major modalities of thought to a common purpose. Though tlus relationship between the understanding, 
the imagination and geometry is only mentioned briefly and in an early work (Rules for the direction of the 
Mind, Rule 14), it remains basically compatible with the structure of Descartes later thought and is highly 
instructive. 
264 Descartes refers the unity of sensory awareness - the 'common' sense (another aspect of internal sense 
perception derived from the Aristotelian tradition) - to a physical explanation in terms of the pineal gland. 
(Rules CSM I 41, AT X 414; Treatise on Man CSM I 105, AT XI 175) The imagination, insofar as it is 
directed by sensory awareness, would be placed after the common sense, as the manifestation m thought of 
this physical combining. This physical explanation of the relationship between sensory awareness and 
imagination is not only fallacious - it also conflicts with Descartes own argument for the significance of 
real extensive space. In any case, with or without reference to a physical explanation, the imagination is 
the umfied representation in thought of a complex of diverse yet interrelated data. 
265 Descartes does not describe the display of extension by the imagination as a 'projection' - this is my 
terminology. However, it is a piece of terminology that is appropriate given Descartes account of the role 
of imagination in general, its relationship with the body and real extension in particular. What are 
interpreted by the imagination are already modes of thought - insofar as these modes are considered to 
relate externally they are the elements of sensory awareness. They are received by the imagination not qua 
their relationship with externality, but qua the precise interactions between one mode of thought and 
another. The result is the presentation of real extended space. Real extended space is produced through an 
internal relation, but is presented as the very form of externality - thus I consider the imaginat10n 
'projective'. 
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to thought266• Its external reference is carried over to the imagination and thus to the projected 
real extensive space. The understanding works upon this projection as well. It finds 
regularities and thus recognises patterns. From patterns, the understanding forms rules and 
produces expectations for future projections, thus demonstrating itself also as projective in a 
certain sense. Although the understanding does not project absolutely (i.e. in the manner that 
the rmagination projects real extension), it projects expectations for action withm space, as well 
as projecting revealed eternal truths across all relevant intellectual content. Furthermore, the 
output of the understanding is sent back to the rmagination, which is able to produce new 
representations based upon the combinatory structure dictated by the understanding. Each 
faculty retains the capacity for error. As both of these faculties are projective - the 
imagination projects extension and the understanding projects relational structures - mmor 
deviations from the adequate operation of either faculty can easily result in errors of great 
magnitude. Separately and in concert, the imagination and the understanding have the 
potential to both hmder and advance knowledge - taken together they represent both its limit 
and its possibility. They represent its possibility in the sense that it is only as a result of their 
operation that the will has material to which it might provide or deny its assent; and its limit, as 
their precise nature formally defines the kinds of knowledge that are possible. 
The Cartesian notions of both error and knowledge are mformed by this structure of thought. 
They are both formed by the interaction between 'will' and 'intellect'. In the Oater) Cartesian 
266 
"It must be realised that the human soul, while informing the entire body, nevertheless has its principle 
seat in the brain; it is here alone that the soul not only understands and imagines but also has sensory 
awareness." Descartes, Principles IV.189, CSM I 279-80, ATVIIIA 315 and, "We lmow for certain that it 
is the soul which has sensory perceptions, and not the body. For when the soul is distracted by an ecstasy 
or deep contemplation, we see that the whole body remains without sensation, even though it has various 
objects touching it. And we lmow that it is not, properly speakmg, because of its presence in the parts of the 
body which funct10n as organs of the external senses that the soul has sensory perceptions, but because of 
its presence in the brain, where it exercises the faculty called the 'common' sense." Descartes, Optics CSM 
I 164, AT VI 109 
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account of thought, the intellect is that aspect of the mind formed by the twin projective 
powers of imagination and understandtng, and perception is the name of the action proper to 
1t as a whole. Imagination provides 'image', understanding provides 'structure' (taken broadly), 
and their enacted interrelation is the 'perception of the intellect'. There are several causes of 
error that Descartes recognises (exactly four in fact) 267, but all have in common that they are 
made technically possible by a laxity of will. This technical possibility is rendered thus: the 
possibility of the perceivmg intellect is represented by the intertwining projective powers of the 
imagination and the understanding, and error in this context is the assent given by the will to a 
projection, according to either or both of the projective faculties, beyond that which is clearly 
perceived and thus beyond certainty268• The scope of the will is wider than that of the intellect, 
and this is the basic source of error. The will is able to give assent to all manner of 
representations and propositions, many of them dubious. However, the will also possesses the 
capacity for doubt and thus, according to the Cartesian method, the ability to renegotiate its 
own capacities such that they may be directed exclusively to the certain. Thus, the will is 
introduced in its capacity as the producer of both knowledge and error. Its role according to 
this capacity is to integrate the mere data of the intellect into a discourse on knowledge, or a 
discourse on certainty, which for Descartes are the same thing (according to Descartes' 
definition, the true must become certain before it may be considered knowledge). For 
267 
"The chief cause of error arises from the preconceived opinions of childhood" and, "The second cause 
of error is that we cannot forget our preconceived opinions of childhood" and, "The third cause of error is 
that we become tired if we have to attend to things which are not present to the senses; as a result, our 
judgements on these things are habitually based not on present perception but on preconceived opinion" 
and, "The fourth cause of error is that we attach our concepts to words which do not precisely correspond 
to real things." Descartes, Principles 1.71, 1.72, 1.73, 1.74 CSM I 218-20 AT VIIIA 35-7 
268 
"Moreover, the perception of the intellect extends only to the few objects presented to it, and is always 
extremely limited. The will, on the other hand, can in a certain sense be called infmite, since we observe 
without exception that its scope extends to anything that can possibly be the object of any other will - even 
the immeasurable will of God. So it is easy for us to extend our will beyond what we clearly perceive; and 
when we do this it is no wonder that we may happen to go wrong." Descartes, Principles l.35 CSM I 204 
ATVIIIA 18 
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Descartes, the bare product of the rmagmation or the understanding is srmply incompatible 
with the notions of knowledge and error. This bare product must be assented to by the will 
before it becomes either269• Once assent is gwen and a judgement is thus formed, the result is 
necessanly either knowledge or error. Obviously then, knowledge of another kind is required 
(that is, of a kind different to that of the judgement at hand) that will enable the development 
of a practise through which such judgements can be clearly and reliably divided illto those 
which result in knowledge and those which do not. This knowledge is of course knowledge of 
the method (and methodology) which, in this Cartesian form utilises 'doubt' as an illnate mode 
of the will that allows the will to restrain its own excesses. 
Recall for a moment the manner in which the twin powers of the intellect serve to limit 
knowledge, as well as enable it: they both enable and limit knowledge by constituting its form. 
However, there is another sense in which the intellect (the imagmation and understanding) 
enable a lrmit of knowledge according to the Cartesian schema. They constitute a limit insofar 
as their positive projective capacity extends beyond the ability of thought as a whole to obtain 
certainty. Alternatively, rather, they contain a limit in this sense; they are the material 
circumstance in which an ideal limit ls constructed according to a given array of concepts -
God, thought (will/intellect) and certainty in particular. Thus, strictly this limit does not 
belong to the intellect. It is an ideal division ef intellect f?y the will where the will can on the 
one side, assent, and on the other, negate. A question appears: how does one assure oneself 
269 
"In order to make a judgement, the intellect is of course required since, in the case of something which 
we do not in any way perceive, there is no judgement we can make. But the will is also required so that, 
once somethmg is perceived in some manner, our assent may then be given. Now a judgement - some kind 
of judgement at least- can be made without the need for a complete and exhaustive perception of the thing 
in question; for we can assent to many things which we know only in a very obscure and confused 
manner." Descartes, Principles I.34, CSM I 204, AT VIIIA 18. It seems, then, that the will is wider in 
scope only in the sense that it is capable of affirming in full those things which are perceived only in part or 
improperly. It does not have a greater scope in the strict sense; i.e. in the sense that it is capable of 
addressing a greater array of objects. 
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that the linut itself is determined correctly? One cannot simply point to the method as an 
answer. The concepts modified through the method, as well as those through which the 
method is constructed, must be products of the intellect. This includes the notions of the 
modes of thought, and notions of thought itself, insofar as they are in fact thought. That is, the 
concepts (including the structure of thought itself) according to which the ideal division of the 
intellect is made by the will must themselves be products of thought, the idea of which is 
exhausted in Descartes' theory by intellect and will. As the will is necessarily incapable of 
producing material for its own judgements270, they must be products of the intellect. Descartes 
applies several methods of varying fame throughout his work, but each can be traced back to 
concepts that must be products of the intellect:271 • In addition to the obvious concepts (i.e., 
those which are actually mentioned by name in the texts), it should also be remembered that 
the demonstration of the power of doubt through the negation of thought required the 
surreptitious functioning of several other concepts. In particular, it was shown earlier in this 
chapter that when the will is wielded as a doubting implement, a particular and historical 
concept of 'existence' is required for the translation between the phenomena and the 
metaphysical system. If this concept is considered as a product of the 
imagination/understanding interaction (in the Cartesian system it must be considered such a 
270 As the modes of thought are ostensibly divided according to function, rather than form or by their 
location in the bram or any other place, to merge their function would be effectively to merge the faculties 
absolutely. Thus, if there is to be a division between will and intellect, then they must be absolutely 
distinct in their function. 
271 In Rules for the Direction of the Mind (in particular Rule 14, CSM I 59, AT X 442-3), one of Descartes 
methods involves the limiting of each projective faculty to its own sphere and using the other as a 
corrective - usmg one to ensure the other has not strayed. Thus the imagination is used to correct ideas 
produced by the understanding that suggest an extensive projection. If the imagination is unable to 
represent a purportedly extensive idea (e.g., the proposition that extension per se may exist without any 
extended thing), then by this method the idea must be false. As extension is projected by the imagination, 
ay idea of something extended must be imaginable at least. Conversely, the understanding conditions the 
status of imaginative projections qua their existence, through recognition of contradiction. Of course, all of 
this can only take the form of 'advice', according to which the will must make a Judgement. 
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product), then one might wonder by what measure the will might make a judgement on this 
projection. Thus, three related yet slightly divergent problems remain. First, the theoretical 
aspect of 'thought', which is largely inherited and largely unquestioned, 1s never submitted to 
the method for verification/ modification - and it is this 'theory' that provides the foundation 
for the laying out of the method. Second, assUIDIDg that this theory is perfectly acceptable, the 
operation of methodological doubt requires historical concepts in excess of those submitted 
for verification - concepts perhaps fundamental to the operation of the Cartesian method 
which cannot in principle be 'purified' (thus muddying the punty of the system's foundation). 
Third, the manner in which this theory of thought 'gets past the censors', so to speak, is highly 
suspect. Assume for a moment that it is acceptable to speak of a notion of thought that is 
prior to theory, and understand this notion to appropriately bear the title 'enacted thought'. 
When the 'I think' is shown to remain after its negation, this 'I think' can be nothing other 
than the very action of the doubt - if it is to be understood as 'thought', it must be as enacted 
thought. No theoretical structure of thought as such is 1IDphed by this inability of enacted 
thought to negate itself. However, the verification of the 'existence' of this 'space' also serves 
in Descartes' system to verify the self-evidence of the mtemal structure of this same space. 
The prototypical moment of methodological doubt serves, and this is one of the system's 
foundational elements, to authorise the introduction of an historical theoretical structure; and 
this through a sleight of the hand that functions by diverting the attention away from the 
theory and toward the thinker thinkmg through the thought experiment. 
271 This term postdates Descartes' writmgs rather substantially and I do not propose to attribute to him any 
notion of epistemology or the epistemological - rather my intent is to draw a retrospective distinction for 
the sake of clarification. 
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In the secondary literature, the primary engagement with the various modes of Cartesian 
thought appears to relate to questions of 'substance' and Cartesian dualism272• In a paper titled 
Cartesian Trialism273, John Cottingham argues that, alongside the 'officially' endorsed Cartesian 
dualism of created substance, is to be found a more flexible theory; something of a 'pseudo-
trialism'. However, he does not argue that Descartes' system appears to support three created 
substances, but rather that the Cartesian psychology appears to support the classification of 
entities into three basic categories - those of mind, those of mind/body, and those of body. 
Tbis position is derived primarily from the final few sentences of Article 48 of Descartes' 
Principles ef Philosopf?y: 
But we also expenence Wlthrn ourselves certam other things which must not be referred either to the mmd alone 
or to the body alone. These arise, as will be made clear later on, lll the appropnate place, from the close and 
intlmate uruon of our mmd Wlth the body. This list lllcludes, first, appetites hke hunger and thirst; secondly, the 
emotions or passions of the mmd which do not consist of thought alone, such as the emotions of anger, joy, 
sadness and love; and finally, all the sensations, such as those of p=, pleasure, light, colours, sounds, smells, 
tastes, heat, hardness and the other tacttle qualities.274 
Before rushing headlong into an analysis of the metaphysics of substance, one would do well 
to consider the above passage in light of Suarez's account of external and internal sense. The 
structures themselves, m spite of the obvious· difference in the senses of 'external', are basically 
identical and, as such, are basically identical in the manner in which they fail to function and 
thus require a supplementary explanation. The very structure of this thought-schema entails a 
difficult transition between the internal and external sense, and the intellect, on the part of 
272 In fact there are surprisingly (considering its systemic importance) few authors that deal directly with 
Cartesian 'psychology'. John Cottingham and Katalin Farkas are two that stand out, but even these two 
appear to be more interested in its import for substance dualism than the Cartesian system as a whole. 
273 John Cottingham, 'Cartesian Trialism', Mind, 94 (1985), 218-30 pg. 218-30. 
274 Descartes, Principles 1.48 CSM I 208-9 AT VIIIA 22-3 
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Suarez, and between the externally-referring and internally-referring modalities of thought on 
the part of Descartes. The interrelation of each level of sense with the intellect is covered ill 
Suarez by the concept of 'harmony'. Descartes, however, employs a different method: all 
aspects of human experience are brought under the notion of 'thought', and are thus united, 
though several modes of such thought refer externally. That is, several modes of thought refer 
to a cause that is not of their kind (i.e. not of think.mg substance). As Katalin Farkas275 
correctly points out, the causes of these externally-referring modes of thought could possibly 
be several, aside from one fact - only the supposition of their cause being 'bodily' tends to 
save God, given the powers attributed to him in the Cartesian system, from being morally 
questionable according to Christian doxa. 
In any case, the question of the relationship between body and mind, extension and thought is 
a question pertaillillg to the effects of the interactions of the several prior elements of the 
Cartesian system. These questions themselves are prior only from the perspective of 20th 
Century philosophy of mind, which tends to take 'Cartesian Dualism' as a bare and complete 
historical approach to the analysis of the ontological structure of the world, abstracting it from 
its position within the Cartesian systermc structure. Taken as an element of the complete 
Cartesian system, substance dualism is an accidental, albeit major, result of the interactions 
between several other elements. The effect being that, if the number of created substances 
were to be modified, assuming that this is done in respect of those systemic elements that 
produced the necessity of two substances originally, the structure of the system itself need not 
be modified. A far more fundamental question (as opposed to that pertaining to the unity of 
two substances in thought), a question pertaining to a concrete sense of systemic pnority is: 
why are the two sides of thought distinct? This question refers immediately back to two 
275 Katalin Farkas, 'The Unity of Descartes' Thought', History of Philosophy Quarterly, 22/1 (2005), 17-30. 
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senses of priority functioning in the Cartesian system: the ontological (in the form of God), 
and the preconception (in the form of an inherited but modified Aristotelian thought-
structure); the appearance of the latter is only discussed by Descartes as a possibility for error -
as error stemming from preconceived ideas. Methodological doubt is primarily designed to 
overcome this form of error, but 1t 1s precisely via this form of error that methodological 
doubt receives its theoretical foundation in the form of an historical thought-structure. 
From the perspective of Cartesian 'thought', the method is the act through which a healthy will 
is cultivated. The health of this will is measured by the depth of its ,mastery of the practice (the 
method), requiring a substantial degree of mental effort, that 1s devised for the purpose of 
obtaining certainty. The representation of certainty in what 1s ostensibly or at least relatively 
'enacted thought'; the experience of this thought/ method structure by the think.er; is 
conceptualised under the notion of the 'clear and distinct ideas' and of the 'natural light of 
reason', as discussed in the previous section. It is surely tempting to view the mstantiation of 
an historical thought-structure on the grounds of a concrete psychological event as an obvious 
failure. In any case it would be counted as a failure from the perspective of some of Descartes' 
own stated aims for the method; the 'purification' of preconceived notions being one example 
of such an aim. To consider such a failure of method as a fundamental systemic failure, one 
must in the first place take Descartes' claims of the centrality of method as unequivocally true. 
However, the method itself is only one moment within the Cartesian system at large. 
Descartes' system appears stronger if his claims about the method are taken less seriously. The 
method and the thought structure that mutually support one another are also independently 
related to other elements within the system - m particular, the ways in which they relate to 
God are basically distinct. The Cartesian system is one in which the interplay of history, 
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method and ontology are, though dist1nguishable, thoroughly intertwined. From the 
perspective of this system as a whole, the Cartesian thought-structure is only a moment Wlth 
an array of causes and effects. It is part of a sub-system mternal to an already given system, 
the function of which is to restrict the spontaneous growth of the system as a whole. 
Considered thus, one ought to understand Cartesian methodological doubt not as 
revolutionary but as reflective. It 1s a systemic element, the function of which is to consume 
and digest not only history but also the system of which it is a part. The element of the system 
that describes the nature of thinking 1s actively thought through so as to condition the system 
as a whole according to the basic affective power of the specific theory of thought that 
Descartes utilises. That 1s, the 'sleight of hand' that introduces a theory about thought is not 
simply a failure; 1t also enables the enactment of thought according to or withm a given structure 
in time. Descartes takes the systemic space of thought seriously as referring to the operation of 
thought m time. Thus, the process of thinking, the enacted thought, becomes systematised 
and so drawn as a concept into the mechanism with which the range and value of concepts is 
determined. The implicatrons of the systematisation of tlunkmg are drawn out by bringing 
actrve thinking into the systemic space occupied by thought as a concept. What is revealed is 
an inhabited living system encountermg its own modification as immanently systemic and as 
temporal. 
9. Conclusion 
Cartesian method can be considered from three basic perspectives, each correlating either with 
a moment within the structure of change that Aristotle analyses in terms of the concepts of 
actuality and potentiality; as an initial state, as a process, and as a result. In this chapter the 
focus has been on the first two; in the next the focus will be on the third. The 'initial state' is 
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the point of intersection of the greater array of passive an active causes. This is point is only 
nominally such, i.e. there is not absolute beginning from which to understand the method, but 
an initial state can be posited as the location of a proxunate cause in order to facilitate 
discussion. This state might be determined as any of many points, but in this case 1t will be 
considered as the point at which the method is created as a set of instructions relation to a 
concrete action in thought. From the perspective of the 'initial state' then, the method is an 
effect. It rmght be considered an effect of Descartes' methodological perspective or some 
other proximate cause, but whichever 1s the case, the most significant detail is that it is a 
prescription for action, but not an action itself. Considering method as a static unity, as an 
effect of the set of passive and active causes from which it arises, its priority lies in its being 
representable as prior. It is the theoretical representation of a potential prior act projected from a 
particular theoretical-conceptual location. This location rmght otherwise be characterised in 
terms of a total structure of passive and active causes. The method must be understood as 
being capable of effecting a transformation of its input such that the telos of the methodology 
is exhaustively represented at its output. It 1s the result of a process culminating in its 
construction, but it is not yet a process itself. Considered thus, as an effect, the method is the 
idea of the concrete path between methodology and telos. It 1s a set of rules or guidelines that 
are devised so as to take into account both the telos and the circumstances within which it 
might be realised. It is essentially projective, and the medium into which it projects is the 
imagined medmm of an enacted thought not yet enacted. In this regard, it is the projection of 
a potential movement based on an array of notions pertaining to theory and to pre-theoretical 
thought. Central to this projection of method is its projection as 'prior'. In this case, 'priority' 
refers to a foundation within knowledge. In the context of Cartesian metaphysics, a 
foundation in knowledge is a point, however small, where 'thought' and 'real being' coincide. 
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Although the Cartesian method, considered as an initial state or an effect, is a prescription for 
action rather than an action as such, it nonetheless contains an imagined movement; it is 
imagined as a temporal process, with a beginning, middle and end. Tlus is a result of its being 
specifically a method devised to operate wi.thin lived, temporally engaged, thought. Its 
beginning point is an imagined moment after which all is different. This is the moment which, 
from the perspective of the complete system, would be understood as its beginning. The 
imagined temporally prior moment of the system, the idea of the moment of the method's 
being instantiated in fact, in enacted thought, is projected along with the projection of the 
method as a set of gwdelines or practices. It might be considered as the projection of the 
memory of its own instantiation, to be remembered as a foundational moment so that the 
process of the method need not be continually re-enacted. 
However, considered as the proxunate cause of the Cartesian metaphysical system, the 
Cartesian method is fundamentally different in kind to the method considered as an effect. 
Considered as a cause, method is enacted; a process. As enacted, the Cartesian method can be 
considered as the unitary efficient cause of a concrete transformation of ideas. However, 
insofar as method is considered as a cause, it must be considered as becoming indefinite. As a 
cause, method must be instantiated in enacted thought, becoming a 'movement' or 
transformation. It can no longer be considered as a set of guidelines for the negotiation of an 
idealised thought-structure. If the method is successful the guidelines or principles, from the 
perspective of enacted method, become the index of a concrete transformation in thought, as 
they are dissipated through enacted thought, which is the imagined space of enacted method. 
Enacted method differs from enacted thought as a totality only insofar as enacted thought is 
restricted in some fashion analogous to the structure of the guidelines that ostensibly 
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motivated it; that is, insofar as enacted thought is restricted in a manner analogous to the 
structure of the Cartesian methodology. The method as a set of guidelines is as different from 
the enacted method as a theory about thought is to thinking. As such, the connection between 
method as effect and method as cause 1s at most one of analogy. The enacted method cannot 
project itself freely according to the prescriptions of a theoretical-conceptual schema, but 
rather runs up against the necessities of its own action and its integration with the 'world'. In 
its becoming indefirute, the method retreats as an object and 1s replaced by the causal 
interactions that obtain according to its actualisation. Insofar as method is considered as an 
efficient cause, it is not an object available for consideration; it is rather the name given to a 
movement of thought such that it might be united analogically with the projection of method 
that extended from the methodology. 
The theoretical sense of 'thought' in the phenomena that are given in enacted thought. The 
phenomena represent the method's a-systemic foundation, but it is only by a 'sleight of hand' 
that theoretical thought ls attached to this foundation and thus given necessary existence. The 
theoretical sense of thought, once given necessary existence, goes on enable the basic 
theoretical structuring of real being. The essential function of methodological doubt is to 
work the a-systermc immediacy of the phenomena into mediate concepts that will translate 
that immediacy such that it might be integrated into a structure of determinate concepts. The 
presence of the method within the system, along with the notion of it's a-systemic phenomenal 
foundation, mvites the system's constant reappraisal. Bemg founded in enacted thought, but 
structured according to a particular theoretical mterpretation of thought, contingency is 
introduced at the system's foundation. Rather than shoring up contingency, the a-systermc 
foundation central to the Cartesian method demonstrates the instantiation of the method as a 
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fundamentally creative interpretive act. Anstotle's pros hen structuring of first philosophy 
allowed that subject matter to become an object of its own study, demonstrating the 
fundamental mstability of a study of being considered thus. The Cartesian method transforms 
refines this instability by locating 1t within the difference between enacted thought and the 
theoretical structure that it authonses. The mstability of the pros hen structure manifests as 
ambiguity. The Cartesian method further specifies this ambiguity as a fundamental possibility 
for creattve reordering inherent in first philosophy. 
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Chapter 5 
THE ACTUALISATION OF CARTESIAN METAPHYSICS 
1. Actualisation and the structure ef Cartesian metapf?ysics 
In the previous chapter, the method was discussed as an aspect of the greater causal situation 
surrounding the transformation of knowledge that Descartes includes at the core of his 
metaphysics. It was shown that, rather than shoring up contingency, the structure of the 
Cartesian method allows for the ambiguity within pros hen structured first philosophy to be 
refined and more thoroughly incorporated into a theoretical account of 1ts study. The 
structure of the Cartesian method was shown to be such that 1t allowed the possibility of 
creative reorganisation into the central part of first philosophy, by way of its incorporating 
enacted thought as a source of a-systemic foundation. In this chapter, the development of 
Descartes' own metaphysical system will be considered from this perspective. This chapter 
thus describes the independent actuality that results from the concrete movement of the 
method. It describes the actuality of the method in the sense of an entelecheia; i.e. the work that 
is freed to enter into causal interactions in terms of that which it is, rather than in terms of its 
own proximate causes. As the method's own ontological foundation is to be found in the 
metaphysical system it purportedly produces, a proper appreciation of the method will only be 
available once it is considered in terms of its foundation in the larger structure of Cartesian 
metaphysics. 
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If the method were to be actualised in such a manner as to derive the certainty that Descartes 
seeks, then 'certainty' as a concept ought to become redundant, as the system would receive 
sufficient and clear ontological foundation in the idea of God. The method provides 
epistemological support for the foundation of the system, but not its ground. It provides the 
conditions under which grounding as such can be justified. With method, Descartes seeks a 
way towards prima philosophia, rather than the prior philosophy as such. Prima philosophia can be 
subsequently deduced from the axioms or common notions that flow from the application of 
the method - the most essential of these being that God exists necessari!J. Within the Cartesian 
system, all other axioms depend on this one. The set of axioms needs to be characterised by 
absolute necessity, and this can only flow from God. When 'certainty' is applied to the world 
as a measure, via the method, necessity becomes possible. Necessity is the metaphysical 
partner to epistemic certainty - they require each other for their sense. The necessity that 
flows from God, through the Cartesian system, renders the natural light a source of certainty. 
Revealed as a gift, the natural light is the local object of faith - but once the local object of 
faith is revealed in its necessity, faith becomes certainty - which is reqwred to demonstrate 
God as necessary at the same time as God's necessity is required to render the method certain. 
This interdependence, considered in the abstract, forms the basic structure of both the 
Cartesian system and that of the Scholastic philosophy he is attempting to displace. 
Nonetheless there is, ID terms of this abstract structure, a fundamental difference between the 
God-human relationship of Thomas Aquinas' philosophy and that of Descartes. For both 
Descartes and Aquinas, God and human can ostensibly be seen to exist assuming the existence 
of the other, but Descartes appears, with the addition of phenomena, to have added a third 
axis of proof of existence outside of the God-human relation. Given the interdependence of 
God and human, divorced from the actual subjective moment of the instantiation of certainty, 
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the role of the Cartesian method is to demonstrate extra-systermc necessity from the 
perspective of knowledge. In this chapter, the focus will be shifted from the movement from 
knowledge through to being, to the movement of being to knowledge, that is, from cause to 
effect. In doing so it will consider the systemic role of God in the Cartesian metaphysics, and 
the specific axiomatic structure ostensibly derived from God's necessity. 
In the context of the Cartesian system, actualisation can be understood in two ways. First, in 
terms of the actualisation ef the system and second, in terms of the actualisation enacted by the 
system. The first of these refers to the genesis of the system and the second refers to its 
function. This difference for the most part mirrors the classical division of forms of priority as 
they pertain variously to knowledge or being. For Descartes, knowledge by definition must 
give direct access to the real; the acceptance of any lesser definition of knowledge will 
indirectly imply God's imperfection. The growth of the structure of the Cartesian system 
must, for this reason, be imagined strictly as the epistemic manifestation of the ontological. 
That is, the various components of each proof, though constructed within the limits of the 
human perceptual apparatus, must be equally vivid from the perspective of God. Items of 
knowledge cannot entirely be products of these perceptual limits; they must be gained zn spite ef 
such limits. The development of the system is the accumulation of the Real. What primarily 
divides the epistemological from the ontological is the direction of causal flow. In the 
development of the system the movement of thought is from effects to causes, but the reason 
for developing this structure is to create a situation in which thought is able to move from 
causes to effects. In the movement from effects to causes one considers the genesis of 
systemic structure; from cause to effect one considers the genesis of world. The material itself 
may be identical if one abstracts it from its concrete manifestation (i.e. the material under 
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consideration as 'world' as such), but is nonetheless modified according to the direction of 
thought. 
The system as a whole must unify both directions of thought: from effect to cause and from 
cause to effect; from God to human and from human to God. After all, any possible position 
from which 'world' can be assessed is itself necessarily embedded within 'world', and thus 
necessarily affected by a complete determination of world as such. Descartes' complete 
system integrates the interrogative act with ontological structures fundamentally. It consists of 
a set of concepts with more or less defimte powers, holding each other in check and thus 
ostensibly constituting the world as a stable system. The Cartesian world-system is, considered 
at a high level of abstraction, a complex relationship between two entity-concepts; human and 
God. Considered at this broad structural level, the Cartesian human-God relationship shares 
much with its contemporaries. Indeed the basic structure of this relationship (and thus the 
basic structure of the Cartesian 'world') is mirrored in Aquinas' Five Ways276 • However, in the 
Cartesian version, the proofs of Aquinas' Summa Theo!ogica no longer merely describe the 
relations between two objects. The nature of the relationship between human and God is 
modified by the mode of access to reality that the Cartesian system affords thought. That is, as 
the Cartesian interface between human and God is demonstrated according to the 
combination of the theory about thought and the idea of enacted thought as such, the 
structure of this relationship must itself be considered in this same manner. The relation is no 
longer merely a matter of argument, but is given in terms of the argument's concrete 
experiential correlate. The proofs of the Summa Theologica are thus in a way removed from the 
page, from the abstraction of demonstration, and mstalled into the structure of the lived world. 
276 Summa Theologica, First Part, Question 2, Article 3 - from Thomas Aqumas, 'Summa Theologiae', in 
Timothy Mc Dermott (ed.), Eyre and Spottiswoode (1989). 
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In the Cartesian system the axes of the proofs of the Five Ways correlate directly with the axes 
of the systemic structure. Cartesian thought is steeped in the Platonic-Aristotelian scholastic 
tradition. However, the Cartesian system, taken broadly, settles mto such a shape as to allow 
this tradition's basic concepts to be transformed into basic structures. In particular, the 
Cartesian God is less significantly an entity that must be justified; more significantly he is the 
origin of the structure of the justification of entities. 
Aquinas' five ways ostensibly demonstrate the necessity of (1) an unmoved first mover, (2) a 
first efficient cause, (3) a necessary being, (4) something which is eminently in being and (5) a 
principle according to which all natural beings are organised teleologically. Regardless of 
Aquinas' intent, it is not entirely obvious that that which is demonstrated by each of these 
proofs reveals a different aspect of the same being. It 1s equally coherent to consider them as 
five (or four, three or two) separate things. Naturally however, Aquinas takes the results of 
these proofs as each referring to an aspect of the one God. ';Ille five ways thus provide a 
model for an attempt to bring priority to a single point, as the array of notions of ontological 
priority is folded into a single entity possessing five infinite attributes. Tbis single point is 
characterised in terms of the God of Christian doctrine, which brings along with it the 
attendant notions of God's 'will' and his infinite goodness. Thus develops the infmite creative 
unity that comes to serve as the default source of solutions to problems pertaining to the 
relationship between determinacy and mdeterminacy. In particular this unity, God, becomes 
the source of the solution to the problem of 'coming to be' that was dealt with by Aristotle in 
terms of actuality and potentiality. As a result, the consideration of actualisation as such 
becomes redundant. The relationship between actuality and potentiality loses its fundamental 
metaphysical significance, since a creative act of God is alone responsible for the difference 
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between an existent and a non-existent essence. For Aristotle, the interface between 
potentiality and actuality was a continually shifting limit that was intimately related to 
questioning as such; where potentiality was consistently usurped by actuality according to logos. 
For Aquinas, the interface between potentiality and actuality is God. Actuality and potentiality 
thus lose their 'insofar as' aspect. That is, a given entity becomes, for the most part, either 
potential or actual. The status of an entity as potential or actual is no longer related 
fundamentally to its place within the greater causal schema; it is either created or not-yet-
created. Actuality is reduced to being the defirung characteristic of present existence, and 
potentiality is reduced to mere possibility. Priority thus remains as 'said in several ways', but 
this 'saying' is said of a single entity that transcends each instance. The result is that 'priority' is 
divorced from the pros hen unity of its Aristotelian sense to become simply one entity with 
many powers, the fundamental systemic role of which is to sustain the world of causes and 
effects. Aristotelian philosophia prote opens up an approach to questioning entities. It is not a 
mode of questioning that seeks to determine the attributes of a given being. On the other 
hand, Aquinas' quest for the first causes of primary substance predetermines the result as 
beillg given in the form of an entity or entities. Furthermore, as an entity is determined to 
serve as the ground for entities as such, it is characterised as infinite in some manner, in order 
to overcome the limlts that it shares with other entities qua entity. 'Infinite being' is thus 
introduced in order to address the 'problem' of an infinite regress of causes. 'Questioning' as 
such, raised to metaphysical significance with the usage of pros hen equivocation ill book iv of 
Aristotle's Metapf?ysics, is likewise reduced accordmg to the structure of the relationship 
between human and God. Although this structure may be understood as the relationship 
between degraded human reason and the eminently reasonable nature of God, the form of 
human reason nonetheless becomes fundamental. The lffiage of humility presented ill the 
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relation between human and God is deceiving. Although God's transcendence is fundamental 
to his function, it remains structured according to a distinctly human schema. The larger 
Cartesian structure aligns precisely with the human-God structure suggested by the Five Ways. 
Although the method ostensibly grounds the system in an a-systemic element through the 
introduction of enacted thought, this is more than balanced on the ontological side by the 
necessary transcendence of God. This transcendence necessarily exceeds the a-systematicity of 
phenomena, as it serves as the ground not only for the system as such, but for 'world' in total, 
including the a-systemic phenomena that ground the method. Nonetheless, the manner in 
wluch the Cartesian system is constructed tends to render the axes of the human-God 
structure somewhat differently as compared to the structure of the Five Ways. For example, 
one may compare the second way and the fourth way of Aquinas with their Cartesian 
analogues. Aquinas' second way is from the notion of the efficient cause and runs thus: 
In the world of sense we find there is an order of effiaent causes. There is no case known (nor indeed, is it 
possible) ill wluch a thmg is found to be the effiaent cause of itself, because ill that case it would be pnor to itself, 
which is impossible. Now ill efficient causes it is not possible to go on to illfiruty, because in all effiaent causes 
folloW!ng in order, the first is the cause of the illtermediate cause, and the illtermediate is the cause of the ultlmate 
cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the 
effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among effiaent causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any illtermediate 
cause. But if in effiaent causes it is possible to go on to infiruty, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will 
there be an ultimate effect, nor any illtermediate efficient causes, all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is 
necessary to admit a first effiaent cause, to which everyone give the name of God.277 
His fourth way is from the 'gradation to be found in things' (the notion of 'eminence'), and is 
written as: 
277 Summa Theologica, First Part, Question 2, Article 3 
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Among beillgs there are some more and some less good, true, noble, and the like. But 'more' and 'less' are 
predicated of different things, according as they resemble ill their different ways something wlu.ch 1s the 
maxunum, as a thing 1s said to be hotter according as 1t more nearly resembles that wlu.ch 1s hottest. There is then, 
somethmg wlu.ch 1s truest, somethmg best, somethmg noblest, and, consequently, something wlu.ch 1s most beillg; 
for those things that are greatest ill truth are greatest in being, as it 1s wntten ill the Metapf?yszcs. Now the 
maxunum ill any genus 1s the cause of all ill that genus; as fire, wlu.ch 1s the maxunum of heat, is the cause of all 
hot thmgs as is said ill that same book. Therefore there must also be somethmg wlu.ch 1s to all beings the cause of 
thett being, goodness, and every other perfection. And this we call God Z78 
These two proofs are almost rrurror images of one another. The relations they suggest 
between human and God are given in each accord.tng to an opposite movement of the mind. 
Following the fourth way, thought moves from effect to cause; following the second, cause to 
effect. The 'gradations' by which the fourth way is demonstrated are gradations judged to 
apply to created beings. They are the raw material out of which their transcendent analogues 
are projected as formal causes. On the other hand, the 'first efficient cause' demonstrated in 
the second way refers immediately to the act of God as creator; it does without the mediation 
of imaginative projection. As is well known, Descartes sought, overtly at least, to reduce the 
number of causes relevant to human endeavours to one; the efficient cause. He nonetheless 
utilises all four Aristotelian causes in various ways; particularly with respect to the structure of 
the relationship between human and God. In this manner, for example, his argument from 
eminence utilises the structure of formal causality, being as it is an analogue of Aquinas' fourth 
way. However, as it is used by Descartes, this structure can only be a means of access to a 
more concrete idea of God; the idea of God as the first efficient cause. Considered in tandem 
with the Cartesian method, and thus with the notion of enacted thought as the space in which 
epistemic certamty is properly grounded, the relationship between the argument from the 
278 Summa Theologica, First Part, Question 2, Article 3 
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efficient cause and the argument from eminence takes a uniquely Cartesian shape. The 
argument from eminence takes the form, when considered ID connection with its Cartesian 
phenomenal ground, of a looking back toward God. The Cartesian system lends a worldly 
aspect to the argumentation of Aquinas by imbedding it in enacted thought. The fourth way 
represents the image of God as restricted by the structure of causality and the nature of the 
imagination. It describes the appearance of the cause from the reduced perspective of the 
effect. The more deeply the effect (i.e. the human) considers its own cause, though it may 
obtain less and less clarity, the further it reaches into reality. Though this argument is given in 
terms of the formal cause, this simultaneous reduction of clarity and increase of reality 
functions equally according to the efficient cause, as it 1s a feature of Cartesian causality as such 
(a feature inherited from Scholastic philosophy), that the cause must contain at least as much 
reality as the effect. This reduction in the breadth of clarity corresponds precisely with 
Descartes' own reductive tendencies. Descartes requires God as the source of certainty and 
attaches certainty to clarity. The reduction central to the Cartesian method is thus founded 
upon the relationship between clarity, reality and causality. Once the structure of the Cartesian 
system has been laid out, the concrete role of God is made plain: he is the first efficient cause 
insofar as he creates and recreates the world from moment to moment. Descartes states this 
explicitly: 
[I]he nature of tune 1s such that its parts are not mutually dependent, and never coexist. Thus, from the fact that 
we now exist, 1t does not follow that we shall exist a moment from now, unless there 1s some cause - the same 
cause which originally produced us - which continually reproduces us, as 1t were, that 1s to say, which keeps us m 
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existence. For we easily understand that there 1s no power ill us enabhng us to keep ourselves ill existence. 
279 Descartes, Principles 1.21: CSM I 200: AT VIIIA 13 
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Thus God functions in the first instance as the efficient cause of time and causality as such, 
which are in fact immanent structures of this created world. They are the structures by which 
access can be gained to the fundamental causal activity; the continuing actualisation of world 
by God. This is the pure idea of divine action - the Cartesian 'Realpolitik' - the interface 
between God and world. The flow of efficient causal chams through time, the appearance of 
order, the formal and material causes and the mediate manifestation of the 'will' of God, all 
supervene upon this first efficient cause, too distant to be viewed directly, and so approached 
via the phenomena of indubitability. 
2. From Axioms or Common Notions 
If Descartes' method is considered 'geometrical', then the Cartesian axiomatics is strictly a 
component of the method, as the geometrical method is by definition a method in which an 
array of propositions are demonstrated by recourse only to a small set of axioms and common 
notions. However, referring to the Cartesian method, as opposed to the geometrical method, 
implies some kind of difference. The differences are mostly to be found in the attention with 
which the sense of 'self-evidence' is given. For Euclid, self-evidence serves adequately on its 
own.280, but for Descartes, the status of self-evidence is itself the major problem of method. 
Thus, the truly Cartesian method is the method by which Descartes develops axioms. It is the 
construction of the system on the back of these axioms that might be compared to the 
'geometrical' method. The set of all possible Cartesian axioms or common notions refers to 
the collection of all eternally true statements as denved according to the Cartesian method. 
Interactions between axioms, and between axioms and imaginative material that has been 
verified as accurate, produces propositions that are themselves necessarily true. Further, these 
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propositions can interact with each other and also with the axioms and accurate imagmative 
material. The axioms thus form the genetic foundation (m knowledge) of the systemic 
structure as such. It is in terms of the relationship between axiomatlcs and system that 
Descartes' method can be called geometrical. Following this analogy, the Cartesian method 
would be comparable to the 'self-evidence' of Euclidian axioms. Thus, qua axiomatics, the 
method is the structure of Cartesian metaphysical self-evidence. The self-evidence becomes 
metaphysical in its transformation into 'certainty' through God. In the Prindples Descartes 
writes, 
[W]e must give our attention ill an orderly way to the notions that we have withm us, and we must judge to be 
true all and only those whose truth we clearly and distmctly recogruse when we attend to them in this way. When 
we do this we shall reahse, first of all, that we exist insofar as our nature consists in thmkmg; and we shall 
snnultaneously reahse both that there is a God, and that we depend on lum, and also that a consideration of lus 
attributes enables us to illvestlgate the truth of other thmgs, Sillce he is their cause. Fillally, we will see that besides 
the notions of God and of our mmd, we have withm us knowledge of many proposltlons which are eternally true, 
such as 'Nothmg comes from nothmg'. We shall also find that we have knowledge both of a corporeal or 
extended nature wluch 1s divlSlble, moveable, and so on, and also of certain sensations wluch affect us, such as the 
sensations of pain, colours, tastes and so on (though we do not yet know the cause of our being affected ill this 
way). When we contrast all this knowledge with the confused thoughts we had before, we will acquire the habit of 
forming clear and distinct concepts of all the things that can be known. These few illStructions seem to me to 
contain the most important pnnciples of human knowledge.281 
As described in the previous chapter, enacted thought is integrated into the general theoretical-
conceptual milieu either in terms of a structure to which it conforms or as the idea of the 
system's a-systemic foundation. The structure is a theory about thought, about the interaction 
280 See: Euclid, 'The Elements ofEuchd: Books I to Vi', m Thomas L. Heath (ed.), (London; Edinburgh: W. 
& R. Chambers, 1884) at Book 1. 
281 Descartes, Principles 1.75: CSM I 221: AT VIIIA 38 
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between intellect and will. On the other hand, the foundational aspect of enacted thought 
does not function according to the peculiarities of any theory. Rather, it is foundational 
precisely and simply by its externality and by the systemic (internal) representation of this 
externality ill terms of clear and distinct ideas. Enacted thought is foundatlonal only insofar as 
the particular lirrut-phenomena it encounters can come to serve the cause of certainty. The 
extra-systenuc status of these limit phenomena provides their power, wluch is ostensibly 
transferred to the system by way of the concept of the clear and distinct idea. Upon 
completlon of this foundational operation, the idea of the 'clear and distinct' can be 
characterised, with respect to its purported function, ill three separate ways: .firstly, it can be 
understood as the idea of enacted thought insofar as it is purified through the concrete 
actualisatlon of the method; secondly, as a product of enacted thought that integrates with the 
Cartesian theory about thought; and finally, as referring to a set of specific outcomes; the 
axioms and clear ideas that are the foundation of the Cartesian system in its specificity. 
Those propositions, the truth of which can be clearly and distinctly perceived according to the 
natural light of reason, Descartes calls axioms or common natl.ons. Axioms are explicitly 
characterised as propositlons and thus, given that propositions are by their nature relational, 
must be considered as having their ongin in the understanding. The imaginative counterparts 
to the axioms are the clear ideas of things and are representational in nature. Although the 
axioms and the clear ideas are formally and genetically separate, they are united in functlon. 
The clear ideas, by their beillg clear and distinct, are considered certainly accurate - but it is 
only by the relevant axiom/ s (that 'all clear and distinct ideas are necessarily true', etc.) that this 
holds. Likewise, though the axioms are considered pure products of the understanding, it is 
only by way of their application to imaginative content that such axioms may extend beyond 
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the confines of thought; for, whilst the imagination projects externality, the understanding 
merely projects onto imaginative content. Clear ideas of things require axioms for their 
certainty, and axioms require clear ideas for their content. Furthermore, there are very few 
possible base level axioms and clear ideas - thus they can only form the barest, most mmimal 
foundation. All certain propositions must either be axiomatic, that is, they must be 
representative of understandings developed under the natural light of reason, or else they must 
be developed according to the mteractions between these axiomatic propositions. The 
majority of axioms are not constructed from the bare interaction between the certain products 
of the imagination and the certain products of the understanding. Rather they are the products 
of the interactions of these products - that 1s, the are 'deductions' in the Cartesian sense. 
Descartes defines deduction (as opposed to induction) in terms of the clarity of its necessity as 
presented to thought. The nature of the connection is not defined in terms of a logical 
structure, but rather in terms of the same clarity of thought that characterised the intuition of 
clear and distinct ideas. Descartes writes in the Rules for the Direction ef the Mind: 
Deduction is made through inuution when 1t 1s s=ple and transparent, but not when 1t 1s complex and mvolved. 
When the latter 1s the case, we call it 'enumeration' or 'mduct:J.on', since the intellect cannot Slmultaneously grasp it 
as a whole, and its certainty m a sense depends on memory, which must retain the judgements we have made on 
the individual parts of the enumeration 1f we are to denve a smgle conclusion from them taken as a whole. 282 
Thus the connections between ideas are subject to the same reductive process as the ideas 
themselves. Taken together, they represent the only formal access to indubitability in the 
Cartesian system. Regarding this Descartes writes, 
282 Descartes, Rules, CSM I 37: AT X 407-8 
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jL] et us now review all the acnons of the mtellect by means of which we are able to arnve at a knowledge of thmgs 
with no fear of being rmstaken. We recogruse only two: mductlon and deduction.283 
The difference between intuition and deduction 1s not one of kind. Rather, both may be 
understood as modes of a larger Intuition concept, whereby 'intuition' is the static and 
'deduction' the dynamic representative. Whilst the intuition of the clear and distinct pertams 
to objects that are simple, static and immediately self-evident, the deduction 1s a sequence of 
movements of thought. The results of the process of deduction are not immediately self-
evident and require the further concept of 'memory' for their integration mto the general 
Cartesian theory about thought. 
Though Descartes gives little attention to memory as a mode of thought, it 1s a concept that is 
foundational for his axiomatics. Memory is the concept under which diverse parts of an 
argument are brought into proximity with one another. It is only under the concept of 
memory that a sequence of propositions can be understood in terms of a 'movement of 
thought'. Memory brings the recollection of the relation between one moment and another in 
this movement, so that it can be submitted to verification according to the natural light. The 
possibility of the verification of relations between propositions is thus explained by memory. 
The other significant role for the memory is that it must retain the method - and retain it with 
an appreciation of its success as a technology devised for the production of necessity. Thus 
one can secure for the deductive chain the same certainty found in the clear and distinct idea. 
It is not enough to verify the integrity of the chain itself, as it is the memory of the clarity of 
the foundation that prevents the constant reappraisal of the system. Such a continuous 
zs3 Descartes, Rules, CSM I 14: AT X 368 
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'revolution' of ideas is unlikely to be Descartes' aim as a physical scientist and metaphysician. 
In any case, one may also want to assume that memory itseffis capable of becoming the subject 
of an axiom. If not, how can it support deduction? One can only guess what form of 
Cartesian argument might be appropriately levelled in support of the status of memory, as 
Descartes does not provide one - indeed he seems determined to deny its participation.284 
Deduction as such must itself also be verified according to the method. Although one may 
recognise a kind of circularity here, it should be remembered that anything that passes the test 
of the method is ostensibly certain - regardless of its origin. There can be no vicious 
circularity, as the natural light is the only relevant measure for knowledge (excluding faith in 
Scripture). Memory ostensibly allows that thought can move from axiomatic propositions to 
conclusions, to further propositions and so on, with the certainty represented in the basic 
axioms remaining intact. In spite of its necessity, Descartes mainly considers memory in terms 
of its inadequacies - and in spite of its inadequacies, he declares the 'deductive' process itself 
urumpeachable: 
Moreover, we must note that whtle our expenences of dungs are often deceptive, the deduction or pure mference 
of one dung from another can never be performed wrongly by an mtellect which is m the least degree rational, 
though we may fail to make the inference if we do not see 1t. Z85 
It seems then that the only potential concern is that one may fail to make a relevant positive 
judgement. There is no issue with the status of a positive judgement once it has been made. 
However, this does not explain the need to develop a technique for the expulsion of memory 
(more on this shortly), if memory is the very mode of thought upon which deduction, in 
distinction from static intuition, is grounded. Memory is in fact highly problematic for 
284 Descartes, Principles 1.44, CSM I 207, AT VIIIA 21 
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Descartes. While it provides the material circumstances for deduction, it also introduces into 
deduction the contmgency, the 'deception', that also characterises one's 'experiences of things' . 
. 
Extending talk of the 'deception' further mto the process of the deduction, via particularity 
and contingency, Descartes writes: 
Deduction, therefore, remal!ls as our sole means of compounding tlungs in a way that enables us to be certal!l of 
theu: truth. Yet even with deduction there can be drawbacks. If, say, we conclude that a given space full of air 1s 
empty, on the grounds that we do not perceive anythmg in it, either by sight, touch, or any other sense, then we 
are mcorrectly coniommg the nature of vacuum with the nature of this space. This is just what happens when we 
judge that we can deduce something general and necessary from sometlung part!cular and contmgent.286 
It is for precisely the same reason that particular sensations are excluded that memory is 
excluded. It has been shown to be as contingent and particular as the senses. However, it is 
reqwred absolutefy for the development of the very certamty and necessity that it threatens. 
Although memory 1s required if one is to 'deduce' new propositions, Descartes fears that its 
hmitations may render it incompatible with the goal of certainty. On deducing distant 
propositions from axioms Descartes writes: 
For this deduction sometlmes requires such a long chal!l of mferences that when we amve at such a truth 1t is not 
easy to recall the entire route which led us to it.[ .. ] So I shall run through them several tlmes m a contmuous 
movement of the lIDagmation, simultaneously mtuiting one relation and passmg on to the next, until I have learnt 
to pass from the first to the last so swiftly that memory is left with practically no role to play, and I seem to mtwt 
287 the whole tlung at once. 
Rather than interpreting his 'continuous movement of the imagination' as perhaps a technique 
for maximising the usefulness of memory as the necessary medium for deduction, Descartes 
286 Descartes, Rules, CSM I 48: AT X 424-5 
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considers it a way of abolishing memory from the deductive process. He appears to be 
arguing that a sigruficant reduction in time between individual propositions within the 
'continuous movement of the imagination' will render them all present simultaneously. That 
is, they become effectively a single static idea. A single static idea, Descartes seems to imply, 
does not require memory or any other temporal aspect. His 'continuous movement' of 
thought as an act produces continuous, and thus unified, thought content. The continuity 
unifies thought so that it is grounded in the present - the thought occurring 'now' is the same 
unified thought that extends into 'before', thus negating the role of memory. Descartes fails to 
recognise that continuity in no way guarantees unity; nor does it exclude temporality. It merely 
modifies the space of the problem of stasis and change so that its material is now 'thought'. 
Descartes has merely inserted an old problem into a new media, i.e. the familiar dyads of 
actuality/potentiality, stasis/ change, discrete/ continuous become rendered in this context as 
idea/ act of thought. Those concepts of urufication (i.e. potentiality, continuity, etc.) are 
excluded on grounds of their connection to contingency. Regardless of this overt exclusion, 
such contingent and continuous notions are reqmred for the function of the Cartesian system. 
For Descartes, one of the systemic manifestations of contingency is the dubitability arising 
from the mteraction of the various human capacities and their limitations, and it is this form of 
contingency that his attempted exclusion of memory ostensibly serves to expel. However, 
unfortunately for Descartes, this approach can only fail. It is the concept of memory itself that 
gives the ontological foundation for the 'continuous movement' that allows for his deductive 
'intmtions' to operate solely in the present. To exclude memory is to exclude Cartesian 
deduction. Descartes' simple denial of its role in deduction is no solution to the problem. 
Furthermore, the structure formed by the interrelated concepts of memory, thought and 
'continuous movement' is a poor fit with Cartesian deduction, which involves the production 
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of particular propositions. In developing new propositions that partake in 'certainty', one must 
intuit that the connection between one thing and another is wholly necessary. This act of 
'connecting' things in thought already suggests a problematic relationship between continuous 
and discontinuous thought. Unless the content of the deductions can be 'translated' mto a 
continuous form, the continuity of the thought act as such can do nothing to negate its 
discreteness. Of course, at least in the Rules for the Direction ef the Mind, Descartes supposes that 
this 'translation' is possible. It is facilitated by the concept of 'extension', which serves to 
mediate between imagination and understandmg on the topic of quantity. However, even 1f 
this 1s correct, it 1s only relevant to those parts of theory that deal with quantity and extended 
space. The deeper parts of the Cartesian metaphysics are not available for translation in this 
way. Descartes writes: 
Deduction can only proceed from words to tlungs, from effects to causes or from causes to effects, from hke to 
hke, from parts to parts or to the whole ... 288 
and, 
If, moreover, we are to make use of the =agmation as an rud we should note that whenever we deduce somethmg 
unknown from sometlung already known, 1t does not follow that we are discovenng some new kind of entity, but 
merely that we are extending our entire knowledge of the topic in question to the poillt where we perceive that the 
thmg we are lookmg for partlc1pates ill this way or that way ill the nature of the thmgs' given ill the statement of 
the problem.289 
In the Rules Descartes understands 'making use of the imagination as an rud' specifically as the 
utilisation of imagination, via 'extension' as an aid in the workmg out of problems of quantity. 
Furthermore, by the time of the Principles, he has completely limited the function of the 
288 Descartes, Rules, CSM I 50: AT X 428 
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imagination to the extensive projection. Thus, the helpful interaction of the understanding 
and the imagination is only helpful regarding certain kinds of problems. In fact, Descartes' 
utopian view of the purity of the deductive process (i.e. 'it does not follow that we are 
discovering some new kind of entity', etc.) clashes not only with the manner in which he 
moves from axiomatics to metaphysical structure, but also with the manner in which he 
arranges his method from the outset. In particular, with the use of analogy to draw 
connections between otherwise unrelated concepts (sand/rock - free thought/obstructed 
thought). 
A proper demonstration of the relation between the Cartesian method and its outcomes is 
lacking in Descartes' writing. The connection between the method, and the specific set of 
axioms that constitute its results, is formed by a constellation of concepts united around 
'clarity'. A major difficulty in applying Descartes' method for the development of axioms is 
that the key concept of 'clarity' is not properly elucidated. Rather, it is assumed to be 
completely and naturally evident. For example, Descartes de.fines a perception as clear, "when 
it is present and accessible to the attentive mind - just as we say that we see something clearly 
when it is present to the eye's gaze and stimulates it with a sufficient degree of strength and 
accessibility."290 His definition is no more precise elsewhere, and is perhaps most precise here 
because he completes the analogy from which he draws the concept. Unfortunately the 
de.fimtion contains no practical detail or instruction, and the analogy itself is broad enough to 
submit readily to creative interpretation. Of course, for Descartes, there ought not to be any 
need to precisely define 'clarity', as 1ts meaning ought to be obvious to anyone who has 
experienced a clear perception. However, 1f one has not experienced such a thing (if, in 
289 Descartes, Rules, CSM I 56: AT X 438 
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Descartes' words, one was unable to put aside preconceived ideas) it will be impossible to 
understand or anticipate its nature, much less its connection with certainty and systemic 
necessity. Those who may doubt the power of 'clarity' are precisely those who must be 
absented from its critique, on the grounds that they cannot have perceived clearly. This 'catch 
22' may render the theory somewhat safer from critique, but it also renders it less convincing -
particularly as those who will need to be convinced will be precisely those who cannot be. The 
development and demonstration of the argument for the necessary existence of thought does 
show a particular sense of 'clarity' reasonably well. However, the manner in which other 
axioms or common notions might share this 'clarity' is not demonstrated. As was shown 
earlier in this chapter, there is no clear and necessary relationship between the method as 
Descartes sets it out, and the particulars of the system that it purportedly founds. What counts 
as 'clear and distinct' under the natural light of reason is by no means clear. 
The demonstration of the necessary existence of thought is the only example of a possible 
implementation of the method given in any real detail. It is from this example that the concept 
of 'clarity' is demonstrated. As has already been shown, even this example is problematic. 
Nonetheless, it is this example that provides the only significant articulation of clarity from the 
perspective of concrete phenomena; and it is from the phenomena that clarity is authorised in 
its systemic role. Even if it is allowed that the phenomena associated with thinkmg the 
negation of thought are adequately characterised as 'clear and distinct', it remains unclear in 
what manner other particular phenomena can be said to share in this characterisation. The 
failure to doubt the 'act of doubt' as it is enacted is a very specific failure with a very specific 
structure. It is not obvious how the structure of the genesis of the axiom to which it relates 
could be shared by any other axiom. One may suspect that the relationship between basic 
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axioms is merely one of analogy, i.e. one that sidesteps the rigours of the method to a large 
degree. An analogy is able to facilitate a reconstruction from both sides of the comparison 
that constitutes it. In other words, one cannot be immediately sure that it is 'clarity' that is 
giving credence to a judgement, rather than a judgement giving meaning to 'clarity'. If it is the 
former, then one would already need to understand 'clarity' in order to appreciate the sense in 
which a given axiom is 'clear'. If it is the latter, then there may be hope for an understanding 
of clarity in terms of the outcome of the analogy. Such an approach to 'clarity' may appear to 
offer greater hope for developing a concrete appreciation of its meaning, but such a hope must 
be based on the assumption that in each case Descartes has devised the axiom properly. One 
might think that it would be possible to approach the meaning of Cartesian 'clarity' by 
scanning his list of fundamental axioms for a common element - to 'survey the analogy', as 
Aristotle entreats, rather than searching for a precise definition. The result could, if one were 
to maintain a degree of scepticism regarding the legitimacy of Descartes' derived axioms, only 
be a purely structural definition. That is, the meaning of 'clarity' would be developed from its 
use or function, as that which unites the various axioms qua axiom, rather than by Descartes' 
overt definitions or genetic narrative. Further, even if this is techmcally feasible, it is 
nonetheless limited in practice, as Descartes does not provide an extensive list of axioms or 
common notions. His list is only as large as he needs it to be for the development of the 
structure of his system, as he considers that an understanding of the method ought to enable 
one to enumerate the set of relevant axioms for oneself.291 Though Descartes does present a 
small number of propositions that he considers would count as axioms, he presents them as 
291 On the enumeration of 'eternal truths', or axioms, Descartes writes, "It would not be easy to draw up a 
list of all of them; but nonetheless we cannot fail to know them when the occasion for thinking about them 
arises, provided we are not blinded by preconceived opinions." Descartes, Principles 1.49: CSM I 209: AT 
VIIIA24 
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finished products292• That is, he makes no attempt to display in detail the successful passage 
through the method of such propositions. Nor does he demonstrate their necessary 
connection to the phenomena that are characterised in terms of clanty and distinctness. Thus, 
in order to develop a broader appreaation of Descartes' sense of 'clarity', lacking a range of 
demonstrations, one has no option but survey the limited analogy provided - with all attendant 
uncertainties mtact. The presence of such a minimal array of axioms can allow one an 
appreciation only of the mirumum spread of axiomatic concepts allowable according to the 
natural light. That is, the existence of several examples allows for an appreciation of some of 
the possible differences between clear ideas such that they nonetheless remain clear. They 
suggest minimally that clear ideas can be different from one another in the specific ways 
demonstrated, whilst ostensibly still maintaining their connection with the phenomena by 
which clarity and distinctness came to be described. 
The axiomatic proposition, nothing comes from nothing (NCFN), is one candidate for analysis. It 
ought to be comparable with He who thinks cannot but exist while he thinks (or I think. I exist 
(ITIE)), insofar as it relates to the method, by tracing it back through the process of hyperbolic 
doubt and testing for its success. One would imagine that, if Descartes had appropnately 
derived this axiom, its reassessment would provide a further example of 'clarity' - perhaps 
identical to the first example, perhaps viewed from a different aspect, or perhaps significantly 
different (In any case, second, third, fourth, etc., examples of clarity would be required if one 
was to attempt to form a significantly refined analogy). By comparison with NCFN, the failure 
to deny the existence of thought derives its power as a demonstration of existence from the 
292 For example, in Principles 1.49 (CSM 209: AT VIIIA 24) he gives the following propositions: Nothing 
comes from nothing; It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time; What is done 
cannot be undone; He who thinks cannot but exist while he thinks. 
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fact that the subject and object of the negation are ostensibly identical.293 Enacted thought 
attempts to negate itself and thus induces a moment of bewilderment. This impasse is 
reversed and becomes the proof of the certainty of the opposite act of the will applied to the 
existence of thought - the affirmation of the thinking subject. Although its integration into 
the Cartesian system at large rema1ns highly problematic, the power of this insight (of the 
implausibility of the doubting of present doubt, given in those terms precisely) is significant. 
However, the one generalisable principle of certainty that Descartes seems to abstract from 
this structure is rather different and retains little of the power of this basic example. From the 
operation of the 'natural light', the intuitive capacity demonstrated by the attempted negation 
of thought, Descartes seems to produce the rule, that anything the derual of which produces a 
contradiction must be true. In the Principles ef Philosopf?y he subtly restructures his statement of 
the necessary existence of thought to take a propositional form, rather than being simply the 
index of an intuition. The "I think) I exist' of the Medztatzons becomes "I am thinking, therefore I 
exis/'294 and finally "He who thinks cannot but exist while he thinkl'295 in the Principles ef Philosopf?y. 
The difference is significant: the first of these directs one to the moment of the intuition as 
such, whilst the second divides the unity of the intuition into two parts connected by a 
relationship of entailment, and the third represents an abstraction of this intuition such that 1t 
becomes a general rule. While the first is grounded in the concrete moment where thought 
fails to negate itself, the second and third are grounded ill a further unjustified premiss - that 
293 Of course, they are only ostensibly identical, as already demonstrated. The thinking as such, the living 
thought in which the negation unfolds is not identical to the concept that is saved by the failed negation. 
The confusion that is confronted in thinking this negation is the result of the negation of the present act, 
precisely as that act. The second form of thought is, on the other hand, a concept inserted into the space 
posited as the beyond of this limit of thought. 
294 Descartes, Principles. 1.7: CSM I 195: AT VIIIA 7 
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an action must be referred to an existent entity296• Furthermore, the grounding intuition is 
forced to conform to the structure of propositional logic by way of the law of 
noncontradiction. Descartes writes: 
But we cannot for all that suppose that we, who are having such thoughts, are nothing For 1t 1s a contradiction to 
suppose that what thinks does not, at the very tlme when 1t 1s thmkmg, exist.297 
The 'sleight of hand' that facilitated the incorporation of enacted thought into the Cartesian 
system as its a-systemic foundation is completed here. Though the thought experiment of the 
Meditations was powerful, i.e. it did not fail to induce the bewilderment required for 'certainty', 
it rested upon a fallacious premiss - that thought can be classified as a unity in the same 
manner as any other object of affirmation or negation. On the back of this objectification of 
thought, a historically derived theory (an Aristotelian/Scholastic theory of the structure of 
thought) was inserted into and formed the centre of the Cartesian system. The transformation 
from intuition to proposition represents a second sleight of hand, in which the mechanism for 
the organisation and recognition of 'mtuited' material no longer requires intuition as such. On 
the back of such a transformation, the precise meaning of 'clarity' is allowed to take on a 
specific logical-historical aspect. The law of noncontradiction and the principle of sufficient 
reason must now be authorised as 'clear' as they now appear to constitute the forms of clarity 
central to the intuitions regardmg the existence of thought and God respectively. In a sense 
they become axiomatic precisely as those structures that are necessary for the fundamental 
296 It is true that Descartes makes mention of this principle. In the Principles he writes, "I did not. .. deny 
that one must first know what thought, existence and certamty are, and that it is impossible that that which 
thinks should not exist, and so forth. But because these are very simple notions, and ones which on their 
own provide us with no knowledge of anything that exists, I did not think they needed to be listed." This is 
clearly a response to earlier criticism, but unfortunately it is a response that can only destroy the integrity of 
his earlier 'intuition'. If these concepts are to serve as his overt foundation, then he can not avoid even the 
appearance of infinite regress that he avoids by anchoring his system a-systemically. 
297 Descartes, Principles 1.7: CSM I 194-5: AT VIIIA 7 
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axiomatic intuitions as such. In the case of the existence of thought, it no longer matters that 
the form of 'contradiction' embedded within the thought experiment is not identical to the 
form found in the law of noncontradiction. Within the famous Cartesian thought experiment, 
the 'contradiction' is particularly powerful because it is not snnply one of logic. The thought 
experiment invites the think.er to direct their attention towards precisely that which allows their 
attention to be drawn as such. It is an invitation to direct attention to that space ill which 
negation, affirmation and attention as such operate. On the other hand the propositions, 
Nothing comes from nothing; It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time; What is 
done cannot be undone; He who thinks cannot but exist while he thinks are of a distmctly different kind. 
The nature of their success as axioms is not identical to the success of the thought experiment. 
For example, nothing comes from nothing refers to relations between objects of thought, rather 
than to thought itself. The confusion inherent in the attempt to consider the reverse of nothing 
comes from nothing is not a confusion in which the attempt, the act, the 'enacted thought' is 
directly implicated. If its negation causes a contradiction, it is a structural contradiction. That is, 
it is a contradiction the result of which is a problem for particular systems of thought (perhaps 
even for all systems, insofar as they are systems), but not for thought as such. 
'Clarity' thus appears to have two senses - one justificatory and one transitive. The 
justificatory sense is a concept devised as the reverse of a thorough and particular 
bewilderment, as described in the previous chapter. The nature of this form of clarity lays in 
its connection via negation to an experience of extreme confusion. As such there is much 
room for misapplication. Though arising from many causes, the experience of bewilderment 
itself appears uniform. This experiential space, uniform in its phenomena yet diverse in its 
causes, is reversed under the concept of clarity - a sleight of hand that allows the diversity of 
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its causes to be reversed according to their natures as well. Thus, supposedly, it is the inability 
to think a given scenario that renders its negation certain, e.g. one fails to articulate something 
comes from nothing in thought, and so one negates it by affirming its opposite.298 However, this is 
not required for the development of the axioms that arise from the above mentioned 
transformation from intuition to proposition, as they emerge precisely as the transformed 
structure of the clear idea as such - i.e. they are themselves the second form of clarity; 
transitive because no longer specific to particular phenomena. Thus the structural differences 
between I think, I am and Nothing comes from nothing are well hidden, though fundamental. With 
respect to the origin of the 'clarity' they each respectively attach to, they differ greatly. I think, I 
am, is not only derived from the same phenomenal material as the concept of justificatory 
clarity - it is in fact the measure of such clarity and the source of any motivation to transform 
and extend clarity to other material. On the other hand Nothing comes from nothing reqmres 
'clarity' to authorise its validity, and this is achieved by a sleight of hand. The sleight of hand is 
in fact the transformation of the content of intuition along propositional hnes, such that the 
basic structure of propositional logic itself appears necessary to intuition. The two 
propositions also differ with respect to the nature and significance of the space they occupy 
within the structure of the Cartesian system. The first (J think, I am) serves to link the systemic 
structure (as yet undetermined as to its precise nature) with something a-systemic, rooting the 
God-human dyad in phenomena. The second merely brings the familiar historical metaphysics 
into the structure, graftmg it onto the rootstock of the first proposition. I think, I am, is a 
systemic interpretation of a potentiality of phenomena. It is an internal representation of 
298 If it seems odd that a limit of a human capacity might serve as the herald of certain knowledge, it would 
pay to remember that m the Cartesian system the faithful articulation of the world in thought, at least in 
properly refined thought, is guaranteed by the beneficence of God, as will be discussed further below. 
227 
externality. Nothing comes from nothing is, on the other hand, an internal principle of systemic 
orgamsation. 
3. Axiomatics and Structure 
As an internal principle, Nothing comes from nothing concerns both the efficient-causal mterplay 
between existent entities or ideas and also the form in which entities and ideas come to be. 
That is, it is not only the continuing interactions, but also the natures of things that must have 
'something' as their cause. This split, between interactions and natures, is mirrored in another 
basic, and related, axiomatic proposition that Descartes offers: that God is the first efficient cause of 
everythin(99• God is brought into contact with this division through his characterisation in 
terms of causality; a concept which is itself structured largely in terms of somethmg like 
Nothing comes from nothing. As a result, the causal relationship between God and world will tends 
to be structured m two separate ways, in line with the split between interactions and natures. 
In tlus way, God is considered both the first efficient cause of motion and change in the world 
and the efficient cause of the space within which causality plays out. With respect to the 
nature of motion, Descartes writes: 
This is twofold: first, there is the uruversal and primary cause - the general cause of all the motions m the world; 
and second there 1s the particular cause which produces m an mdivrdual piece of matter some motion which 1t 
previously lacked. Now as far as the general cause is concerned, 1t seems clear to me that tlus is no other than 
God lumself.300 
299 
"[W]e should not be so arrogant as to suppose that we can share m God's plans. We should, instead, 
consider him as the efficient cause of all things; and starting from the divine attributes which by God's will 
we have some knowledge of, we shall see, with the aid of our God-given natural light, what conclusions 
should be drawn concerning those effects which are apparent to our senses." Descartes, Principles CSM I 
202: AT VIIIA 15-16 
300 Descartes, Principles 2.36: CSM I 240: AT VIIIA 61 
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Thus he overtly names God as the origin of motion itself - but this 1s not all. Descartes 
understands God as preserving the world in an identical manner in which he created it301 , i.e. 
God continually recreates the world at each instant, guaranteemg its rational unity by his 
benevolence. In this manner, the concept of God and the concept of time become 
inextricably entwined: 
[T]he nature of tune 1s such that its parts are not mutually dependent, and never coexist. Thus, from the fact that 
we now exist, 1t does not follow that we shall exist a moment from now, unless there is some cause - the same 
cause which onginally produced us - which continually keeps us in existence.302 
And this 'existence' could have been entirely different had God so desired: 
[W]e cannot determine by reason alone how big these pieces of matter are, or how fast they move, or what kinds 
of circle they describe. Smee there are countless different configurations which God rmght have mstltuted here, 
expenence alone must teach us which configurations he actually selected m preference to the rest.303 
Although it is matter and motion that are dealt with in the above quote, the effect of God's 
omnipotence also affects relational principles as well, as Descartes notes in the Meditations. 
Descartes needn't have made this explicit though, as it is a direct and clear result of God's 
continual re-creation of the world in time that principles of transformation are possible at all. 
Thus, on the one hand, God will be understood as the primary cause from within a particular 
causal milieu. But, on the other hand, he will be understood as the cause of the precise nature 
of causality, and thus of every factor which has causal relevance; not just as to their motion but 
as to their nature, i.e. to their potentiality for motion. 
301
"God imparted various motions to the parts of matter when he first created them, and now he preserves 
all this matter in the same way, and by the same process by which he onginally created it." Descartes, 
Principles 2.36: CSM I 240: AT VIIIA 62 Although this quote refers in particular to motion, the arguments 
can be (and in fact are) extended to all aspects of created things. 
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Though it 1s strictly impossible for the Cartesian intellect to form an image of God304, given 
that the finite imagination is not equal to the task of reproducing infinite being, Descartes 
considers the understanding as being capable of recognising certain eternal truths pertaining to 
God's essence. Any Cartesian axiom is, by its nature, a product of the understanding rather 
than the imagination, and this is true a fortiori for any axiom pertaining to God. Thus, although 
'God', being a pronoun, suggests a particular umfied being of a certain nature - an imagined or 
imaginable being - any statements pertaining to this sense of God could not be axiomatic. 
The most basic axiom pertaining to God is a statement of his necessary existence. However, 
'existence' is an empty concept; not because it serves no purpose, but rather because it does 
not provide any information that is specific to the being that has had its existence 
demonstrated (on the other hand, as will be discussed further, specific information is required 
in the first place, in order to demonstrate its existence). 'Existence', as used by Descartes, is 
devoid of representational content. From the Scholastics he inherits a purely binary concept, 
the purpose of which is to name the difference between a possible or actual beIDg. What is 
common to both a possible and an actual being is its essence. The essence is in the truest 
sense that which the being is. It is in terms of the essence that a being may have possible 
existence or actual existence, but in each case remain the same being. Thus, the axiom 
pertaining to God's existence can on its own provide no information whatsoever that might 
pertain to God as such; i.e. to God's essence or any information at all pertaining directly to 
302 Descartes, Principles 1.21: CSM I 200: AT VIIIA 13 
303 Descartes, Principles 3.46: CSM I 256: AT VIIIA 100-101 
304 
"[T]he infinite, qua infinite, can in no way be grasped. But it can still be understood, msofar as we can 
clearly and distinctly understand that something is such that no limitations can be found in it, and this 
amounts to understanding clearly that it is infmite. Now I make a distinction here between the indefinite 
and the infinite. I apply the term 'infinite', in the strict sense, only to that in which no limits of any kmd 
can be found; and in this sense God alone is infmite." Descartes, Fzrst Set of Replies: CSM II 81: AT VII 
112-13 
And 
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God. In comparison, God is the first efficient cause of everything does endow God with a specific 
characteristic, i.e. that of bemg the first efficient cause. However, for Descartes, the 
characterisation of God as efficient cause is a negative one; i.e. he is onfy to be considered in 
terms of efficient causality. The characterisation of God as first efficient cause 1s given as a 
limit constructed to mitigate the effects of the finitude of human knowledge - in parttcular, the 
rampant speculation born from the consideration of final causalit:y3°5. The context in which 
Descartes makes this reduction is one in which the relationship between human and God is 
automatically characterised causally accordmg to Aquinas' five ways. Aquinas' five ways 
function according to the four Aristotelian causes; two according to the efficient cause and one 
each for the material, formal and final causes. As a result of their bemg generated accordmg to 
an idea of quadripartite causality, these proofs arguably demonstrated more than simple 
existence. Each demonstration shows God in a particular light; as being in a particular 
relationship with causality and with humanity. Given the prevailing philosophical/ theological 
thinking m Descartes' time, it might be expected that Descartes would understand the 
characterisation of God in terms of causality as philosophically neutral. Indeed, from this 
perspective he was reducing, purifying the role of God in his system by reducing the material, 
formal and, in particular, final causes. It need not have been obvious to Descartes that God as 
cause could be considered as a supplement to God as existing. 
Upon consideration of the relationship between Nothing comes from nothing and God is the first 
efficient cause of everything, 1t becomes clear that, rather than merely being divided analogously, 
they develop their particular Cartes1an-systeffilc meanings in tandem. Nothing comes from nothing, 
understood superficially, that is, ahistorically, suggests the necessity of a foundational entity. 
"[S]ince we are finite, it would be absurd for us to determine anything concerning the infinite; for this 
would be an attempt to limit it and grasp it." Descartes, Principles 1.26: CSM I 201: AT VIDA 14 
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God is the first efficient cause ef everything supplies the empty structure of Nothing comes from nothing 
with a determinate structure. It refines and focuses the axiom that serves as its counterpart, 
reducing the scope of its potential meaning and thereby simplifying the actualisation of the 
remainder. Nothing comes from nothing on its own is too wide in scope - it broadly suggests that 
'things' are responsible for the generation of 'things', and that if no-thing is responsible, then 
no-thing is generated; whereas God is the first efficient cause ef everything lends a particular tone to 
that basic structure. The axiom pertaining to God gains weight by the simplicity of its partner 
axiom, whilst reducing that simplicity and thus renderin~ the pair more useful for the task of 
system building. One axiom renders causality as necessary, while the other axiom determines 
the meaning of 'cause' according to one historical kind (efficient cause) and sets a first or 
primary cause (God). The setting of a primary cause appears to avoid the 'problem' of infinite 
regress of causes, which could be considered a problem for two related reasons. Firstly, such a 
causal structure is incompatible with Christian theology and is thus inappropriate for reasons 
that may be considered non-philosophical. Secondly, given that Descartes had inherited the 
notion that knowledge from the cause is greater than knowledge from the effect, and given the 
slippage between his concept of knowledge and his concept of beillg, it would have been at 
least very difficult for him to consider the lllfinite regress of causes as anything but a problem. 
It would have meant that adequate knowledge was effectively unattainable; and thus that the 
Cartesian method was unfeasible, given its emphasis on the relationship between indubitability 
and certainty. 
The specific nature of the characterisation of God in terms of efficient causality derives from 
both the reduction of historical Aristotelian causality, the interplay of this characterisation with 
other Cartesian axioms, and the acceptance of the divine revelation of Scripture as a higher 
305 See again Descartes, CSM I 202: AT VIIIA 15-16 
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form of knowledge than that given by the natural light. As such, if a proposition stands as an 
axiom, it does not strictly do so according to the Cartesian method. It may mdeed display 
'clarity' in the Cartesian sense, i.e. that its denial produces bewilderment, but only where it has 
been taken as axiomatic in a sense prior to the institution of methodological doubt. That is, its 
denial may produce the requisite bewilderment only if it is understood as coming from a 
source more fundamental than the natural light. This is in fact Descartes' understanding, and 
the source in question is, of course, the book of Genesis. The derivation of certain axioms 
from Scripture is not surprising; in fact Descartes is very clear about the pre-eminence of 
Scripture in cases where it conflicts with the natural light. However, there is a further 
problem. As it is Scripture and subsequent theology that establishes God as having particular 
charactenstlcs, and it is in terms of these characteristics that indubitability becomes certainty 
via the concept of the natural light, it is not entirely clear what such a conflict might consist of. 
Considering that revelation as manifested originally in Scripture is the source of certainty for 
both, it seems that pre-eminence of one over the other can only consist in its being in closer 
proximity to the source. If this is the case then the implication seems to be that the knowledge 
characterised by the 'feeling' engendered by the application of the method, the feeling of 
'certainty', is in fact somewhat less certain than the results of the direct interpretation of 
Scripture, for the reason perhaps that it suggests more interpretive steps between the source 
and the knowledge. In any case, whatever the reason, three results appear. Firstly, the natural 
light (and the interaction of products of the natural light) is not the sole source of axiomatic 
propositions and second, the natural light is the less certain of the two sources and thus, 
thirdly, the certainty manifested by the natural light is not absolute. In this way the suspicion is 
further strengthened, that the natural light ought more accurately to be understood as the 
mechanism within the Cartesian system by which 'self-evidence' or 'common sense' is 
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authorised as a particular manifestation of faith. This is a very broad criticism. However, the 
same basic problem can be followed right down to the level of the phenomena. For example, 
the sources of the bewilderment that is reached through negation might be several. As the 
state of bewilderment itself is one in which positive clarity 1s lost (whereas a negative clarity is 
gained, i.e. a 'failure to proceed') it is not obvious that each manifestation of such 
bewilderment has its source in factual indubitability. Although factual indubitability may be 
interpreted as one of these sources (and thus, if the rest of the argument holds, certainty one 
of the outcomes), it is by no means necessary that in any particular case indubitability is 
actually the source in question. This fact, considered together with the demonstration of the 
existence of God according to the natural light, and the function of God within the system at 
large (to be elucidated in the next section of this chapter) suggests the role of the natural light 
to be at most something of a legitimator of fundamental doxa, 'common sense', or 'self-
evidence'. The factual inability of enacted thought to negate the space of negation is thus an 
exception rather than an exemplar. The natural light can be seen to lend from the 
indubitability and certainty concepts (as discovered in the attempt to negate thought) little 
more than an air of the legitimacy that it ostensibly provides, serving to cloud the distinction, 
drawn by Descartes himself, between doxa and knowledge, between preconceived ideas and 
truth. 
Even if it is allowed that the Cartesian method does produce some axioms that are necessarily 
true, other problems arise. These become most clear upon consideration of the demonstration 
of the accuracy of extensive space according to the intersection of the benevolence and 
omnipotence of God306• One need not attend specifically to the demonstrated accuracy of 
306 The division of perceived content into imagination (extensive projection) and understanding (everything 
else) appears rather ad hoe. However, it helps Descartes greatly, as it means that any perceived material 
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extensive extended space, as opposed to the demonstrated truth of any axiomatic proposition, 
as each relies upon this intersection of benevolence and omnipotence. However, although all 
axioms are ultimately grounded in God's benevolence by way of the natural light, the case of 
extensive space is clearer, as there is no intermediary. That is, extensive space is rendered 
certainly accurate according to God's benevolence and omnipotence directly. According to 
Descartes' theoretical construction of thought, the imagination itself cannot produce anything 
to parallel the axiomatic propositions of the understanding. While the understanding may 
intuit true propositions, the imagmation obtains no eqwvalent certainty on its own. 
Nevertheless, the function of the imagination, the projection of extensive space, is determined as 
certain by the understanding. Descartes understands the function, or rather the faculty itself, 
to be a direct creation of God, whereas the content of each faculty is formed by the complex 
interactions between such creations. Thus, although Descartes attributes error within any 
faculty of thought to human thought's extension beyond its natural limits, he considers that an 
inaccuracy of the farm of that faculty would suggest either a flaw in one of God's creations or 
else a limit to God's benevolence. He thus reasons that, given God's moral perfection and 
omnipotence, the basic form of any faculty must accurately represent that which, if anything, it 
ostensibly represents. In order to render such an argument as axiomatic, the understanding 
ought first to determine the certain existence of a God with particular properties. This must 
be a God that stands in the kind of relation to extension that renders extension formally 
certain as described. However, in the first instance, only the existence of God is demonstrated. 
Descartes argues that God must exist because a perfect being, bemg perfect, must at least 
other than that relating drrectly to extension is potentially ax10matisable. This is why specific concepts of 
causality, among other impure relational concepts, are able to be determined as eternal truths. 
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possess the perfection of existence. 307 Disregarding the absurdity of this argument (which 
would be more properly, albeit uselessly, constructed conditionally as: if there 1s a perfect being 
then it must exist), which has been demonstrated too many times already, and allowing that 
God thus described exists, it still remains that simple eXIstence cannot stand God in any 
particular relation to any other thing. In order to connect the pure existence of God (which is, 
strictly speaking, empty) to any other concept or systemic element, this pure existence must be 
gwen at least some minimal qualities or properties. In order to prove God's existence certain 
properties were already assumed. For example, God was taken from the outset as a perfect 
being. From the assumption of God's perfection, Descartes secures the 'necessary' existence 
of a perfect being by reflecting on his own imperfections.308 This is essentially a modified 
argument from the cause, whereby 1t is understood that there must be at least as much reality 
in the cause as the effect - a standard argument upholding church dogma then and now. 
Secondly he makes the argument, if God is taken as perfect, then he must, a fortiori be taken to 
exist. 309 If one accepts that these arguments demonstrate God's eXIstence, one must also 
accept God's perfection. 'Perfection' is a quality that rmght be said to apply, msofar as the 
demonstration is considered successful, to God insofar as he exists, and thus may be capable 
307 
"[I]f we attentively examine whether existence belongs to a supremely powerful being, and what sort of 
existence it is, we shall be able to perceive clearly and distinctly the following facts. First, possible 
existence, at the very least, belongs to such a being, just as it belongs to all the other things of which we 
have a distinct idea, even to those which are put together through a fiction of the intellect. Next, when we 
attend to tlle immense power of this being, we shall be unable to think of its existence as possible without 
also recognising that it can exist by its own power; and we shall infer from this that this being does really 
exist and has existed from eternity, since it is quite evident by the natural light that what can exist by its 
own power always exists. So we shall come to understand tllat necessary existence is contained in the idea 
of a supremely powerful being, not by any fiction of the intellect, but because it belongs to the true and 
immutable nature of such a being that it exists." Descartes, First Set of Replies: CSM II 85: AT VII 119 
308 
"[R]eflecting upon the fact that I was doubtmg and that consequently my being was not wholly perfect 
(for I saw clearly that it is a greater perfection t know than t doubt), I decided to inquire into the source of 
my ability to think of something more perfect than I was; and I realised very qmckly that this had to come 
from some nature that was in fact more perfect." Descartes, Discourse on the Method: CSM I 128: AT VI 
33-34 
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of serving as a bridging concept between God and other things or ideas. However, perfection 
is also a somewhat empty concept. It refers to a superlative state, but to no particular 
superlative. It refers to the superlative state as such. In order to connect God with any 
content of the imagmation, at least one superlative element will need to be drawn more clearly. 
One of the major axes upon which superlatives are applied to God is morality. This ought not 
to be surprising, as perfection itself implies gradations of value (i.e. as opposed to gradations of 
size, colour, place, etc.). The fact that God's perfection is considered absolute must render 
certain contextual 'perfections' as less relevant to a consideration of God; i.e. bemg perfectly 
suited to a particular role within a particular context. Omrupotence is a perfection of course, 
but God's omnipotence can in no way provide an argument for or against any of God's 
propensities to action; rather it is an lndication of the potential amplitude of such an act. 
Further, God's perfection cannot be cast in terms of certain acts as, being limited, these can 
only ever be seen as at most only the particular manifestations of divine power. Rather, it is by 
moral virtue, by its being negatively and positively absolute simultaneously, that God can be 
shown to have absolute power, yet simultaneously to tend towards particular outcomes. It is, 
for example, his absolute veracity (and thus abhorrence of mendacity), that brings certainty to 
the extensive projection. It would, according to Descartes, result in a contradiction if one was 
to doubt the accuracy of the form of the imaginative projection.310 Any particular mode of 
309 Descartes also makes the same argument a little differently: that it can be seen by the natural light that 
God's essence contains his existence. However, given the circularity of such a reference to the natural 
hght, I consider this to be the weaker of the arguments. 
310
"The first attribute of God that comes under consideration here is that he is supremely truthful and the 
giver of all light. So it is a complete contradiction to suppose that he might deceive us or be, in the strict 
and positive sense, the cause of the errors to which we know by expenence that we are prone." Descartes, 
Principles 1.29: CSM I 203 AIBIA 16 
"God would deserve to be called a deceiver if the faculty which he gave us was so distorted that it mistook 
the false for the true even when we were using it properly." Descartes, Principles 1.30: CSM I 203 ATillA 
16 
"This substance [the substance that excites the senses such as to form images in the imagination] is either a 
body, that is, a corporeal nature, in which case it will contain formally everythmg which is to be found 
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that projection (i.e. any particular entity found in the world or imagined) can readily be 
doubted; understood as products of the limit of human capacities or of the overextension of 
the will. However, the form of the projection itself (extension) can be attributed only to that 
which created the faculty of imagination as such (i.e. God). In light of his assumption that the 
creator God must be perfectly benevolent and thus perfectly truthful, for Descartes any 
inaccuracy in the form of the projection of the imagination is unthinkable, and thus, not the 
case (note that in this case the matter at hand is rendered certain not by its conformity with the 
phenomena, but by its conformity with the structure that is assumed to authorise particular 
phenomena as a herald of certamty). As the concept of perfection employed (outside of those 
aspects relating to potentiality to act, i.e. omnipotence, omniscience, etc.) relates primarily to 
the perfect manifestation of virtue (i.e. in opposition to vice) there is no room within it for 
deviant perfections. For example, although the idea of something being eminently 
mendacious is structurally identical to the idea of something being eminently veracious, only 
one half of this antinomial pair is appropriately termed a perfection. Although perfection and 
errunence are of course synonymous in the Christian dogmatic sense, thus rendering an 
eminent vice automatically contradictory, in the rarefied air of methodological doubt such 
objectively in the ideas; or else it is God, or some creature more noble than a body, in which case it will 
contam eminently whatever is to be found in the ideas. But since God is not a deceiver, it is quite clear that 
he does not transmit the ideas to me either directly from himself, or indirectly, via some creature which 
contains the objective reality of the ideas not formally but only eminently. For God has given me no 
faculty at all for recognising any such source for these ideas; on the contrary, he has given me a great 
propensity to believe that they are produced by corporeal things." Descartes, Sixth Meditation: CSM II 55: 
ATVII79 
"[W]e have sensory awareness of , or rather as a result of sensory stimulation we have a clear and distinct 
perception of, some kind of matter, which is extended in length, breadth and depth, and has various 
differently shaped and variously moving parts which give rise to our various sensations of colours, smells, 
pain and so on. And if God himself were immediately producmg in our mmd the idea of such extended 
matter, or even if he were causing the idea to be produced by soothing which lacked extension, shape and 
motion, there would be no way of avoiding the conclus10n that he should be regarded as a deceiver. For we 
have a clear understanding of this matter as something that is quite different from God and from ourselves 
or our mind; and we appear to see clearly that the idea of it comes to us from things located outside 
ourselves, which it wholly resembles. And we have already noted that it is quite inconsistent with the 
nature of God that he should be regarded as a deceiver." Descartes, Principles 2.1: CSM I: AT VIIIA 40 
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'impurities', or rather, preconceived ideas might be expected to require a demonstration of 
their authenticity in the same manner as other such preconceptions. 'Perfection', as it stands 
within the demonstration of the accuracy of extension, is 'moral perfection', and this moral 
perfection refers of course to a particular historical moral structure. Such a structure must 
count as among the 'preconceived ideas' to be reassessed according to the method. However, 
it is not assessed in any fashion. Thus, as this structure is simply inserted into the space 
created by the demonstratlon of the existence of God, its particulars remain entirely 
contingent. The necessity of the axes according to which moral gradations (whereby God 
might be said to be eminently x or eminently y) are given cannot be shown simply by the 
existence of a 'perfect' being. Rather they ought to be shown to be formally necessary for 
much the same reason as that extension must be demonstrated both as existing and as the 
correct form of bodily substance; or more accurately, as the particular histoncal thought-
structure mserted into the Cartesian system also ought to have been demonstrated in its 
necessity. The axes upon which moral gradations (benevolence/ malice, veracity/ mendacity, 
etc.) function ought to have been verified as to their formal necessity according to the method 
and thus according to the test of the natural light if they were to be utilised in the formation of 
basic prmciples. However, given that it is by these very moral axes that the natural light is 
authorised as the local focus for faith in God, their verification according to the method would 
be profoundly circular; perhaps one of the few forms of vicious circularity that might pass 
through the method and yet remain vicious. Descartes could not, and does not, attempt such 
a venfication, as it would highlight the centrality of preconceived ideas within his system; not 
as potential error or material for verification, but as foundatlon. The natural light, and any 
principles preserved under the natural light, rely for their status qua certainty on the formal 
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necessity of particular axes of morality; in precisely the same manner as does the 
demonstration of the accuracy of the extensive projection. 
The particular array of virtues attributed to God that form the structure within which certain 
aspects of the world are guaranteed as accurate, is thus formed according to the intersection of 
the concept of perfection and a particular historical moral schema. The demonstration of 
God's existence is also given in terms of the concept of perfection, but in this case 'perfection' 
does not appear at first to be structured ill this same manner - according to this moral 
structure. Rather, God's existence is demonstrated according to his, for want of a better term, 
'metaphysical' perfection. The differences between these two forms of perfection are 
significant according to their effect yet minor according to their cause. 'Moral perfection' 
might be understood as the complete attainment, or rather, the attainment to an infinite 
degree, of the complete range of positively valued elements within a given moral framework. 
This particular historical moral framework, structuring Descartes' integration of God into the 
system as the genesis of certalnty, consists of a collection of interrelated dyads, with each dyad 
composed of an antinomial pair. Each pair is extended opposed, along an infinitely graduated 
span, toward infinity in both directions, with the infinite value found in each direction 
corresponding to the infinite magnitude of the element of the dyad with which it 1s aligned. 
Thus the notions of infinite benevolence and infinite malice might be understood as occupying 
the two poles of a single dyad. Each dyad derives from a particular human virtue/vice. The 
complete moral framework can be said to represent the 'values' of humans in two senses. It is 
a framework according to which human beings value and also a framework according to which 
human beings are valued. God is assigned moral perfection in both senses, that is, as judge 
and judged, but it is only the second sense that is relevant to Descartes' system; where he is 
240 
considered as holding mfinite positive value accordmg to a finite human framework. It is in 
this form that God's perfection is relevant to the demonstration of the accuracy of the 
extensive projection or the natural light. On the other hand, 'metaphysical perfection' does 
not ostensibly derive its meaning according to a structure of value that is human in both senses 
(i.e. though it refers to a structure by which humans value, it need not refer to a structure by 
which humans are valued). It roughly refers to the complete possession of all positively valued 
attributes or qualities, msofar as these are not limlted by other imperfect attributes or qualities, 
taken as a whole. So whereas a rock or tree, for example, cannot be virtuous, it can exist, or be 
brown, or be extensive, or be impervious (relatively). Of course, being said to be brown or 
extensive is not appropriate for God, due to the limitation implied, but being said to be 
impervious or existent appears to create no such problem. In any case, in order for something 
to be brown, extensive, or impervious, it seems that it must exist. Thus the 'necessity' of 
existence may appear to endow it with a positive value. However, 'existence' is a concept the 
history of which is tied to the history of a particular problem. Namely, 'existence' is that 
concept that preserves a foundational role for God in the post-Aristotelian structure of 
coming-to-be that is characterised by the triad essence/poss1bility/actuahty311 • Within this 
structure, existence is that which God adds to the possible essence such that it is actual. It 
(existence) provides a name for the difference between possible and actual essences, and 
preserves a role for God in the coming-to-be of otherwise self-sustaining actualisations. 
However, there 1s not a prima facie need for this sort of concept in Descartes. After all, hasn't 
he done away with the categories, and the formal and final causes? Indeed, there ought no 
longer be a need for the categorial explanation of the being of objects ill the world, as their 
explanation is now given according to the Cartesian physics. Nevertheless, there are several 
311 For a detailed account of the historical emergence of the concept of 'existence' see Gilson, Being and 
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powerful reasons why tlus existence concept does not simply disappear with the destruction of 
Scholastic/ Aristotelian physics. Firstly, and this will be detailed in the following section, the 
four causes are not reduced to the effiaent cause, except in the case of local motion. Although 
the movement or change of worldly objects is understood solely ill terms of efficient causality, 
the structure of the world and the relationship between world and God is still understood ill 
terms of all four causes. Secondly, from the outset Descartes is responding to real or imagined 
'non-believers'; i.e. those who do not believe God to exist. Tbis dialogue itself moves 
Descartes to interpret God in the manner of an essence (the ontological argument relies upon 
this interpretation). Tbirdly, the existence-concept is required for the integration of 
phenomena and system, as described in detail earlier. In the same manner, the graftmg of an 
historical moral structure onto the foundation of the system, interpreted as phenomenally 
grounded, is made possible through the mediation of a concept that tends to determine 
relatively continuous phenomena in a determinate manner favourable to that historical 
structure. Thus the existence-concept facilitates the transformation of doxa into a transcendent 
value structure. Fourthly, the concept of the efficient cause had developed since Aristotle such 
that the version contemporary with Descartes' writing (and still today perhaps) was intimately 
tied to the structure of coming-to-be of the Scholastics. In particular, the notion of what is a 
proper subject for causal interactions had to change given that the notion of what is a proper 
subject for interactions per se had changed. That is, from the Aristotelian position, where an 
entity is only understood as an efficient cause insofar as it is actual rather than potential, the 
Scholastic version of the same position is that only an actual, as opposed to possible, entity can 
be an efficient cause. This is a direct result of the transformation of the continuity of the 
Aristotelian actuality/potentiality concept into the strict duality of 'actual' and 'potential' 
Some Philosophers. 
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essences, divided by 'existence'. Thus, the existence concept is required in order for 
fundamental Cartesian systemic processes to function. Given the idea of contemporary 
efficient causality as the notion of a cause operating between existent entities, the fundamental 
utility of the existence-concept for Descartes consists ill the fact that it can enable a given 
entity to be integrated into the efficient-causal milieu. This is the prunary structural reason to 
interpret God in terms of existence. 'Existence' allows God to be integrated with causality 
generally; and without this integration, God could not be the 'first efficient cause of 
everything'. However, 'existence' is not a concept that admits of gradations, rendering 1t 
strictly incompatible with the notion of eminence. It is a concept that divides the possible 
from the actual, according to a specific historical schema, incompatible with any notion of 
measurement beyond the binary existent/ non-existent. Ideas that admit of gradations are 
ideas of quantity and as such are understood in terms of measurement. 'Eminence' is precisely 
the projection of supremely large measure of a positively valued, graduated idea. Descartes' 
use of eIDillence betrays a particular moral system (which is not hidden in any case); first, 
formally, as the concepts mvolved are of such and such a kind, and second, because these 
concepts are usually dual, of which only one pole is considered a perfection. The concept of 
existence is irrevocably tied to the sentiment that God must have a place withm the structure 
of coming-to-be. It is a concept the principle technical role of which is to provide God with a 
job. Considered thus, God is first and foremost the difference between possible and actual. 
Of course God was understood in other ways, but considering only the problem of coming-to-
be, and ignoring the question of God's will for the moment, this is the systemic role of God 
for Descartes' Scholastic contemporaries. In light of this, the consideration of God in terms 
of existence/non-existence starts to appear somewhat shambolic. It is perhaps this shambolic, 
'bewildering' appearance that lends power to another of Descartes' 'eternal truths', that God's 
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essence includes his existence. In any case, 1t is at least clear than in fact, if not in principle, the 
Cartesian axioms bear little connection to the method. The significance of the method, from 
the perspective of the system brought to actuality through axiomatic mteraction, is as a post hoe 
justification. The axioms are 'self-evident' in the same sense as Euclid's axioms, as they 
represent the genesis of system insofar as the system is able to represent its own origin. They 
are significantly less valuable than Euclid's axioms m one sense of course, as the interactions 
between the Cartesian axioms are not characterised by the same necessity, and in fact are 
determmed once again by such 'self-evidence'. But they have a different significance for the 
reason that, accurately or not, they are understood to be grounded in some aspect of the hfe-
world that is necessarily a-systemic. Thus, they suggest, qua genesis, the ground of 'self-
evidence' as being one that escapes the theoretical space in which such self-evidence appears. 
4. From God 
The ontological eqwvalent of Cartesian certainty is necessity. That is, Cartesian certainty is the 
subjective correlate to the objective necessity of God. Descartes utihses two proofs for the 
existence of God, i.e. the 'ontological argument' and the argument from eminence. These 
arguments can be wielded from two directions each. In the first place, if God is assumed to 
exist, they can be used, along with other arguments, to demonstrate the possibility of certain 
attributes being predicated of God analogically; that is, approximately. However, assuming 
that God's existence must be demonstrated, as Descartes does, one must begin with the 
assumption that a god must possess those attributes that would be demonstrated by these 
arguments. Descartes clearly assumes that all relevant questions pertaining to the approximate 
conception of God were settled by Aquinas (who integrated the idea of God with an 
Aristotehan cause-structure), as he sees no reason to consider what it might be appropriate to 
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predicate of God in the first place. Thus, at the very least, Descartes' system must be 
understood as being founded in part on particular Christian dogma, and thus being held 
together not only by the faith in the natural light for which he argues, but faith in a particular 
historical interpretation of Scripture. The relationship between human and God, taken from 
the perspective of the human, is mediated by faith in both Scripture and the natural light. God 
1s connected directly, though mfinitesrmally, to method, by human fruth ill the natural light, 
and is aligned with the natural light by faith in God's good will. Thus clear perception is 
structured as a gift from God; the gift of a glimpse of the Real. Being as it is a gift of 
information, the primary relationship to be had with it is one of trust or faith. The trust in the 
direct experience is secured by faith in God as being both supremely powerful and supremely 
good. Thus faith in God is structurally identified with trust in the natural light. Without faith 
in God, the experience of 'clanty' may be as readily interpreted as a form of madness as an 
access to knowledge. Faith renders the negative account of knowledge (i.e. the Cartesian 
account, where knowledge is the remainder once the obscure has been removed) as positive; a 
reduction in obscurity becomes a knowledge of the real. Considered in the abstract, i.e. purely 
m terms of the systemic structure and function of its elements in relation to one another, faith 
in the natural light is, qua knowledge, the pomt of near-direct (mediated by the Real) 
intersection between human and God. However, this intersection says nothing of God's 
broader systemic function. It only indicates the point at which human failure to recognise the 
legitimate effect of God as creator ends. It is still negative and still constrained by the idea of 
concrete human capacities. Nonetheless, God has a concrete positive systemic function. The 
role of God within the Cartesian system is clouded by both the local objects towards which 
fruth is directed (i.e. Scripture and the natural light), and also by the proofs with which his 
existence is demonstrated (the ontological argument and the argument from eminence). Each 
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of these demonstrates a facet of the relationship between human and God in a certain way, but 
rarely in terms of God's direct systemic function. For example, Descartes proves the existence 
of God by way of the argument from eminence. Such a demonstration necessarily provides 
God with attributes of a sort (i.e. every excellence found in every created thing, insofar as each 
such excellence can be rendered free of any defect, and rendered infinite in scope). However, 
the attribution of such qualities to God is necessary to the Cartesian system only as a pathway 
towards the transition from indubitability to certainty. It is a component of the movement 
from the epistemological to the ontological, but does not contribute significantly to the latter. 
On the other hand the 'ontological' argument, whilst seemingly providing God only with 
empty existence, requires for its success that either, maximally, God be taken to have an 
'essence' in fact, or rrunimally, it is appropriate to apply the concept of an essence to God. In 
either case the implication is that, although God may not be deterrrunable (given epistemic 
lunitations), he may nonetheless be determinate. Whilst Descartes allows that God must be 
infinitely different from created things, he nonetheless integrates God into their causal 
structure by minimally allowing that God can be considered in terms of essence/ existence. It 
was shown in this chapter and the previous chapter that Descartes on occasion employs a 
sleight of hand whereby he demonstrates the existence, but not the essence, of a being, only to 
graft an essence of his own choosing onto the root of the empty existent. In like manner 
Descartes gwes God's actual attributes accordmg to ordinary doctrine, having only 
demonstrated his empty existence. Of course, ostensibly at least, these attributes are reduced 
according to the method. This reduction does little in fact to modify God's systemic role, but 
much to further the sleight of hand - restructuring the appearance of the dynamic aspect of 
the inclusion of God as a reduction rather than a positive addition. Taken from the 
perspective of knowledge and the method at least, the affective role of God 1s 'reduced' to his 
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being the first efficient cause of everything. However, the 'faith' that is directed toward God 
via the natural light is not the faith in tlus efficient cause. As doubt removes the telos from 
consideration, it leaves an entire causal field open only to God, forming a vacuum into which 
knowledge might be filtered through doubt. Tlus correlates with the reduction/ expansion 
pattern, considered from the perspective of the relationship between faith and knowledge. 
The idea of God's will grounds the limited human experience of God as efficient cause; the 
difference between these creates the space within which 'world' is projected. Cartesian 
methodological doubt, directed towards certainty, requires faith in precisely the obscurity of 
the infinite/ outside, as the potential yet ontologically prior space into which knowledge is 
projected. Thus the fundamental object of faith is the externality of a teleological structure. 
That there is such a thing as a first efficient cause is assumed from the outset of Descartes' 
project; the assumption taking the form of an axiom of sorts, that the efficient cause must 
have at least as much reality as its effect312• The faith relates rather to the structure of that 
which is taken to be the first efficient cause. Specifically, it is faith in an entity with primary 
efficient causal status that is structured in such a fashion as to be classifiable according to a 
specific historical moral structure. Thus, mirumally this entity must be compatible with the 
notion of 'will'. The faith in God that is systemically relevant is faith in a primary efficient 
cause that is in possession of a will. It is precisely faith in a 'will-structured' infinitely powerful 
being that renders the particular certain. Of course, according to Descartes, there is no human 
capacity that allows for an understanding of God's will. This is why, 1n line with the reduction 
of the method, God is understood only as the first efficient cause of all thmgs. 313 Final 
causality correlates with the idea of God's will, and both are the province of God alone, yet 
312 Which Descartes supposedly derives by way of the natural light. He writes, "Now it is mamfest by the 
natural light that there must be at least as much <reality> in the efficient and total cause as in the effect of 
that cause." Descartes, Meditations, CSM II 28, ATVII 40 
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necessary as objects of faith for structuring of the precise efficient causal matrix in such a 
fasluon as to render certainty possible. 
From the perspective of knowledge, the Cartesian God appears anthropomorphic. 
Considered as an omnipotent, omniscient being, structured according to the notion of 'will', 
the action of God appears as a mere radicalisation of human action. Furthermore, considering 
that the Cartesian God is not only mfinite, but infinitely dijferent, from the created human, the 
spread of his infinite nature is readily interpretable in terms of experience. That is, being that 
God is understood in terms of so many anthropomorphic concepts, yet is nonetheless 
infinitely dijferent (i.e. not just infinitely more powerful, etc.), it is a simple matter to understand 
the relation between human and God as an analogue of the relation between human and 
human, where the common feature is the internal infinitude of experience. This feature, God's 
experience of himself, also characterised as his will, or as the final cause, is removed from 
specific consideration by methodological doubt, as well as by doctrme. However, from the 
perspective of God's action (as opposed to knowledge of God), as required by the Cartesian 
system, God appears somewhat differently. Those attributes of God that are used to argue for 
certain human knowledge are accidental to his primary role as creator. The divme attributes 
are found in a world already created in such a fashion as to allow them to appear. The basic 
functional role of God is not to be 'good', or to have a 'will', but to actualise the world 
precisely as it is. He creates and re-creates the world in precisely such a manner as to allow for 
the connection of cause to effect in the way that it comes to be seen. God brings individually 
static moments of 'world' together in such a manner as to allow the appearance of motion, 
change, causality, and stability of law. Descartes writes: 
313 Descartes, Principles 1.28: CSM I 202: AT VIIIA 15 
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Thus, from the fact that we now exist, it does not follow that we shall exist a moment from now, unless there is 
some cause - the same cause which ongmally produced us - which continually reproduces us, as it were, that is to 
say, which keeps us m existence.314 
From the perspective of being, God is that whtch explains structure as such. The 
anthropomorphic God does not relate to his action qua God, but only to the acquisition of 
knowledge of God. That is, the anthropomorphic God is the static intelligible counterpart to 
the idea of divme creativity. It is a necessary step along the way to the creation of a system in 
whtch the transcendence of God can be recognised in terms of activity rather than attribute. 
The activity of God, that which God adds to the complete Cartesian system, is the integration of 
moments, static though infinite in scope, into an order. 'God', understood purely according to 
activity or function, is required in order to integrate the ideas of succession and mteraction. 
Without the maintenance of precisely this world, faith would have no telos as its object. Faith is 
maintamed from the lived world towards a 'beyond' that secures the world precisely as it is. 
Removed from the consideration of the path toward knowledge that this being-structure 
allows, this 'beyond' need no longer be considered along anthropomorphic lines, but rather 
takes the function of pure temporality. However, 'pure' temporality is beyond the reach of the 
Cartesian system, within which God, even considered as a pure structural-systemic function, 
always retains a mmimal anthropomorphic signature. The Cartesian God is equivalent to the 
structure of time, only insofar as time is considered as the succession of static moments, such 
as to be productive of the experience of duration through causally linked movement. The 
concept of 'God' 1!l the Cartesian system 1s at base an expression of the transcendence of pure 
temporality. The ineffable nature of God's will, from the perspective of knowledge, correlates 
directly, from the perspective of being, with the meffability of 'succession' and 'order', and 
314 Descartes, Principles 1.21: CSM I 200: AT VIIIA 13 
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thus with the original Aristotelian problem situation, ill wluch actuality and potentiality were 
created to render the contmuity of time and the discrete manifestations found therein 
compossible. 
5. Conclusion 
Cartesian Philosophia Prima is actualised ostensibly through the interaction between axioms and 
by the subsequent interaction between these axioms and the propositions that are produced 
from them. The system is actualised once it has achieved its ontological foundation; that is, 
when the systemic function of God has been described. Thus the actualisation of the 
Cartesian system can also be understood as the actualisation of Cartesian priority. It is only 
when the systemic role of God has been determined that that the system as such can attain 
stability. This is not only for the reason that Descartes holds that knowledge from the cause is 
greater than knowledge from the effect, but also because of its more significant metaphysical 
correlate. The fundamental sense of systemic priority is found in the precise function of God. 
This is because God, considered only as a Cartesian systemic function, is reducible to the idea 
of systemic necessity and sufficiency. The actualisation of the Cartesian system (considered 
broadly) is precisely the actualisation of a space in which method can function, and in which an 
axiomatic actualisation of system can illterface with being as such. The potential for this 
actualisation consists of the originally ururuxed state of the axioms or common notions. A 
latent appreciation of the potential inherent in a particular collection of unmixed simple 
notions must form the basis of any attempt to create an axiomatics. This is an assumption 
shared by Cartesian and Euclidian axiomatics. It is primarily ill terms of his axiomatlsation of 
metaphysics that Descartes can be seen as attempting to mathematicise philosophy. However, 
the propositions ostensibly deriving from the interactions between the Cartesian axioms do 
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not attain the apparent necessity of the geometrical propositions deriving from Euclidian 
axioms. Etienne Gilson correctly notes: 
The evidence of mathematics depends on both their complete abstract generahty and the speofic nature of their 
object Because of its complete generahty, the mathematical method can be mfirutely generalised, but, 1f we want 
1t to yield evidence, 1t cannot be mdiscrlffilnately extended to all possible objects.315 
The successful axiomatisation of geometry is largely the result of quantity itself being an idea 
amenable to abstraction. In any case, the 'mathematicismg' of philosophy is not, whether in 
terms of a renegotiation of concepts, or the construction of evident relations between axioms 
and propositions, of primary structural importance to the Cartesian system. In terms of 
priority and the Cartesian systemic structure, the fundamental difference between Cartesian 
and Euclidian axioms lies in the source of their 'self-evidence'. For Euclid, the foundation for 
the axioms consists in their self-evidence. For Descartes, the functioning of self-evidence 
itself must be rendered evident. Thus, from the perspective of the Cartesian axiomatics, the 
function of the method is to provide an external ground for this 'self-evidence'. Further, this 
'external ground', understood as the method in total, is itself grounded ostensibly m a concrete 
act of thought. However, the connections between the concrete act and method in total, and 
between the Cartesian method and the axiomatics, are constituted by a sleight of hand. The 
connection between act and method is made by passing off a historical theory about thought 
as identical with the concrete act. The connection between method and axiomatics is formed 
by ignoring the genetic differences between different moments of 'bewilderment', interpreting 
all in terms of the genesis most favourable, i.e. in terms of the bewilderment encountered as a 
result of the thought attempting to doubt itself. Further, the actualisation of the system as 
such is founded on a similar sleight of hand. Upon demonstrating (whether adequately or not) 
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the necessity of a god of some kmd, Descartes switches this somewhat open notion of a 
'creator', for a complex concept born out of the interaction between scripture, doctrine and 
post-Aristotelian philosophy. The resultant formation is a large-scale systemic structure 
formed broadly according to the structure of the God-human relationship set out in Thomas 
Aquinas' five ways. In spite of this, Descartes modifies the God-human relationship ID two 
fundamental ways. Llke that of Aquinas, the Cartesian system sets up an ostensibly necessary 
relationship between God and human such that, if one is assumed to exist, then the other must 
exist as well. However, in 'enacted thought' Descartes fmds an extra-systemic source of 
necessary existence. This fundamentally modifies the structure of the God-human 
relationship, as it redefines several of the axes of their connection, such that they no longer 
correspond to relations between two determinate concepts, but are rather structured in terms 
of their being subjects and objects of thought. The relationship is rendered three-
dimensionally, so to speak - whereas the God-human relationship according to the five ways 
sketched out the structural interactions between two present entities, the Cartesian system 
requires that the structure is 'inhabited', such as the signs of the interactions are rendered in 
terms of concrete phenomenal data. Where, for example, 'faith' is no longer merely a concept 
of connection of a certain kind, but is rather identified with a precise thought-act. As a result, 
the mechanisms proper to introspection and those proper to conceptual analysis are (perhaps 
awkwardly) integrated; most obviously through the systemisation of extra-systemic 'enacted 
thought'. 'Enacted thought' does not survive this inclusion except as the idea of phenomenally 
derived certainty. It doesn't remain as an element of the system except as the very idea of 
extra-systemic foundation. Further, the phenomenal foundation is quickly rendered as 
necessarily one of faith. This faith integrates a local conceptual-phenomenal element (i.e. the 
315 Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience pg. 144. 
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natural light) with being at large. Faith in the natural light is structurally identified with faith in 
God. However, those aspects of God by which faith extends knowledge into being are not 
identical to God's overall systemic function. The concrete object of faith is always an 
outgrowth of doctrine, characterised by an array of first-level anthropomorphic concepts, 
distinguished from anthropos as such only by their eminence, infinitude or perfection. 
However, the concept of God always retains, in similar fashion to the foundational 
phenomena, the attribute of externality. Faith in God manifests 'internally' (both with respect 
to the system and with respect to thought), but precisely as the idea of an a-systemic cause 
(where the notion of 'system' is expanded to include 'world' in its totality). The function of 
God considered purely in terms of his systemic transcendence, i.e. no longer m terms of the 
passage from appearance to knowledge but purely in terms of lus function, 1s no longer 
anthropomorphic except in the broadest possible sense. Reduced entirely to his creative 
function within the Cartesian system, the idea of the transcendence of God is equivalent to the 
idea of the transcendence of time. Though he failed to give it serious attention, 'time' is 
fundamental to Descartes' system, whether through necessary inclusion of enacted thought, or 
through the artifice of the narrator in the Meditations, or through the necessary yet derided 
function of memory. A-systemic foundation is the fundamental Cartesian a priori concept. It 
manifests in two ways: from knowledge, the transcendence of enacted thought; from being, 
the transcendence of time, nominally determined as God. 
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Chapter 6 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing chapters should be understood as an attempt to consider the transformation of 
fundamental knowledge from a variety of perspectives. Each of these perspectives ought to be 
understood as coalescing around a single object, determined as such analogically. The analogy 
m question began to develop in chapter two, through Aristotle's analogical demonstration of 
the utility of the concepts of actuality and potentiality. Aristotle's use of analogy as the sole 
form of 'definition' for these concepts leaves them structurally open to extension. Further, the 
form of extension required for the application of the concepts of actuality and potentiality to 
transformations in knowledge had precedent in Aristotle's thought. In the Protrepticus Aristotle 
had applied the concepts of actuality and potentiality to the status of the being of the 'knower' 
of knowledge. By the time of the Metap&Jsics he had extended the actuality-potentiality 
concepts such that they could be applied to the status of knowledge as such. However, a given 
form of knowledge could never be taken by Aristotle as the subject of a transformation, as 
'knowledge' does not qualify for inclusion under his categories. This constitutes a significant 
difference between Aristotelian thought, and the use made of Aristotle's thought in this thesis. 
However, this difference ought not to be overstated. Aristotle does describe 'knowers', 
'teachers' and 'learners' in terms of their relationship with the knowledge held, transmitted, or 
learned. This knowledge is not absolute, but rather of some particular kind such as the 
example Aristotle gives of 'house-building'. As such, although it is outside of Aristotle's 
purview, there are grounds for considering a particular 'epistemic X' as the possible subject of a 
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transformation. In considering a form of knowledge as a possible subject for transformation 
the concepts of actuality and potentiality were extended, in chapter two, from applying to the 
status of a generalised idea of knowledge, considered solely in terms of its modification of 
knowers and potential knowers, to the status of the knowledge itself that might be passed 
between knowers and potential knowers. In considering an epistemic 'something' as being 
subject to transformation, and theonsed under the concepts of actuality and potentiality, this 
'something' is thus brought into the greater structure of active and passive causes. Still, in 
order to be integrated thus, a form of knowledge would need to be understood as unified in 
some way. Aristotle's consideration of knowledge in terms of actuality and potentiality, in the 
development of his analogical demonstration of these concepts, shows knowledge to function 
in a sense incompatible with 1ts being taken in terms of a categorial uruty. Functioning as a 
difference under the category of ousza, knowledge cannot itself be considered either a genus or 
a species. 
For this reason, chapter three was dedicated to a consideration of pros hen structure as one 
sense in which a knowledge-structure, and in particular the knowledge of being qua being, 
might be understood as constituting a non-specific or -generic unity. With his several uses of 
pros hen Aristotle demonstrates both a non-genenc form of unity and a basic outline of a theory 
of the structure of particular knowledge. Furthermore, this structure can be interpreted such 
as to integrate a structure of knowledge into the larger world of beings and their interactions. 
In chapter three pros hen structured knowledge was characterised as something that both 
changes, and is changed, by beings. Aristotle's analogical demonstration of pros hen structure 
was expanded upon to show that, within Aristotle's thought, there was a latent theoretical 
structure applicable to the creatl.on of an account of the integration of the notion of a 
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transformation of a structure of knowledge into the greater causal manifold. As Aristotle 
extends his application of pros hen structure to the subject matter of 'being', the properties of 
pros hen structure more generally can be considered to apply to the study of this particular 
subject matter. The relationship between a pros hen structured subject matter and its objects 
was shown in chapter three to be fundamentally co-constitutive. That is, the subject matter 
and its objects were shown to be subject to modification according to the structure of the 
interrogation of objects suggested by the pros hen organisation of a subject matter. As such, the 
study of being qua being, and the awareness of 'being' that organises this study was seen to be 
integrated into the greater causal narrative as both cause and effect - organised according to 
the broadest range of causal interactions and also serving to organise causal interactions; it can 
affect and be affected. A pros hen structure is named according to its subject matter ('health', 
'medical' and 'being' are Aristotle's primary examples). One of the purposes of this thesis has 
been to show that transformations in such subject matter can be imagined according the 
concepts of actuality and potentiality. In extending the pros hen structure to the subject matter 
of 'being', Aristotle also extends to 'being' its inclusion, as a subject matter, into the wider 
causal structure. This is by way of the very structure of prose hen, whereby the subject matter 
both determines, and is determined, by, its particular instances. Aristotle thus provides the 
foundation for the extension of transformations in being to transformations efbeing as such. 
In chapter four, the Cartesian method was approached as a first-person representation of the 
transformation a structure analogous to that suggested by the pros hen organisation of a 
structure of knowledge. An attempt was made in this chapter to take Descartes' use of liVlllg, 
enacted thought senously as a source of systemic foundation. This attempt was structured 
according to the Cartesian theory of judgement, which provides the fundamental structure of 
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his method. The integration of a 'subjective' mode into the transformation of a structure of 
knowledge is mdeed significant, but does not preclude this transformation from being 
considered according to a different mode. That is, although the first-person mode mtroduced 
by Descartes tends to restrict focus to the proximate 'subjective' elements of certainty, 
indubitability and faith, these elements can also be considered according to their role within the 
greater structure of Cartesian metaphysics, abstracted from this first-person mode. Considered 
in terms of this greater structure, the operation of the Cartesian method was considered as a 
transformation rather than exclusively ill terms of the attainment of a goal. The telos of the 
method may be 'certainty', but this need not mean that the attainment of these telos exhausts 
the Cartesian method's mearung or function. Similarly, the failure to attain this goal need not 
render the Cartesian methodological project a total failure. The Cartesian method shares with 
pros hen structure the feature of, when pushed to display its function more clearly, containing 
evidence of its own integration into the greater causal milieu. This integration has significant 
meaning for the studies through which these theoretical structures are themselves created, as in 
each of these cases (in the pros hen orgarusation of the study of bemg qua being and the 
Cartesian reorganisation of metaphysics by way of the method), the study that is undertaken 
must be considered a component of its own object. The integration of both pros hen structure 
and Cartesian method into the greater causal flow results in the creation of recursive structures 
right at the foundation of the theoretical systems they support. 
Descartes describes a transformation from one structure of fundamental knowledge to 
another. In order to offset the contingency that such a transformation would lend to 
fundamental knowledge, he attempts to anchor the specific transformation he undertakes to an 
aspect of psychic life. In so doing he introduces living, temporally engaged thought to the 
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study of metaphysics. However, he takes account of this 'enacted' thought only to justtfy the 
installation of a historical-theoretical thought-structure at the centre of his method. The 'self-
evidence' of the existence of thought is transferred uncritically to his theory about thought, 
such that this theory becomes the internal structuring principle of his metaphysics, and a 
narrative descnbmg the origin of the self-evidence of his axioms. 'Enacted' thought, in spite 
of 1ts being in fact external to the developed Cartesian system, remains within the system as the 
idea of its phenomenal foundation. This is partly rendered possible by the kind of phenomena 
that he considers and the manner of his consideration. In taking a kind of 'bewilderment', a 
concrete inability to proceed with thmking, as the source of certainty, he provides a 
phenomenal space onto which a range of notions can be projected. This is because, differing 
from the 'rock and sand' analogy according to which it is considered, the 'inability to proceed' 
with thinking does not itself provide any knowledge of the source of the obstruction. There is 
no equivalent to the 'rock', but rather a generalised breakdown in the entire structure of the 
attempt to think. As a result of this generalised breakdown, described above as 
'bewilderment', a space is opened up, a 'gap in thinking' into which a variety of propositions 
might be placed. It can be difficult to counter such projections precisely because, in thinking 
through the narrative of their origin, thought becomes 'bewildered'. Setting aside his stated 
aim of the attainment of certainty, Descartes' project might be understood as an account of the 
transformatton of a total conceptual apparatus. The use of the phenomena is one element 
among many contributing to the greater causal context in which this transformation takes 
place. Other elements include Christian doctrine, the theoretical determination of thought, the 
potentiality for deformation of the concepts brought under the method, and of course the 
greater causal manifold within which thinking operates in fact. This greater causal manifold is 
approached by Descartes in terms of the relation between human and God. However, 
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considered at a further level of abstraction (that is from above the 'view of God'), the concept 
of God can be seen to coincide, on the level of pure 'function', with a notion of time in which 
temporally discrete moments inhere. As such, a return to a problem-situation more directly 
analogous to that out of which actuality-potentiality developed can be seen. The basic 
structure of Descartes' final ontology is such that a transcendent, continuous temporality 
stands in contrast to the discrete moments of time that form the basis of the structure of 
causality. In Aristotle's writing, in particular in the P&Jsics as noted in chapter two above, the 
problem-situation within which he wrote was such that the continuity of temporal being 
became an issue for the determination of discrete entitles as such and such an entity. Aristotle 
dealt with this by allowing that any determination is contingent upon the greater collection of 
passive and active powers within which such a determination takes place. He thus extended 
the sense of what a being is from its pure static determination back towards its causes and also 
continuing forward toward its effects. This extension was described according to the 
conceptual apparatus of actuality-potentiality. Descartes' system exhibits a similar structure. 
However, rather than applying to entities in their particularity, the fundamental ontological 
structure of Descartes' system relates to the transformation of 'world' as such, the a supporting 
structure for the transformation of individual entitles, which on their own are no longer central 
to ontological considerations for the reason that they are to be theorised according to 
mathematical science. The Aristotelian concepts of actuality and potentiality thus find 
analogous structures in the Cartesian metaphysics both at the level of method and of ontology. 
On the level of method, the transformation of one knowledge structure to another is directly 
analogous to the transformations described by Aristotle ill the P&Jsics and Metap&Jsics. On the 
level of ontology, Descartes' total system resolves to a structure in which the problem-situation 
out of which the concepts of actuality and potentiality developed is recreated on a grand scale. 
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For Aristotle the problem of change grew from consideration of a change from not-x to x. 
Descartes defers consideration of change in the physical world to mathematical science. 
However, the result is that problem is reasserted at a higher level of abstraction, becoming a 
problem relating to the persistence of a world in time. The Cartesian metaphysical system is 
thus, rather than a solution, a total restatement of the problem situation for which Aristotle 
developed the concepts of actuality and potentiality. 
Aristotle utilises pros hen structure to demonstrate the possibility of a uni£ed form of study, the 
study of prote philosophia in particular, the unity of which is non-generic. However, the use of 
this structure has the further effect of opening up the possibility for the integration of a form 
of knowledge into the greater causal milieu; allowmg it to both affect and be affected as both 
an agent and a patient of change. In characterising the study of being qua being, or first 
philosophy, as structured pros hen, Aristotle incorporates first philosophy into the total causal 
situation, opening up the structural possibility of a transformation of the totality of study the 
of being qua being, from its subject matter through to its objects. Further, first philosophy, 
structured pros hen, becomes an object of its own subject matter; introducing a recursive 
ambiguity at its foundation, modifying the possibility of its transformation such that it might 
be understood as the possibility for spontaneous change. Such a possibility is in part what 
Descartes seeks to close off with his method. The method is, from this perspective, an 
attempt to take control of the transformation of first philosophy such that it might be 
transformed comctfy, such that it could no longer be subject to such change. He finds the 
principle of correct transformation in the relationship between a concrete inability to doubt 
and the concept of 'certainty'. However, Descartes leaves the movement between 
indubitability and certainty, between experience and concept as fundamentally ambiguous. 
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Further, as the remainder of the system, including its ontological foundation, is drawn from 
this ambiguous relationship, the Cartesian metaphysical structure remains as recursive as 
Aristotelian prote phzlosophia. He reduces and refines the contingency of first philosophy, but it 
is not excised. Rather 1t is reconfigured such that, rather than the entire systemic structure 
being imbued with a generalised ambiguity, this ambiguity is focussed at the point of a 
founding creative act. The structures of prote philosophia and prima philosophia, taken together, 
demonstrate the possibility for creative reordering inherent in the project of first philosophy 
considered broadly. This possibility extends from the specific attributes of the Cartesian and 
Aristotelian systems, met with today by their influence upon diverse streams of thought, but 
also more fundamentally from the more generally recursive structure of any totalisillg system. 
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